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The objective of this study was to investigate what agency compensation models are available 
for search engine advertising (SEA) in the Finnish market and explain the rationale and 
selection process for why certain models are being used. This is deemed highly important and 
current as SEA is now globally estimated to be the most popular form of digital marketing 
available for firms of all sizes, and these functions are suggested to be often outsourced to 
advertising agencies due to their high complexity. This study uses and tests agency theory as 
a theoretical lens to examine how the interests of an advertising client and its agency can be 
aligned to motivate the agency to work in the client’s best interest. Agency theory was 
deemed a particularly useful framework to examine SEA compensation models as it has been 
often used for the similar objective of examining what compensation schemes are most 
suitable for various contexts and helping predict how various models affect managerial 
behaviour. 
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The empirical research was conducted as a multiple case study. The primary, qualitative data 
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Finnish market. The study is primarily deductive whereby a theoretical model is developed by 
combining both agency theory and related theoretical extensions. The model is then 
retrospectively tested in the empirical setting to evaluate its ability to predict and explain 
compensation model selection decisions for the SEA context. 
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reduced as the relationship progressed. This is due to the theories inability to explain the 
changes in feature evaluation over time or encompass the meaning of trust in the agency-client 
relationship. 
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Tavoitteet 
Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää, minkälaisia palkkiomalleja hakukone-, digi-, ja 
media toimistoilla on Suomen markkinoilla saatavilla hakusanamainontaa varten sekä selvittää 
miksi ja kuinka tietty palkkiomalli valitaan. Tämä on erittäin tärkeää ja ajankohtaista, koska 
hakukonemainonnan arvioidaan olevan tällä hetkellä maailmanlaajuisesti suosituin 
digitaalisen markkinoinnin muoto kaiken kokoisille yrityksille ja koska hakukonemainonta 
usein ulkoistetaan monimutkaisuutensa vuoksi. Tämä tutkimus käyttää ja testaa agenttiteoriaa 
teoreettisena näkökulmana selvittämään, kuinka mainostavan asiakkaan ja sen käyttämän 
toimiston intressit voidaan yhdenmukaistaa, jotta toimisto on motivoitunut toimimaan 
asiakkaansa eduksi. Agenttiteoriaa pidettiin hyödyllisenä viitekehyksenä tutkimaan 
hakukonemainonnan palkkiomalleja, koska sitä on usein käytetty vastaavanlaiseen 
tavoitteeseen eli selvittämään, mitkä palkkiomallit ovat soveliaimpia erilaisiin olosuhteisiin 
sekä ennustamaan, kuinka mallit vaikuttavat johtamiskäyttäytymiseen. 
 
Metodologia 
Tutkimuksen empiirinen osuus toteutettiin monitapaustutkimuksena. Primääri, laadullinen 
tutkimusaineisto kerättiin haastattelemalla palkkiomalleihin vaikuttavia henkilöitä 
kahdeksassa eri Suomen markkinoilla toimivissa hakukone-, digi-, ja mediatoimistoissa. 
Tutkimus on pääsääntöisesti deduktiivnen eli siinä rakennetaan teoreettinen malli 
hakukonemainonnan palkkiomallien määräytymisestä yhdistelemällä agenttiteoriaa sekä sen 
laajennuksia. Teoreettista mallia testataan empiirisessä kontekstissa arvioimaan, kuinka hyvin 
se pystyy ennustamaan sekä selittämään palkkiomallien valikoitumista hakukonemainonnassa. 
 
Keskeisimmät löydökset 
Tulokset paljastivat seitsemän eri palkkiomallin olevan käytössä Suomen markkinoilla ja että 
yksi niistä, “uusi komissio”, on kirjallisuudelle kokonaan uusi. Löydökset osoittivat, ettei 
mitään näistä  palkkiomalleista  pidetty erinomaisena, vaan että jokaisen kohdalla oli tehtävä 
kompromissejä eri toivottavien ominaisuuksien tärkeyden suhteen. Jokaisen toivottavan 
ominaisuuden tärkeysarvioon vaikuttaa suuri määrä kontekstuaalisia tekijöitä sekä 
asiakassuhteen alussa että sen edetessä. Agenttiteorian todettiin olevan hyvä ennustamaan 
palkkiomalleja asiakassuhteen alussa, mutta sen ennustus- ja selityskyky heikkenevät 
asiakassuhteen edetessä. Tämän todettiin johtuvan agenttitoerian kykenemättömyyydestä 
selittämään eri ominaisuuksien tärkeyden muuttumista asiakassuhteen aikana tai käsittämään 
luottamuksen merkitystä asiakassuhteessa. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Advertising agencies are means for firms of all sizes and business models to be able to 
outsource their online and offline marketing activities in order to tap into professional 
expertise and potential time and cost savings (Smith & Chaffey, 2005). As the volume and 
complexity of available online and offline advertising media increases (Horsky, 2006), the 
need for hiring specialized service providers for consulting, creating and managing digital 
content and advertising campaigns on behalf of clients is forecasted to increase (Eleveld, 
2012). Reports suggest that the expected growth trend in agencies is picking up (Johnson, 
2014). This is already reflected in advanced markets such as the U.S. where agency 
employment is at a record high since the dot-com-bubble and increasingly shifting from 
traditional into digital media activities at a rate of 12% annually (ibid). 
 
Search engine advertising (SEA), also referred to as keyword advertising, pay-per-click 
advertising and paid search, is the paid digital marketing activity of attracting traffic to 
websites via Internet search engines. Since its rise in the late 1990’s, search engine 
advertising has been argued to have had a dramatic impact on modern advertising for firms of 
all sizes. The revolutionizing measurability and tracking quality brought by SEA and digital 
advertising has enabled marketers to quantifiably examine the efficiency and effectiveness of 
their objectives through various tracking technologies and web analytics measurement 
systems (Grensing-Pophal, 2014). SEA is now globally estimated to be the most popular 
form of digital marketing available; constituting approximately half of all online advertising 
expenditure of firms of all sizes (Abou Nabout et al., 2014). Paid search advertising currently 
forms the largest part (36%) of Finnish advertiser’s digital advertising spend (TNS Gallup, 
2014). As firms and their management are continually pushed for growth, increased 
efficiencies and results, even under current recessionary economic circumstances 
(Talouselämä, 2014), it is increasingly important to examine and understand the factors 
which lead to the selection of a particular search engine advertising agency compensation 
scheme designed to maximize advertising efficiency and effectiveness. Research in the area 
of search engine advertising as well as related compensation models is still in its infancy and 
has only recently begun to reach the level argued to be appropriate for this increasingly 
significant advertising channel (About Nabout et al., 2012).  
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Agency theory is a stream of literature that examines how a relationship is managed between 
a client and an agent who is contracted to perform a particular service on the client’s behalf. 
Contracting an agency to carry out an advertising activity involves a firm finding a reliable 
agency business partner and those parties reaching a satisfactory agreement which ensures 
that the goals and interests of particularly the commissioning party, the client, are met. 
Agency theory is poised towards addressing the risk of opportunistic behaviour by agents 
under conditions of asymmetric information by aligning the interests of the principal and the 
agent through contractual arrangements (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
 
1.2 Research Problem and Gap 
According to agency theory, the interest tensions between an advertising client (the principal) 
and an advertising agent (the agent) toiling under circumstances of uncertainty and risk can 
be aligned through contractual arrangements. These arrangements range from compensating 
the agent for advertising outcomes (outcome-based contracts) or advertising activity 
behaviours (behaviour-based contracts). The focus of agency theory is on identifying the 
most efficient contractual model for governing the principal-agent relationship. Applying an 
agency theory perspective to studying search engine advertising agency contracts can be 
deemed appropriate as it meets several of the critical circumstances described by Eisenhardt 
(1989a:71):  
1) Substantial goal conflict exists between the parties providing incentive for 
opportunistic behaviour. This is clearly present as the advertising client wants 
maximum advertising results with minimum expenditure yet the agency’s short-term 
utility is maximized by the highest possible agency fee payment accompanied with 
minimum effort and campaign production costs.  
2) Outcome uncertainty is high in search engine advertising, which is influenced by, 
among other things, continuously changing advertising features, competitors and 
overall auction intensity. These make advertising outcomes subject to a considerable 
amount of risk and uncertainty. 
3) Verifying the agent’s behaviour is difficult as search engine advertising involves 
combining a multitude of account optimization procedures that combine both manual 
and automated techniques. The commissioning client may or may not have access to 
the advertising platform itself to verify that any advertising activities have been 
carried out.  
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Though agency theory has been applied to advertising through numerous conceptual and 
empirical studies for several decades (see e.g. Spake et al. 1999; Ellis & Johnsson 1993; 
Bergen, Dutta & Walker, 1992; Abou Nabout et al., 2012), no academic studies currently 
exist on what contractual models are available and commonly used, specifically for search 
engine advertising services in the Finnish market nor the international market for that matter. 
This is of particular interest not only due to the importance of SEA to businesses of all sizes, 
but also due to the recent emergence of more sophisticated tracking technologies and 
analytical systems. These could be the answer to numerous scholars’ calls for increased 
measurability, as the key to making compensation models based on advertising outcomes, as 
opposed to carried out advertising actions, increasingly more efficient (Spake et al. 1999; 
Ellis & Johnsson 1993; Swain, 2004). Recent research has not kept up with what possible 
shifts may have happened in the market and little is known of what types of contractual 
models are currently in use and why. This study therefore attempts to address this specific 
question and shed light on what kinds of contractual models are currently in use and explain 
why. This is of particular analytical interest as there have long been calls for advertising 
agencies to adapt their compensation models for providing clients with increased efficiencies 
(Swain, 2004). Strong calls have also been made for tying compensation closer to results yet 
the proliferation of outcome-based compensation models into the market place has, at least 
based on extant research, been found to have been unexpectedly slow. This has been deemed 
surprising considering the drastic improvements digital marketing has afforded to measuring 
marketing effectiveness compared to traditional advertising (Yoon & Kim, 2001). The early 
studies of Zhao (2005) argued that though performance-based compensation models were 
showing slow signs of increased use, these were still not well understood by neither clients 
nor agencies and that they have received insufficient attention from the academic community.  
It is therefore still largely unclear, what factors, if any, might be impeding the adoption of 
more outcome-based compensation models considering the particularly measurable nature of 
search engine advertising. Furthermore, it is unclear how relevant these theories might be 
since the explanatory power of agency tehory in understanding SEA compensation models 
has not been adequately explored. 
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1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
The objective of this study is to describe what kinds of compensation models are available for 
SEA advertising clients in the Finnish market. The study also aims to explain why these 
models are being used as well as how they are determined for individual clients. In alignment 
with the goals of earlier scholars applying agency theory to examining advertising agency 
contractual agreements, the goal of this study is to ‘provide advertisers and their agencies 
with a menu of managerial implications for advertising agency contract negotiation’ (Ellis & 
Johnson, 1993:79). The aim of this study is therefore to provide clients and their agencies 
with valuable guidelines on the specific contexts in which certain types of compensation 
models may be preferable to others. Moreover, this thesis sheds light on understanding what 
factors, if any might still be impeding the wider adoption of advertising agency contracts that 
focus on outcomes as opposed to actions – a question argued to still be largely unexplained 
by extant, increasingly dated, research (Zhao, 2005; Davies & Prince, 2010). Moreover, this 
study notably answers these questions through primary data gathered from the agency side as 
opposed to the client side. Assuming the agency perspective is done in order to derive both 
principals and agents fresh insight from a completely new perspective since all extant agency 
theory studies on advertising compensation models have been conducted with data gathered 
only from the client side (see Spake et al. 1999; Davies & Prince 2010; Davies & Prince 
2011). 
 
Research Objectives 
● Describe a typology of SEA compensation schemes and the circumstances for when 
one scheme may be preferable to another.  
● Explain how and why certain compensation models are currently being selected for 
SEA in the Finnish market. 
● Investigate whether and why performance-based compensation models are being used 
for SEA services in the Finnish market. 
● Evaluate how well agency theory helps predict compensation model selection for 
SEA services. 
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Research Questions 
1. What compensation models are used for SEA services and why?  
2. How are compensation models selected for SEA services? 
3. Why (or why not) are performance-based compensation models used for SEA 
services?  
4. How well does agency theory predict compensation model selections for SEA 
agency-client relationships? 
 
1.4 Limitations  
This research contributes towards improved understanding of search engine advertising 
agency compensation model determinants and the contract negotiation processes. Due to the 
chosen qualitative nature of the study, the thesis does not, nor does it even attempt to assess 
the relative actual higher or lower efficiencies of a particular contractual scheme. The 
findings therefore do not answer the question of whether one model might be statistically 
bringing clients a higher return on investment compared to another model, or whether clients 
are, on average, more satisfied with one model over another. Moreover, the scope of the 
study is limited to examining search engine advertising as a particular form of advertising.  
As such, the findings cannot be generalized to apply to contracts used for other forms of 
online or offline advertising, though the findings indicate that interlinkages do exist. Finally, 
the empirical part of this study has been conducted within the context of the Finnish market 
and as such the generalizability of the findings are limited to this specific market. 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The study begins with a literature on general agency theory. This if followed by a contextual 
review that describes the research context of search engine advertising, the different types of 
advertising agencies examined as well as the nature of professional business services. The 
later section of the literature review relates the theory more specifically to advertising and  
describes how agency theory as a stream of literature can help us understand advertising 
agency compensation schemes and the nature of the client relationship.  Several extensions 
and criticisms to agency theory are also examined in order to critically identify the short-
comings of the theory as well as demonstrate the complexity of real-life organizational 
circumstances and decision-making processes. The methodology section of the thesis 
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describes and justifies the methodological choices and analytical tools used for the empirical 
section of the study. Validity, reliability as well as ethical considerations are also addressed. 
The findings section contains the empirical findings of the multiple case study, identifying 
and explaining how model selection decisions are driven by a multitude of factors. The 
findings section concludes with an advertising agency compensation scheme determination 
model that summarizes the main findings. The discussion section examines the variables 
found in the empirical model and evaluates how these align or deviate from what agency 
theory would predict thus esting the theory’s explanatory power. The thesis concludes by 
providing broad answers to the research questions proposed in the beginning of the study. 
Key managerial implications are also assessed from the perspective of both advertising 
clients and agencies. The study concludes with a examnations of its limitations and 
suggestions for future research directions.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Agency Theory 
The following section describes agency theory constructs on a general level. After a brief 
contextual review, the middle section of the literature review then delves into discussing how 
agency theory helps us understand the particular context of advertising agency-client 
relationships. The last part of the literature review discusses criticisms of agency theory and 
how the theory can stand to benefit from being complemented by additional theoretical 
streams. 
 
2.1.1 Agency Theory Overview 
The original founding scholars of agency theory are usually regarded to be Arrow (1971), 
Ross (1973) and Spence and Zeckhauser (1971 referred to in Kivistö, 2007) who originally 
defined the nature of the principal-agent relationship and examined available relationship 
governance mechanisms. Agency theory involves examining the relationship between at least 
two parties where one (the principal) assigns a task to another party (the agent) to be 
performed on its behalf. The nature of the task is such that it involves delegating at least some 
degree of decision making over to the agent (Ross, 1973; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Agents are not only used for delegating labour but they are also a means for the principal to 
be able to access the specialized expertise held by the agent (Zhao, 2005). Maintaining 
several assumptions, the value of agency theory lies in both predicting what contractual 
model will be chosen to govern the business relationship as well as helping predict how 
various models may affect managerial behaviour (Arrow, 1985; Hendry, 2002). Agency 
theory has long been applied to the study of multiple disciplines such as finance (Fama, 
1980), accounting (Lambert, 2001), organizational behaviour (Eisenhardt 1985) as well as 
marketing and sales (Bergen et al., 1992).   
 
One of the most influential scholars in agency theory has been Eisenhardt who developed 
empirically testable hypotheses for managerial and organizational literature to address 
principal agent problems (1985; 1988). Eisenhardt’s later works also made significant 
contributions by developing the agency theory subset variables that help predict how  
changes in the operational context affect efficient contract determination (1989a). 
Consequently, this study first discusses some of basic variables and assumptions of agency 
theory and then later delves deeper into Eisenhardt’s subset variables together with the works 
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of scholars who have applied the elements to the particular context of advertising agency 
client relationships. The below Table 1 summarizes the key agency theory concepts and 
assumptions, which are elaborated on in the upcoming sections. 
 
 Agency Theory Overview (adapted from Eisenhardt 1989) Table 1
Key idea Principal-agent relationship should reflect efficient organization of information and risk bearing costs i.e. minimize 
agency costs. 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent. 
Human assumptions Motivated by self-interest; will engage in opportunistic behaviour 
Bounded rationality: Parties act rationally but within the limits of time, cognitive ability and information availability. 
Risk aversion 
Organizational 
assumptions 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Partial goal conflict between parties 
Information 
assumptions 
Information is incomplete (information assymmetry between parties) 
Information is a purchasable commodity 
Contracting 
problems 
Moral hazard (agency shirks on its responsibilities) 
Adverse selection (agency may intentionally or unintentionally misrepresent its cabilities to perform the work) 
Risk sharing in uncertain environment 
Problem domain Principal and agent have differing goals and risk preferences 
 
The focus of agency theory is on identifying the most efficient contract to govern the 
relationship bewteen the two parties. The most efficient contract is considered to be the one 
that produces the highest results at the smallest possible overall agency costs (Eisenhardt, 
1985). Agency costs are the sum of three factors: 1) monitoring costs to the principal from 
verifying the agent’s actions, 2) bonding costs for the agent to ensure the principal is not 
engaging in actions that could harm the principal, and that it will compensate to the client if 
such harm does incur, and 3) residual loss i.e. the losses incurred to the principal if the 
agent’s actions are eventually suboptimal for the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Moreover, agency theory modelling usually assesses what is the most efficient contract from 
the perspective of the principal, as opposed to the agent, or both parties jointly. This is done 
because the overall assumption is that the principal is the dominant party in the relationship 
as it has the option to choose from multiple potential service providers (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
This has indeed been taken as the basis of all extant conceptual empirical agency theory 
applications to advertising agency relationships (see Bergen et al., 1992; Ellis & Johnson, 
1993, Zhao, 2005, Davies & Prince, 2010; Abou Nabout et al. 2012).   
 
Agency theory assumes that there is significant environmental uncertainty and that both 
parties are assumed to be inherently self-serving, and operating under circumstances of 
information asymmetry i.e. a differing level of information and knowledge between the 
parties. A significant amount of information is tacit and typically held only by the agent 
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(Davies & Prince, 2010). The nature of information is assumed to be such that it is a 
commodity, which can be purchased for example at the expense of time (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
As such, agency theory is closely related to transaction cost economics, which focuses on 
examining vertical integration (Beccera & Gupta, 1999) i.e. firm’s outsourcing decisions and 
especially how cost minimization is of pivotal concern. Time expenditure is thus considered 
to be a form of transaction cost, which either occurs before or after a contract is struck 
(Arrow, 1969). Pre-contractual costs include the time expenditure going into gathering 
information, and the cost of negotiating and specifying contractual terms, whereas post 
contractual transaction costs include contract monitoring, enforcement and amendment in the 
case of misalignments (Williamson, 1985). Morever, the principal and agent are also assumed 
to have differing goals and risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1985), which affects their 
preferences on what actions are appropriate. 
 
Agency theory typically categorizes the contracting problems faced by the principal 
depending on whether they are pre-contractual or post-contractual problems i.e. whether they 
occur before or after a contract is reached. These categories were originally named by Arrow 
(1985) and are respectively referred to as the hidden information and the hidden action 
models (Arrow, 1985).  These two models are typically examined in isolation though it is 
acknowledged that they can be addressed simultaneously (Bergen et al., 1992).  
 
2.1.2 The Adverse Selection Problem: The Hidden Information Model  
Considering the prevailing circumstances of infromation asymmetry, the hidden information 
model examines whether or not the agent has the skills and characteristics necessary to 
complete the tasks required by the principal. Moreover it addresses what measures and 
expenses the principal is willing to undergo to establish an agent’s level of ability. The 
hidden information problem, more typically known as adverse selection in financial and 
insurance literature, refers to the problem of the agent potentially misrepresenting its 
intention or ability to act in the principal’s interest in the beginning of the relationship before 
a contract is struck (Bergen et al., 1992; Hendry, 2002). Other agency theory scholars 
acknowledge that this issue may still continue as the relationship progresses (Eisenhardt, 
1989a) indicating that the adverse selection problem may also persist over time. Bergen et al., 
(1992) provide principals three means for reducing information asymmetry: screening, 
signaling and providing opportunities for self selection. These are briefly discussed below. 
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Screening, involves the principal gathering information about prospective agents in order to 
assess their quality. Carrying out screening activities involves the principal assessing the 
trade-off between the costs associated with carrying out screening activities and the costs 
associated with the agent not performing to expected standards. Though screening can be 
expensive it is suggested to be, nevertheless, the best option for reducing the impact of the 
hidden information problem if the potential impact of a bad selection is potentially severe 
(Bergen et al., 1992). Examples of screening in the context of advertising agencies could be 
information gathering through agency websites, interviewing agency executives and 
gathering references.   
 
Signalling, involves an agent engaging in activities that seek to reveal its nature and 
capabilities to the prospecting principal (Bergen et al., 1992). Signaling could for example 
take the form of agents aquiring professional qualification and degrees to demonstrate subject 
matter competence. 
 
Providing opportunities for self-selection, involves the principal presenting prospective 
agents with the option to partake in activities that allow it to signal competence and 
motivation. A decision on the agent’s behalf to not partake or to drop out at an intermediate 
stage would constitute self-selection (Bergen et al., 1992).  An example self selection could 
be a client requesting multiple agencies to riggorously audit and report the advertising 
development opportunities they can identify for the client. 
 
2.1.3 The Moral Hazard Problem: The Hidden Action Model   
The hidden action problem occurs after an agreement has been made. Eisenhardt 
conceptualizes two post contractual problems faced by the principal, referred to as the agency 
problem and the risk sharing problem (Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
 
The agency problem concerns the conflicting goals between the principal and its agent as 
well as the difficulty and expenses for the principle to verify the agents actions (Eisenhardt, 
1989a). The agency problem thus stems from the existence of information asymmetry as well 
as the assumption that people are inherently motivated by self-interest (ibid). The underlying 
tension in the agency client relationship is therefore the assumption that the principal’s utility 
is maximized by the highest possible outcomes (e.g. profits), whereas the utility of the agent 
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is positively related with compensation and negatively related with effort. The agent is thus 
expected to seek maximum compensation at minimum effort (Ross, 1973; Coughlan & Sen, 
1989; Hendry, 2002). For any given contract to be accepted by the agent, its reservation 
utility must be met and it therefore acts as a constraint (Ross, 1973). 
 
The risk sharing problem involves examining differences between the risk attitudes of the 
principal and agent. In an environment where outcomes are subject to uncertainty, one party 
may be inclined to being more risk averse than the other resulting in a disagreement in what 
actions are preferable (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Simplistic agency theory models assume that the 
agent is more risk averse than the principal (ibid). Inside a firm for example, an employee 
tends to prefer job security whereas an entrepreneur is willing to tolerate more risk (Spake et 
al, 1999). Outside the firm, the degree of the agent’s risk aversion depends upon the level of 
competition and the consequent buyer versus supplier negotiation power differential (Ellis & 
Johnsson, 1993). 
 
As the agent is typically more knowledgeable about the assigned task than the principal, this 
creates an opportunity for the agent to behave opportunistically and pursue its own interests 
at the expense of the principal’s (Fama, 1980).  The term moral hazard, typically substituted 
by the term hidden action in the advertising field (Bergen et al., 1992) is used to refer to the 
lack of effort from the side of the agent to pursue its principal's goals (Holmström, 1979). For 
example, this could take the direct form of an agent’s manager consciously shirking on his or 
her responsibilities, or be more subtle in the form of the manager’s personal career 
advancement goals taking time precedence (Hendry, 2002). The hidden action model 
essentially involves aligning the interests of the principal and the agent with a contractual 
agreement that reduced the probability of opportunistic behaviour and incentivizes the agent 
to take actions that maximize the principal’s profits as well as its own compensation (Spake 
et al., 1999; Bergen et al., 1992).  
 
2.1.4 Behaviour-based and Outcome-based Contracts in Agency Theory 
Contractual agreements discussed in the hidden action model generally fall into two 
categories: the behavioural-based or the outcome-based approaches (Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Eisenhardt, 1985; Bergen et al., 1992).  In the behaviour-based approach, information 
asymmetry is reduced between the principal and agent through the use of information 
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systems that monitor the agent’s behaviour and reveal its actions to the principal. This 
verification of the agent’s alleged actions makes the agent less likely to behave 
opportunistically but does not come without monitoring cost (Eisenhardt, 1989a). In the 
outcome based approach, the interests and goals of the principal and agent are sought to be 
aligned through incentivizing and motivating the agent to act in the interest of the principal 
through transferring part of the principal’s risks over to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989a). In this 
model, the compensation is derived from evaluating actualized performance against 
predefined goals. Outcomes are not only affected by the actions taken by the agent but are 
also subject to environmental factors such as competition intensity and technological 
developments. These create risks and uncertainty that either party, or partially both, must bear 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
 
Comparing the two contractual approaches against each other involves evaluating the trade-
offs between the cost of measuring behaviour with cost of risk transfer and the difficulty of 
measuring outcomes in environments with different levels of uncertainty and risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; 1988). The cost of risk risk transfer in an advertising context might mean 
that an agency requires its client to pay a premium fee, if it is required to take-on its client’s 
business risks such as seasonality variations. Eisenhardt argues that the lower the outcome 
uncertainty, the lower the price of transferring risk to the (presumably more) risk averse 
agent. This makes the outcome-based contracts more efficient and attractive for the principal 
under lower risk circumstances i.e. when the premium to be paid for risk transfer is low. 
Outcome-based contracts are therefore preferable to the principal when the cost of 
transferring risk from the principal to the agent is less than the cost of monitoring the agent’s 
behaviour. In contrast, behaviour-based contracts are preferable when the cost of transferring 
risks from the principal to the agent is higher than the cost of monitoring agent behaviour 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a).  
 
Agency theory further addresses the ease of measuring behaviours and outcomes through the 
variables of task programmability and outcome-measurability. Task programmability refers 
to the nature of the task itself as either being static or dynamic (Eisenhardt, 1985) and is 
defined as the ‘degree to which appropriate behaviour by the agent can be specified in 
advance’ (Eisenhardt, 1989a:62). The degree of task programmability affects how difficult 
and costly it is for the principal to set up information systems to monitor the behaviours of 
the agent (Eisenhardt, 1985). Dynamic and undefined tasks are considered more difficult to 
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monitor than simple, structured tasks. Outcome measurability, on the other-hand refers to the 
degree in which outcomes can be easily ascertained once achieved (ibid). Measuring 
monetary golals or sales volumes is for example deemed easier than measuring a more 
abstract concept like brand awarenss (Spake et al., 1999). When outcomes are not easily 
measured this makes outcome-based contracts less attractive and behaviour-based contracts 
become more attractive as they can be more easily determined (Eisenhardt 1989a).  
  
The following Figure 1 summarizes basic agency theory decision making between behaviour-
based and outcome-based compensation models: 
 
Figure 1: Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1985). 
 
2.2 Advertising Agency Business Context 
This section of the thesis appends the literature review with an overview and insights into the 
specific context of the study. The section begins with a review of search engine advertising as 
a rapidly growing form of advertising demonstraiting the significance of the topic. This is 
followed  by a review of advertising agency types as well as the nature of their work to 
demonstrate how they add value to their clients. 
 
2.2.1 Trends in Digital Advertising and Search Engine Advertising 
Global Internet users have grown tremendously from only half a billion users in 2000 to over 
2.4 billion users by 2012 (Internet World Stats, 2013). Digital advertising is taking a foothold 
in all areas of advertising and has been largely acknowledged as a viable advertising channel 
for driving a multitude of purposes: Brand building, direct response, in-store and online sales 
(Flosi, Fulgoni & Vollman, 2013). Studies of online advertising expenditure in Europe show 
that online advertising grew by 14,5% in 2011 while the growth of offline advertising 
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remained low at 0,3%. Part of the growth differential has been attributed to the versatility of 
online advertising formats and the clear measurability offered by paid search advertising, 
which is growing faster than any other form of online advertising at the annual rate of 17,9% 
and amounts to 46,5% of total online advertising (Interactive Advertising Bureaux, 2012).  
 
A search engine is essentially a database of indexed web pages and its function is to offer its 
users a means for finding Web pages on the Internet that are relevant to the search phrase or 
keyword specified by a user. The unique value of using search engines for marketing 
products and services is that they allow businesses to unobtrusively identify and reach 
potential customers precisely when they are looking for the type of product or service their 
firm has to offer (Mamaghani, 2009; Ghose & Yang, 2009). Search engines have been found 
to have a highly dominant role in the online world as more than half of traffic to websites has 
been found to be coming through search engines (Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000). Studies 
reveal that globally, 25% of internet users have bought a product online and 52% report that 
they used a search engine to research before purchasing (TNS, IAB & Google, 2013). Search 
engine marketing has thus been argued to have become the most important form of online 
marketing (Ghose & Yang, 2009) and arguably the most important online channel for 
customer acquisition (Smith & Chaffey, 2005). The search engine market is currently highly 
consolidated: Google appears to be the market leader with approximately 90.59% of global 
searches (Gandour & Regolini, 2011).  Therefore the focus of this thesis is on the search 
engine advertising offered through this particular search engine. 
 
The umbrella term of search engine marketing (SEM) encompasses both the paid or 
inorganic form of search engine advertising (SEA)  and the free or organic form of search 
engine optimization (SEO), which are both activities geared towards attacking relevant traffic 
to a website (Mamaghani, 2009).  SEO refers to activities aimed towards optimizing a 
website and its content for Google’s proprietary software algorithm to perceive the website as 
highly relevant to a particular set of keywords and bring it to the top of the search results for 
improved visibility. Though appearance in the search listings for every individual query is 
free, website content creation does indeed carry significant time and resource implications. 
SEA refers to paid advertising activity whereby advertisers can pay for their ads to appear in 
the search listings. The focal point of this study is SEA owing to its afore described 
inarguable monetary significance. Notably, practitioners often use the term SEM as a 
synonym for SEA. 
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A higher position on the search results page compared to the competition is paramount to 
attracting busy searchers attention. The order in which search listings appear in the free 
search results listings section, located in the middle of the results page, is based on a Google 
proprietary software algorithm that seeks to identify the relevancy of each website to a user’s 
particular query bringing the most relevant to the forefront.  The order in which listings 
appear in the paid advertisements section located both at the top, bottom and right-hand side 
of the search results page, is based on a generalized, second-price auction with sealed bids 
(Edelman, Ostrovsky & Schwarz, 2007). An advertiser therefore submits a maximum bid 
through Google’s advertising platform AdWords to specify what they are willing to pay for a 
click for a particular keyword. The relevancy of an advertisement and website to a particular 
query is also considered through a metric called the quality score, which considers among 
various things landing page relevance to the keyword and click-through-rate (CTR) i.e. how 
often an ad that has previously been showing for a keyword has been clicked on (Google, 
n.d.d). The realized cost per click, as well as the order in which advertisements are ranked on 
the search results page is based on the total resulting weighted figure of the quality score and 
the bids such that the highest weighted figure appears at the top (Google, n.d.a). This is also 
referred to as pay-per-click (PPC) or cost-per-click, (CPC) advertising, which means that an 
advertising expense is only accrued when a user reacts to an advertisement by clicking on it, 
thus making it a highly efficient and unobtrusive form of advertising (Ghose & Yang, 2009). 
Individual bids can vary from as low as a couple cents to beyond $10 per click depending on 
the auction intensity of a particular industry (Mamaghani, 2009; Schwarz, 2007).  
 
AdWords advertising accounts can get incredibly complex with hundreds or even thousands 
of keyword and ad combinations with individual bids to be optimized to provide the best 
possible return on investment, advertisers are suggested to rarely manage their own AdWords 
accounts and prefer to hire dedicated agencies to devise and run campaigns on their behalf 
(Abou Nabout et al., 2012). The availability of tracking technologies  for digital marketing 
and especially PPC advertising meansthat those who engage in it are argued to be put under 
significant pressure to produce results: ‘Be aware that the very nature of e-marketing is that 
you may be expected to demonstrate a clear relationship between investment and return’ 
(Smith & Chaffey, 2005:476). Lastly, it should be noted that though the focal point of this 
study is paid keyword search advertising (SEA) tha AdWords platform also supports broader 
advertising solutions through other ad formats such as video and text and image ads on 
YouTube and websites that partner with Google (Google, n.d.b). 
 21 
 
2.2.2 Agency Organization and Functions 
An advertising agency is a firm that is dedicated to providing planning, creating and 
management services related to advertising and promoting its clients products or services 
(WoonBong, Marshall & Woodside, 2009). Typical functions performed by an advertising 
agency include copywriting (i.e. creating content), design and final advertisement production. 
Advertising agencies may also conduct broader marketing services such as research and 
media planning as well as buying (WoonBong, Marshall & Woodside, 2009).  Table 2 below 
summarizes the types of agencies that provide search engine advertising services and which 
are included in this study. 
 
 Agency Types Table 2
Agency Type Activities scope Historical trend Organization 
Full-service agencies / Media 
agencies 
Strategic market planning & 
research, media mix selection and 
placement, direct market 
promotion, interactive marketing, 
advertisement planning & 
production (search engine 
marketing). *Note: The core 
difference between a media agency 
and a full-service agency is 
typically suggested to be that full-
service agencies also provide 
creative and copywriting such as 
artwork and design. 
Full-service agencies were the 
norm until 1980’s when media 
agencies (also referred to as 
media shops) entered the 
scene to specialize and 
achieve higher economies of 
scale in buying various new 
media at bulk discounts. Set 
the motion for the unbundling 
of advertising tasks between 
agencies. Typical clientele 
include large customers who 
seek a wide range of services 
such as account planning 
services. 
Organized in various 
departments such as account 
services, media and 
(creative*). May have a digital 
department, which can operate 
as integrated with the rest of 
the agency or as a stand-alone 
entity. 
Digital agencies (a.k.a. 
Interactive agencies or new media 
agencies) 
Online media services e.g. web 
design & development, creative 
design, search engine marketing, 
email marketing, affiliate 
marketing, display advertising, 
social media management.  
Emerged as a new type of 
agency when traditional media 
and full-service agencies were 
slow to embrace the 
opportunities of the Internet. 
Rapid growth before 
downsizing after the dot-com 
bubble burst - now back on a 
steady but slower growth 
track. 
Paid search advertising, 
organic search engine 
optimization, display 
advertising and creative copy 
writing functions may often be 
completed by separate teams. 
Search engine agencies (a.k.a. 
SEM agencies) 
Search engine marketing: search 
engine optimization (SEO), search 
engine advertising (SEA) and 
accompanying web analytics. 
Creation of text and image ads, 
website content creation, media 
purchases of pay-per-click 
advertising and display advertising.  
Recently emerged as an 
agency type specialized in 
ROI focused lead generation 
and ecommerce.  As SEM 
agencies grow, their scope 
may vary to take on activities 
that are more often associated 
with digital agencies e.g. 
email marketing. 
SEO and SEA are typically 
maintained in separate teams.  
 
Table adapted based on Davies & Prince, 2011; Horsky, 2009; Mediacom (N.d.); Wray, R. (2010), KWD Digital (n.d.); Wikipedia, N.d.  
 
Because there are various types of advertising agencies performing a varying breadth of 
functions, the blank term ‘agency’ will be used henceforth to refer to any given type of 
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agency that offers search engine advertising services. It should also be noted that due to the 
relatively young age of search engine advertising as a form of advertising, what literature 
typically refers to as an advertising agency is the full-service or media agency type discussed 
below. With the continually rising demand for digital advertising, industry specialists predict 
that the number of agencies providing digital marketing services will double in the upcoming 
years, and stretch across agencies of all sizes, ranging from one person consultancies to large 
digital and media agencies (Eleveld, 2012).  
 
2.2.3 Relationship Marketing in the Professional Services Businesses 
This section discusses the notion of relationship marketing as a context for advertising 
agency professional services. Relationship marketing literature is drawn upon as it has been 
suggested useful for illustrating the nature of the advertising agency-client relationship 
(Halinen, 1997) and to describe how the parties may have varying levels of reletionship 
expectations and where these expectations stem from.  
 
Relationship marketing is defined as the following: 
Marketing from a relational perspective has been defined as the process of identifying and establishing, 
maintaining, and when necessary terminating relationships with customers and other stakeholders, at a 
profit, so that the objectives of all parties involved are met, where this is done by mutual giving and 
fulfillment of promises (Grönroos, 1997:407).  
The relationship marketing approach argues that both firms and clients can be in two types of 
modes. The two modes are the relational or transactional modes, which indicate whether a 
firm or its customers have chosen whether they need, wish or expect to activate the latent 
relationship between the parties. Whether or not a firm chooses to activate the latent 
relationship depends on whether the firm finds it profitable to adopt a relational or a 
transactional business strategy (Grönroos, 1997). If a firm chooses to adopt a relational 
strategy, it is argued to be important for its clients to be in a relational mode as well. 
Marketing in a relationship context is described to be the process whereby perceived value is 
created for the customers over longer periods of time (Gronroos, 1997). A following key 
concept to relationship marketing is that it is not deemed sufficient for a firm to only offer a 
core product or service to its customers but that additional activities and resources are needed 
to satisfy clients’ long-term value needs (ibid).  Gronroos (1997) had developed the following 
equation on customer perceived value, which describes how additional value adding services 
(e.g. prompt, or severely delayed customer service) can either add or detract from a 
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customer’s total perceived value: Customer Perceived Value = Core Value +/- Added Value. 
Moreover, the existence of a long-term relationship offers the client additional value in terms 
of a sense of trust, reduced purchasing risks and a feeling of control (Grönroos, 2004). Value 
is described to be created in an interactive process whereby value is partly co-created by the 
firm and its customers and is inherent in the service production process itself, not just the 
final output (Gröroos, 2004).   
 
Relationship marketing theories reveal the higher or lower importance of the service delivery 
process itself in advertising agency work dependant on weather an agency is pursuing a 
transactional or a relational mode strategy. It also explicates that the value that clients expect 
may or may require the agency to deliver additional value and services beyond the mere 
successful conduction of a SEA advertising campaign itself. Agency theory, rooted in 
economic theory, shows that advertising clients prefer and expect to compensate agencies for 
core value,  measurable outcomes. Including a relationship marketing perspective reveals that 
clients’ perception of total results (i.e. perceived value) is also influenced and embedded in 
the service delivery process itself as added value. Relationship marketing theory therefore 
suggests that both suppliers and buyers of a service (i.e. the advertising client and agency) 
may or may not perceive there to be significant value and financial gain in forming a strong 
and personal business relationship. 
 
2.3 Agency Theory in Advertising 
This section of the thesis discusses agency theory specificly related to advertising and, where 
possible, directly to the defined context of search engine advertising.  
 
Agency theory has been applied to the field of marketing and advertising for well over two 
decades exploring areas such as sales force compensation, channel coordination and control, 
consumer promotions (Bergen et al., 1992) as well as more recently to search engine 
advertising (Abou Nabout et a., 2012). The principal-agent relationship stems from the 
advertising client’s need to collaborate with an agency in order to have an advertising 
activity, performed on its behalf (Spake et al., 1999). The details of the marketing activity are 
typically unclear to the client, but the client is aware that a significant degree of effort is 
needed to formulate and deliver a message through appropriately selected media (Spake et 
al., 1999). The client is also suggested to be aware of the fact that the level of effort applied 
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may not be perfectly related to the actual outcome attained (ibid). A key consideration related 
to advertising agency theory examination is that a part of the decision making delegated to 
the agency involves advising or making choices on selected advertising media as well as the 
advertising budget (Spake et al., 1999). This is of pivotal concern as a higher available budget 
increases the agency’s motivation to exert more effort on the client’s account under all 
compensation schemes except for fees (discussed in more detail in the following section) 
since a higher media budget also increases the agency’s remuneration (Zhao, 2005). 
 
Advertising contracts are argued to be plagued by both the moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems of agency theory (Bergen et al., 1992). The issue of moral hazard is 
argued to be clearly present in the advertising industry where a client may not be fully able to 
monitor its agency’s actions during campaign production while the agency may not be 
putting in the promised amount of effort (Ellis & Johnson, 1993; Bergen et al., 1992).  Also, 
the adverse selection problem is equally maintained to be present as the agency may 
misrepresent its abilities to carry out an advertising campaign (ibid). In advertising terms, the 
existence of moral hazard and adverse selection make outcome-based contracts lucrative for 
the advertising client, whereas the presence of a risky competitive advertising environment 
makes the behaviour-based compensation models a safer and more appealing compensation 
method to the agency. Under competitive market circumstances, the agency will accept an 
outcome-based contract offered by the client when the fear of losing or not gaining a client 
outweighs the risk of accepting an outcome-based contract (Davies & Prince, 2010). 
Agencies are also suggested to be able to accept outcome-based contracts even when the 
premium paid for risk transfer is disproportionate to the risk because agencies are able to 
diversify their client portfolios (Davies & Prince, 2010). 
 
2.3.1 Advertising Agency Compensation Scheme Types 
Advertising agency compensations models have been suggested to have traditionally fallen 
into one of three categories: commission-based, fee-based, and performance based 
(Cantalone & Drury, 1979; Ellis & Johnson, 1993). It is suggested that there are advantages 
and disadvantages to each model, as well as their variants, and it is argued that ‘there is no 
singular compensation approach that fits every individual advertiser–agency relationship - 
any model can work effectively when the parties interests and priorities are aligned’ (ANA & 
AAAA, 2006:n.pag.). Employing a number of contractual models simultaneously as hybrid 
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models has also been found to be increasingly common; case studies found a large agency 
using 38 different compensation models across its portfolio of clients even before the 
suggested increasing trend towards performance-based models began (Beals & Beals, 
2001:4). In spite of the more recent increased interest towards search engine advertising 
service compensation schemes, it is suggested that no optimal model has yet been found for 
the particular context of search engine advertising (Abou Nabout et al., 2012).  
 
The following Table 3 summarizes the compensation model types typically used in general 
advertising agency-client relationships and summarizes how they deal with different elements 
of agency theory. The pros and cons of the models are denoted from the perspective of the 
principal advertising client. 
 
 Agency Compensation Models in Advertising  Table 3
Model Arch Types Model Description Pros Cons 
Commission  
(a.k.a. billing-based 
model) 
Traditional model where commission 
is based on a defined percentage of 
media spend paid on top of 
advertising expenses.  Commission 
traditionally at 15%, but found 
declining (Cantalone & Drury, 1979). 
Incentive for agency to grow 
the client to grow their own fee 
(Spake et al., 1999). 
Encourages media budget overspend 
as opposed to efficient media 
allocation. Agency discounts in 
certain media usage disincentives 
agency making media neutral 
investment proposals (Lace, 2000). 
 
All risk held by advertising client 
(Spake et al., 1999). 
 
Fees  
(a.k.a. cost-based 
method) 
Agency compensated based on hourly 
fee for services provided. Fee contains 
labour costs and a mark-up for agency 
profit. Fee can be either fixed or 
variable based on realized working 
hours delivered (Cantalone & Drury, 
1979). 
Agency incentivized to give 
media neutral advice - no 
budget overspending incentive 
(Lace 2000). 
Agency incentivized to inflate the 
number of required or realized 
working hours (Spake et al, 1999). 
 
Little incentive or reward - no link 
between value created and 
remuneration (Lace, 2000). 
 
 
Performance-based 
(a.k.a. incentive-
based method) 
Compensation based on achievement 
against mutually agreed on results e.g. 
sales, increased market share, brand 
awareness (Ellis & Johnson, 1993). 
Multiple variations exist such as 
performance incentives, which has 
fixed or variable fees accompanied by 
an additional component that adjusts 
up or down based on performance, 
and value-based, where all 
compensation is based on achieved 
results (Crain, 2010).  
Goals alignment is achieved 
through transferring risks. 
(Abou Nabout et al, 2012; 
Weinberg, 1975). 
 
 
Risk of agency focusing on short-
term profitability goals to meet KPIs 
and ignore long-term brand building 
efforts (Abou Nabout et .al, 2012; 
Seggev 1992). 
 
Risk transfer can be expensive and 
as the model requires agency 
reservation utility to be met 
(Weinberg, 1975). 
 
 
 
The below Figure 2 summarizes the different contractual models based on how they have 
been typically categorized along the agency theory behaviour vs. outcome continuum. Most 
notably, in terms of agency theory categorization, the commission scheme has been regarded 
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to have both behaviour-based and outcome-based properties. This is argued to be the case 
because the scheme is based on the act of placing advertisements in various media and 
though it is not immediately linked to outcomes, it is outcomes that will eventually determine 
whether a higher investment is made in the future and whether the client relationship 
continues (Spake et al., 1999). 
 
 
Figure 2: Agency Compensation Models: Behaviour vs. Outcome (Spake et al., 1999) 
 
For the particular context of search engine advertising, the few existing academic studies 
suggest that there are largely two types of performance-based compensation methods. The 
first one is called CPA, cost-per-acquisition, where the agency covers the media budget and 
then receives a fee per each conversion (i.e. a lead or sale) achieved. The challenge with the 
model is suggested to be that there emerges a risk for the generally more risk averse agency 
to in fact underspend on media (bidding too low on search keywords) as its own up-side 
profit potential is capped. Thus the scheme runs the risk of overall limiting the profit potential 
of the principal. The second is called the incentive rate based plan (IRB) which functions 
based on shared profits (Abou Nabout et al., 2012). Notably the fee per conversion model has 
been found to be used in practice in search engine advertising whereas the IRB model for 
search engine advertising based on the ideas of shared profits is a purely theoretical model 
(Abou Nabout et al, 2012). In this plan the agency receives an incentive rate, which is a 
percentage of the clients profits achieved through the advertising activity after advertising 
expenses have been covered. The client advertiser will seek to minimize the incentive rate to 
be as small as possible yet it must be set at a level with which the agency can receive a 
minimum expected profit i.e. satisfies the agent’s minimum utility requirement. Once this 
condition is fulfilled, both parties’ interests will be aligned and the agency’s bidding 
behaviour will then seek to maximize joint profits (Abou Nabout et al, 2012). 
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2.3.2 Changes to Advertising Agency Compensation Schemes 
Advertising agency compensation models have been found to have experienced significant 
changes over the years. Change pressures have resulted from multiple forces including the 
Total Quality Management efficiency revolution of the 1980’s that placed expectations for 
the marketing and sales functions to serve as a source of increased efficiencies for firms. 
Moreover, stable or declining market prices have created a competitive environment where 
the drive for profit growth has required increased sales volumes and the need to produce 
higher results at lower costs (Spake et al., 1999). The long-standing agency compensation 
norm of commissions based on media expenditures began to be questioned with increased 
pressures for models that aided firms in cost cutting, and provided higher equitability and 
accountability (Lace, 2000). The main criticism of commissions is that though it encourages 
an agency to grow client sales (which in turn grow its own fee), there is also an inherent 
incentive for the agency to favour media budget overspending as opposed to focusing on 
allocating the media budget efficiently (Spake et al., 1999). The demise of the commission 
model was furthered by the trend that media agencies began providing value added services 
separate from media expenditures (Lace, 2000).  
 
Several empirical studies found that the advertising agency-client relationship has been 
increasingly plagued with client dissatisfaction over traditional compensation models, placing 
too much focus on activities as opposed to results (Levin, 1990 referred to in Spake et al., 
1999). Calls were made for agencies to ‘work harder to customize their compensation 
structures’ (Selinger, 1995:3) as well as tie compensation to actual results (Swain, 2004). 
Performance-based compensation has even been suggested to pose a means for agency 
competitive advantage in an increasingly competitive environment:  
A focus on significant and measurable results (e.g., sales, improvement in brand preference, qualified 
lead generation, etc.) and a compensation proposal structured on a “you pay for results” basis will get 
more serious attention from most clients’ (Crain, 2010:27).  
 
Performance-based models do not go without criticism as there have long been concerns that 
these could result in both clients and their agencies focusing on easily measurable, short 
terms results at the expense of long-term brand building efforts (Seggev, 1992). Emphasis is 
therefore placed on selecting metrics that have both long-term and short term beneficial 
effects (ibid).  
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The pressures in moving towards more performance-based compensation models have been 
varyingly received at the agency side: Some have been suggested to view it as an opportunity 
to signal accountability and value whereas others feared reduced compensation if stated goals 
could not be met (Gleason, 1996). Early studies in the US by the American Association of 
Advertisers reveal that the changes in compensation schemes indeed posed both an 
opportunity as well as a threat: Some agencies reported experiencing better profit margins 
after the once standard 15% commission scheme was no longer the norm, whereas some 45% 
of agencies merely reported reduced rate commissions (Spake at al., 1999). More recent 
studies suggest that progress has been achieved to some degree as the Association of National 
Advertisers research on US advertisers, that jointly controlled a budget of $250 billion USD, 
found that 61% of agencies had already at least some performance based compensation 
element in their advertising agency compensation schemes showing a remarkable jump from 
only 46% in 2012 and 35% in 2000 (Parekh & Bruell, 2013:1). No comprehensive studies 
have been found on the characteristics or prevalence of various compensation models 
specifically for search engine advertising in the Finnish market or internationally. Thus it is 
still unclear what models are currenlty in use and why certain models might be considered 
most appropriate considering the current level of measurement technology. 
 
2.3.3 Determinants of Advertising Agency Compensation Schemes 
This section discusses how the postcontractual agency theory subset variables and theoretical 
propositions developed by Eisenhardt (1989a) help determine the most efficient contract 
under varying contextual circumstances. The propositions concern the variables of 
monitoring costs, outcome measurability, goal conflict, environmental uncertainty, risk 
aversion,  length of relastionship, and task programmability. The section also draws upon the 
conceptual and empirical studies of the scholars that have built on the works of Eisenhardt 
(1985; 1989a) and adapted these propositions particularly for the context of advertising 
principal-agent relationships. Specific considerations to SEA as a form of advertising are also 
addressed. The below Table 4 summarizes all the propositions and how the higher or lower 
presence of a particular variable is expected to affect the compensation model decision to 
sawy from making either behaviour-based or outcome-based contracts relatively more 
efficient.  
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 Summary of Conditions & Variables Affecting Relative Advertising Agency Table 4
Contract Efficiency and Attractiveness 
Behavior-based Outcome-based Proposition Rationale 
Low Monitoring Costs High A lower/higher degree of monitoring 
costs makes behaviour-
based/outcome-based contracts more 
efficient. 
The lower the costs of monitoring the agent, the more 
relatively efficient it becomes to monitor instead of 
transfer risks to the agent.  
High Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Low A higher/lower degree of 
environmental uncertainty  makes 
behaviour-based/outcome-based 
contracts more efficient. 
The costs of shifting risk to the agency increases 
when environmental uncertainty increases overall risk 
making outcome-based contracts less efficient.  
Low Outcome 
Measurability 
High A lower/higher degree of outcome 
measurability makes behaviour-
based/outcome-based contracts more 
efficient. 
The efficiency of outcomes vs. behavior-based 
methods depends on how easily outcomes can be 
ascertained due to e.g. having various quantitative & 
qualitative campaign goals. Measuring outcomes 
requires establishing accurate metrics.  
Low Effect on 
Outcomes* 
High A lower/higher degree of effect on 
outcomes makes behaviour-
based/outcome-based contracts more 
efficient. 
The easier it is to link agency effort to market results, 
the more efficient outcome based contracts become. 
Low Goal conflict High A lower/higher degree of goal conflict 
makes behaviour-based/outcome-
based contracts more efficient. 
A lower goal conflict reduces the need and costs of 
monitoring agency behavior making behavior-based 
contracts more efficient. 
High Agency 
Risk Aversion 
Low A higher/lower degree of agency risk 
aversion makes behaviour-
based/outcome-based contracts more 
efficient. 
The cost of transferring risk over to the agency 
increases/decreases as the agent becomes more/less 
risk averse and requires a higher/lower premium. 
Low Client 
Risk Aversion 
High A lower/higher degree of client risk 
aversion makes behaviour-
based/outcome-based contracts more 
efficient. 
A more risk averse client will want to shift financial 
risks over to the agency to the extent that it has 
negotiation power. 
Long Relationship 
Length*** 
Short A long/short duration of the client 
relationship makes behaviour-
based/outcome-based contracts more 
efficient. 
Lower goal conflict reduces as the parties engage and 
monitoring costs reduces as information asymmetry 
reduces between parties. 
Short Long A short/long duration of the client 
relationship makes behaviour-
based/outcome-based contracts more 
efficient. 
Uncertainty reduces over time when the agency 
produces results (cheaper to transfer risks) & 
experiential knowledge makes it easier to measure 
agency effect on outcomes. 
High Task 
Programmability** 
Low A higher/lower degree of task 
programmability makes behaviour-
based/outcome-based contracts more 
efficient. 
Cheaper to set up monitoring for a task that can be 
predefined. The less the principal is able to determine 
appropriate behavior in advance, the more attractive it 
becomes to use an outcome based model where 
activities are not defined.  
Table created based on Ellis & Johnson* (1993), Eisenhardt** (1985; 1989a), Spake et al.*** (1999). 
  
Monitoring costs referes to the costs associated with verifying agent behaviours (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The more costly it is to verify behaviours, the less efficient behaviour-based contracts 
become (ibid). Examining monitoring costs is particularly interesting in the context of SEA 
advertising as all core AdWords advertising activities carried out (e.g. adding or subtracking 
keywords, creating ads and adjusting bids) will be recorded in account change history visible 
to anyone with appropriate access to the account (Google, n.d.c). This feature offers a new 
kind of window to monitoring agent behaviour not previously afforded by traditional media.  
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Environmental uncertainty refers to the degree of risk imposed by the operational 
environment (Eisenhardt, 1989). The higher the environmental uncertainty, the more 
expensive it becomes for the principal when the agency demands a higher reward for bearing 
a higher amount of risk (ibid). For advertising, environmental uncertainty could for example 
result from client seasonality, and rapidly changing AdWords auction intensity and that 
neither the principal nor agent can directly affect (Abou Nabout et al., 2012). 
 
Outcome measurability refers to the degree in which outcomes can be easily ascertained 
once achieved (Eisenhardt, 1985). The variable of outcome measurability is examined 
through two linked propositions in advertising. The first proposition developed by Ellis and 
Johnson (1993) argues that outcome-based contracts efficiently increase with the ease of 
determining the outcomes. The second linked proposition similarly argues that outcome-
based contracts become more efficient when the ease of measuring the agency’s effect on 
achieving the outcomes increases (ibid). The second proposition therefore augments the first 
one by not only addressing measurability but by also stating that an agency’s level of effort 
should have a clear connection with the realized results (Ellis & Johnson, 1993). Measuring 
campaign outcomes is argued to be a difficult task in itself when single campaigns may have 
multiple objectives (ibid) such as an SEA campaign possibly serving both performance and 
branding goals. It is maintained that clients that wish to use outcome based compensation 
schemes under circumstances where outcomes are not easily quantified will need to develop 
more specific and quantifiable metrics to employ such compensation methods effectively 
(Ellis & Johnson, 1993).  
 
Spake et al. (1999) tested Ellis & Johnson’s (1993) second proposition on a sample of 349 
advertising clients in the US and found partial support for the two propositions on outcom 
measurability but only under certain conditions. The propositions were supported by the 
findings that outcome-based compensation models were more often associated with business-
to-consumer clients as opposed to business-to-business relationships where determining 
outcomes were more difficult. However, the authors’ finding that the type of outcome-based 
compensation model that more frequently occurred with the examined clients was a 
combination of fees and commissions, as opposed to a fully outcome-based compensation 
model, suggested that imprecision in advertising measurement was an issue that hampered 
the adoption of purely outcome-based compensation models (Spake et al., 1999). Moreover, 
the quantitative study enabled the scholars to not only identify ease of measuring advertising 
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and effect on advertising but also the perceived importance of advertising to the client. The 
authors analysed the correlation of perceived advertising importance and the used 
compensation model and concluded the following on the importance of advertising to the 
client relative to the ease of measuring outcomes: 
[B]ecause measuring advertising effect is neither cheap nor trivial, ease of measurement alone will not 
prompt clients and agencies to move toward outcome-based compensation. Advertisement must also be 
an important part of the marketing mix (Spaket et al, 1999:68).  
 
In SEA advertising terms,  the findings could indicate that the type of advertising client (B2B 
or B2C), the availability and cost of applying cheap tracking technologies (e.g. Google 
Analytics) as well as the client’s perceived importance of SEA advertising, could also have 
significant implications on the compensation model selected.  
 
Goal conflict refers to the degree of interest deviation between the agent and principal 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). The third proposition by Ellis and Johnson (1993) on advertising agency 
compensation models argues that the higher the degree of goal conflict between the 
advertising agency and client, the more suitable performance-based compensation schemes 
become. This is argued to result from the fact that a lower level of goal alignment makes it 
necessary for the client to transfer risks over to the agency whereas a high level of goal 
alignment reduces monitoring costs (Ellis & Johnson, 1993). Spake et al. (1999) ad to this by 
specifying that this results from the existence of trust between the parties. Morgan & Hunt 
(1994) suggest that congruous values between contractual parties results in higher levels 
commitment and trust. This is however do not supported by Spake et al. (1999)  who found 
no statistical support for this propofition. This is however aknowlegded to potentially result 
from the way the study was constructed whereby it examined the differences between the 
agency and client’s philosophical similarities, values and treatment of customers as opposed 
to goal conflict pertaining to a particular campaign (ibid). As such, this shortcoming leaves 
significant room for evaluating the level of goal conflict between the client and agency’s 
expectations for the planning, execution and measurement of a particular SEA advertising 
campaign, especially if the advertising goal of the campaign is easily quantifiable, such as 
sales through a webshop, as opposed to a more complex advertising goal such as brand 
awareness.  
 
Risk aversion involves loosening the static assumption of the more risk averse agent. If the 
agent becomes less risk averse, outcome-based contracts become preferable as the cost of 
 32 
 
transferring risk decreases. This makes it increasingly attractive for the principal to pass risk 
onto the agent. If however the agent becomes more risk averse, the cost of the principal 
transferring that risk to the agent increases, making behaviour-based contracts more attractive 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a). Accordingly, Ellis and Johnson (1993) propose that the use of 
performance based compensation should increase with the level of client risk aversion. This 
is contended to be the case as risk averse clients will want to transfer as much of the 
uncertainty to the advertising agency as possible. The limit to this is suggested to be the 
negotiating power of the client as well as the agency’s perceived level of risk, that one of 
their competitors would be willing to make the client a similar or better offer (ibid). The 
theory of the generally more risk averse agent in ad agency-client relationships is suggested 
to be the prevailing view of most authors (Zhao, 2005).  Zhao  (2005) accepts this same 
assumption and argues that it is supported by agencies resistance to transitioning towards 
performance-based compensation as well as ad agencies’ profits, revenues and market 
capitalization usually always being less than their clients’, making them more vulnerable in 
relative terms. 
 
The client-side empirical studies of Spake et al. (1999) are limited to only examining the 
degrees of risk aversion experienced by the principal advertiser, leaving the agency side 
unaddressed. The studies partially support the proposition that a higher degree of client risk 
aversion makes outcome-based contracts more probable as it was found that advertisers who 
more often participated in the advertising activities (clients that have the need to monitor their 
agencies more closely is taken as a proxy for higher risk aversion) were more likely to use the 
more outcome-based compensation model of commissions and fees. As such, a significant 
limitation to this model seems to be that a client’s higher participation in an agency work 
could also indicate the existence of a more strategic partnership, an issue that is later 
addressed and corroborated to be the case by the authors Davies & Prince (2011). Overall, 
there seems to be room for more empirical studies to find increased definition and assess the 
meaning of the nature of the degrees of both client and agency risk aversion.  
 
Length of relationship examines the effect of the duration of the agency-principal 
relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Agency theory predicts that as the relationship progresses, 
information asymmetry is reduced between parties as they engage (Lambert, 1983). Ellis & 
Johnson (1993) propose that the longer the relationship between the agency and the client, the 
less likely it is for an outcome-based compensation model to be used. This is argued to be the 
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case as the client’s increased amount of history will reduce information asymmetries and 
possibly reduce the client’s need for risk transfer due to adverse selection i.e. the fear that the 
agency is not able to perform as it initially claimed (ibid). Davies & Prince (2010) elaborate 
that outcome-based contracts are also more favourable in the beginning of a relationship 
when monitoring systems have not yet been set up and the client’s understanding of agency 
processes are at a lower level. Spake et al. (1999) elaborate on the matter hypothesising that 
over time, overall uncertainty will decrease as the degree of diversion between the agent’s 
and principal’s degree of goal conflict, ease of measuring agency effect on outcomes and 
monitoring costs will decrease. Specifically a reduction in monitoring costs and degree of 
goal conflict favour behaviour-based contracts in longstanding advertising agency-client 
relationships. It is also aknowledged that the opposite could be true, as well, since a decrease 
in monitoring costs and the difficulty of measuring agent effects on outcomes favours the use 
of outcome-based compensation models. Spake et al. (1999) thus contend that as an 
advertising relationship progresses, the contract will either sway towards having more 
outcome or more behaviour-based properties. The further studies of Davies & Prince (2010) 
tentatively support this notion as behaviour-based compensation models were more 
frequently found in transitional as opposed to initial or mature relationships (Davies & 
Prince, 2010). Spake et al. (1999) advise that a prudent model for an initial advertising 
agency client relationship is to start with a contract that contains both outcome-based and 
behaviour-based characteristics and adjust the contract as the relationship progresses. In 
summary, evidence is mixed and it is still unclear  how agency contracts might change over 
time and whether and what impediments to change might exist.  
 
Task programmability refers to the nature of the task as having varying degrees of 
measurability (Eisenhardt, 1989a). The more difficult it is for the principal to determine 
appropriate agent behaviour in advance, the more attractive it is to employ an outcome-based 
contract. A predefined task is also less costly to monitor as it is easier to set up appropriate 
monitoring systems (Eisenhardt, 1985). Task programmability as a variable has not been 
explicitly examined by previous advertising related agency theory studies yet it has been 
aknowledged to be an important consideration. Advertising agencies have traditionally been 
hired for their creative capacities (Lace, 2000) and the nature of their work is such that ‘the 
multiple tasks performed by an ad agency act in a complex way jointly to produce advertising 
outcome’ (Zhao, 2005:257). The work done therefore has synergistic effects and the 
outcomes of an agency’s advertising efforts cannot necessarily be measured only as the sum 
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of individual activities (ibid). Advertising agencies have also been argued to shy away from 
traditional service fee pricing models, such as those used for doctors and lawyers, because the 
outcome of the advertising produces results are on a sliding scale (e.g. sales profits, brand 
recognition) and is thus more complex and not as straightforward as aiming to win a court 
case or ensure the best possible quality of life (Seggev, 1992). Finally, task programmability 
is included in this study due to the fact that the nature of SEA might be considered relatively 
more static than traditional advertising as SEA happens through the one defined AdWords 
platform with only a limited range of features.  
 
2.3.4 Summary of Issues Unaddressed by Agency Theory 
Several issues still remain inaccurately explained by agency theory related to advertising, and 
more specifically search engine advertising: Risk aversion from the perspective of the agency 
has not yet been addressed, and there is considerable ambiguity concerning the impact of goal 
conflict and relationship length on compensation model selection. Furthermore, the nature of 
SEA as a form of advertising might differ significantly from other forms of advertising 
leading to a higher level of task programmability and thus different models now being more 
viable. 
 
Measurability is a key agency theory issue still left with ambiguous empirical support. A core 
question that still remains largely unaddressed is the reasons behind why performance based 
compensation models still seem to have not gained as much traction as their merits would 
suggest (Davies & Prince, 2010). An explanation offered by Spake et al. (1999) as to why 
advertising contracts at later relationship stages may still pertain more behaviour-based as 
opposed to outcome based properties, is that the costs of monitoring behaviour are still less 
than the costs of setting up and maintaining systems to measure agency effects on outcomes. 
Moreover, it is believed that clients are reluctant to disclose the necessary level of details 
required for effectively setting up such measurement systems (Gleason, 1995) such as 
profitability data that an agency could opportunistically use also for the benefit of the client’s 
competitors (Davies & Prince, 2011). Therefore, in the light of more advanced and cost 
efficient tracking systems such as Google Analytics, it seems reasonable to further investigate 
what real-world factors, such as client or agency skill level, deficient harmonization of 
multiple information systems or type and level of competition in a specific client’s industry, 
might be affecting the adoption of outcome-based compensation models. Moreover, two-part 
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contracts such as the performance incentives have been suggested on multiple occasions, to 
have received little attention from academic literature for advertising in general  (Spake et al. 
1999), as well as over a decade later for search engine advertising in particular (Abou Nabout 
et al. 2014). 
 
Previous research on advertising agency compensation models determination recognizes that 
other social factors not fully grasped by the economics-focused agency theory may also be 
affecting compensation models decision (Spake et al, 1999, Bergan et al, 1992, Davies & 
Prince 2010). Since agency theory is based on economics principals it has been criticized for 
having limitations in social contexts where other increasingly complex factors may be at play 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: Cuevas-Rodrigues et al. 2012; Fehr & Falk, 2002).  Further studies have 
been called for to investigate the meaning of softer factors such as easy budget forecasting as 
a significant factor in compensation model decisions (Abou Nabout et al., 2012). The 
following section delves further into critical agency theory limitations, such as the theory’s 
inability to explain the significance of the relatinship itself and the meaning of trust in 
agency-client relationships. Including theoretical lenses that go beyond economic theory is 
necessary as relationship marketing literature as a context for advertising agency work 
reveals that core advertising outcomes may not be sufficient when total client total value is 
strongly influenced by perceived value (Grönroos, 1997). As such, the following section 
brings additional theoretical lenses that challenge some of the core agency theory 
assumptions, such as self-interest seeking and opportunistic behaviour, and offers further 
explanations for explaining advertising agency-client relationships and their governance 
mechanisms. 
 
2.4 Agency Theory Criticism and Complimentary Theories 
Agency theory maintains several assumptions on the role of the relationship and contract as 
well as the nature of the parties involved. The assumptions of opportunistic behaviour, goal 
conflict, economic utility, efficient contracts and consistent risk preferences may not always 
hold in the SEA context where an agency might excert significant extra effort to build a 
strong and lasting client relationship. The assumptions of agency theory are suggested to be 
shaken by findings that people as social beings are motivated by a multitude of factors such 
as emotional utility for carrying out the principal’s wishes, desire to work on interesting 
tasks, and a desire to reciprocate gestures of good will (Fehr & Falk, 2002). Neglecting these 
 36 
 
factors and focusing solely on incentive and control mechanisms through contractual 
agreements has been argued to ignore the fact that alternative means could be used for 
reducing agency costs (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al. 2012).  
 
Several authors argue that agency theory has not run its course but that it is recommended 
that it be combined with other theories so that these will, together, yield more realistic views 
of the actual complexity of organizations, and contractual arrangements across organizations 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Becerra & Gupta, 1999; Cuevas-Rodrigues et al. 2012). This view has also 
been reflected in agency theory research related to advertising agency compensation: Though 
previous scholars have found agency theory useful for understanding the advertising agency 
contractual relationship, agency theory alone has been argued not to be able to fully grasp the 
nature of the relationship (Spake at al, 1989; Davies and Prince, 2010). As a result, several 
extensions to agency theory have gradually emerged. The most relevant ones including trust 
literature, stakeholder theory, institutional theory, prospect theory and switching costs are 
discussed in the following sections.  
 
2.4.1 Trust Literature Perspective 
Agency theory assumes that the relationship between the principal and agent is only a source 
of costs that need to be mitigated through contractual arrangements. Trust literature takes a 
different stance on reducing relationship governance costs. Though it is acknowledged that 
reducing relationship governance costs is essential, it is maintained that a prime objective is 
to create an adequate environment for ‘constructive relationships’ (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 
2012:532). The emergence of trust in relationships is suggested to reduce information 
asymmetry between the parties because communication can be more open and honest 
(Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998). Trust in relationships is also suggested to not only 
reduce the principal’s need to monitor the agents actions (Beccera & Gupta, 1999) but also 
provides additioanal value through quicker coordination, decision making and 
implementation (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 2012; Neu, Gonzalez & Pass, 2011). This means 
that the relationship can be a source of perceived value (Grönroos, 1997). Relationship 
marketing literature further discusses the importance and ability to capture these benefits of 
trust through the emergence of a so called Trusted Advisor role in interfirm service sales 
relationships (Neu, Gonzalez & Pass, 2011). The trusted advisor is described to be a desirable 
and rare role whereby a sales person develops and in-depth understanding of a client’s 
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business and then provides impartial solution planning and implementation work for the 
client. The work is carried out in a highly collaborative manner (Neu & Brown, 2005).  
 
Agency theory has been criticized for overemphasizing the economic utility paradigm, which 
has been argued to hamper the emergence of trust and a cooperative climate to a business 
relationship (Fehr & Falk, 2002). This is suggested to be of paramount importance because an 
expectation of trust, loyalty, honesty and good will have been emphasized to be a necessity 
for any functional business relationship where work is being delegated (Hendry, 2002). As 
such, agency theory has been largely criticized because of its failure to grasp the meaning of 
trust between the actors and therefore this has been argued to render its predictive validity 
debatable in actual social contexts (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al. 2012; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Moreover, trust in relationships is suggested to offer an alternative means for solving the goal 
conflict problem in agency theory, separate from the prescribed control versus incentive 
measures. This is argued to be necessary as the stick and carrot methods of agency theory 
could in fact undermine the emergence of trust in principal-agent relationships and have the 
opposite desired effect of increasing the possibility of the agent’s opportunistic behaviour 
(Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 2012).  
 
The sources of trust in advertising agency-client relationships, specifically, have been divided 
into pre-contractual general trust, formed based on information gathered on the agency’s 
reputation, and post-contractual specific trust, which emerges during the course of the 
relationship through interaction (Halinen, 1997). Trustworthiness has been argued to be 
important as it has been maintained to be an important source of competitive advantage in 
both specifically advertising agency work (Davies & Prince, 2005) as well as other 
professional service businesses due to its intangible nature, meaning it cannot be readily 
transferred from one relationship to another (Neu, Gonzalez & Pass, 2011).  
 
Though acknowledging trust undermines the self-interest assumption of agency theory and 
assumes that the parties are in a transactional mode (Grönroos, 1997) the compatibility and 
complementary nature of agency theory and trust literature is still largely maintained when 
basic assumptions are relaxed or extended (Beccera & Gupta, 1999; Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 
2012). 
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2.4.2 Stakeholder Theory Perspective 
Stakeholder theory ads to the agency theory discussion by suggesting that agents are not only 
motivated by pecuniary benefits but that people as social beings value relationships. This 
leads them to value justice and fairness in their business dealings.  Reciprocity refers to the 
the strong need and tendency for people to  reciprocate a positive or negative gesture with a 
gesture in kind (Fehr & Falk, 2002). Reciprocity has generally been argued to be an 
important factor in considering economic incentives. It is argued that whether an agent 
considers a pecuniary compensation gesture as either being an act of kindness or hostility, 
will either have a positive or negative motivational implication, respectively (ibid). A 
gesture’s kindness or hostility is assessed through perceptual fairness, which is formed by the 
equitability of the distribution of the likely payoffs to a suggestion (ibid). The existence of 
perceptual fairness has been argued to have significant commitment implications for both 
parties to an advertising agency relationship (Davies & Prince, 2010). Moreover, by investing 
in their relationships with their principals, agents can create social debt, which considering 
social norms will trigger a sense of reciprocity (Fukuyama, 1995 referred to in Cuevas-
Rodrigues et al., 2012). Cuevas-Rodrigues et al. (2012) suggest that creation of goodwill ‘can 
produce a social asset that can be drawn on should changing conditions require contributions 
from stakeholders that exceed the economic benefits of the exchange’ (p.533). Moreover, as 
the name of the theory suggests, it is argued that agencies face the need to balance between 
the varying goals of multiple stakeholder at the principal firm (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 
2012). Thus it is propositioned that outcome-based pay is less frequently used as the number 
of principal actors increases as disagreeance on goals is expected to increase (ibid.) This 
challenges the assumption that (overall) higher goal conflict between principals and agents 
would lead to outcome-based contracts as the agent cannot accept an outcome-based contract, 
if the multiple principals cannot agree on what goals are to be achieved. 
 
Stakeholder theory strongly challenges the agency theory assumptions of participant 
motivation being only hinged on self-interest and economic utility since people are social and 
moral beings that are excited by factors beyond money value relationships. The perceived 
fairness of any given gesture will have significant motivational implications that should be 
considered in appropriate incentive selection. 
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2.4.3 Institutional Theory Perspective 
The institutional theory perspective on compensation challenges the agency theory 
assumption of the parties reaching an economically efficient contract. This is done through 
the notion of normalized industry practices whereby the social context of a firm leads it to 
conform to industry practices, values, norms and beliefs in the effort to reach legitimacy and 
social acceptance (Zucker, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1988). The compensation model decisions of a 
firm operating in any given industry is thus argued to be subject to the firm’s industry 
specific norms that lead to isomorphism within the industry environment (Zucker, 1987). An 
integral part to this theory in relation to agency theory is that institutionalized practices are 
suggested to be maintained even in the event of changes in technology or job content 
(Eisenhardt, 1988) and that these may maintain irrespective of task performance levels 
(Zucker, 1987). Both agency theory and institutional theory are thus suggested to assume a 
rational compensation model determination process though agency theory bases the logic on 
the efficient contract whereas the institutional perspective bases this on the logic of social 
legitimacy (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 2012).  
 
2.4.4 Prospect Theory Perspective 
The prospect theory perspective challenges the agency theory assumption of the principal’s 
and agents static risk preferences. As a neo-classical economics model, agency theory is 
criticized for focusing too much on the assumption that principal’s and clients are inherently 
and continually risk averse (Wiseman, & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 
(1998) argue that adding a behavioural approach to agency theory can enhance its 
explanatory and predictive capabilities. Though the assumption of risk aversion can be 
relaxed within agency theory, as was demonstrated before, agency theory alone offers no 
explanation for why relaxing the assumption may indeed be necessary. Including a prospect 
theory perspective into agency theory analysis helps explain principal and agent risk 
preference variation.  
 
Prospect theory suggests that social actors may change their risk preferences over time and 
based on the framing of their contexts (Kahneman & Traversky, 1979). The behavioural 
economic approach of prospect theory posits that an individual’s risk utility curve operates 
such that the curve is concave for gains but convex for losses, indicating that the disutility 
offered by a loss is higher than the utility offered by a gain of the same magnitude (ibid). This 
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is suggested to be a sharp contrast to the linear risk and reward relationship assumed by 
economic theories (Mukherji & Wright, 2002) such as agency theroy. Though economic 
theories assume all actors have the same risk utility curve, empirical studies assert that 
individuals have differing and subjective preferences that vary over time, contexts, situations 
and circumstantial contingencies (Mukherji & Wright, 2002). While agency theory  assumes 
a rational approach to decision making whereby actors are profit maximizing, prospect theory 
takes a behavioural approach emphasizing that the context influences the decision and that 
individuals are not, in fact, profit maximizing, but loss minimizing (ibid). Moreover, it has 
been found that firms employing agents that are pursuing an innovator, prospecting strategy 
searching for new products and markets, are more inclined to assume higher degrees of risk 
(Miles & Snow, 1978 referred to in Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 2012). As such, Cuevas-
Rodrigues et al., (2012) argue that while agency theory focuses on minimizing risk, prospect 
theory amends the picture by emphasising that individuals may actually be more prone to 
minimizing losses.  Consequently, this means that the risk preferences of a given principal or 
agent can vary based on the context and time, and that the multiple individals within a 
principal or agent can have differring risk preferences. 
 
Prospect theory challenges the agency theory assumption that principals and agents are utility 
mazimizers. The theory also demonstrates that studying the nature of agents or principals 
may require digging deeper into identifying the individual employees of a single principal or 
agent. Morover, examining risk preferences can become increasingly complex when not all 
employees of a single principal or agent can be assumed to have homogenous and stable risk 
preferences over time and context. 
 
2.4.5 Agency Switching Costs 
Agency switching costs are another factor that is suggested to affect agency compensation 
models through changes in client commitment and the parties’ power differential. Davies and 
Prince (2010:13) define switching costs as the ‘time, effort, money, and psychological burden 
involved in setting up a relationship with a new agency or the benefits lost from terminating 
an agency relationship’. Switching costs are are derived from human capital and are incurred 
from both set-up costs (measures taken to ensure that an agent is able and equipped to 
transform its skills and resources to produce value for a particular client) and exit costs 
(forgoing the benefits of the built-up, non-transferable value, if the relationship is 
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terminated). The degree of power held by the client as well as its degree of commitment to 
the relationship is suggested to correlate with higher degrees of switching costs. In principle, 
the higher the switching costs, the less likely a client is to change its advertising agency. In 
theory, and as supported by clients surveyed in North America, the use of outcome-based 
compensation is correlated with the higher degree of switching costs in the initial and later 
stages of agency-client relationships (Davies  and Prince, 2010).  
 
Switching costs are suggested to be high in the beginning of the relationship when the client 
has just made a high personal and psychological commitment to the newly hired agency 
(Davies & Prince, 2010). Projects assigned to the agencies are typically suggested to be 
shorter and more measurable in the beginning of agency-client relationships when trust is still 
weak (Davies & Prince, 2005). As the relationship progresses, switching costs reduce and the 
client recuperates its initial relationship investment costs (Davies & Prince, 2010). At this 
intermediate relationship stage, clients are speculated to potentially behave opportunistically 
and wish to reduce the total agency remuneration in intermediate relationship stages when 
information asymmetry and uncertainty have reduced, indicating the use of behaviour based 
models. Switching costs begin to increase again once the relationship progresses and trust 
develops in the relationship. The client also becomes more dependent on the stable 
advertising results it is receiving. As the content of the work becomes more strategic, 
outcome-based contracts become more probable over time once the agency’s effect on 
outcomes becomes evident (ibid). Switching costs have also been found to vary based on 
client size such that large customers have higher switching costs due to using a broader range 
of services from their agencies and a tendency to develop deeper relationships and using 
agencies more as strategic partners as opposed to ad hoc project managers. A broader range 
of services means higher client exposure. This further increases switching costs through 
requirring rigorous efforts in the agency selection and set-up processes (Davies & Prince, 
2011).  
 
The following Figure 3 illustrates the behaviour of switching costs over time, revealing that 
switching costs are highest in the early and more mature stages of the agency-client 
relationship. 
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Figure 3: Switching Cost Development Over Time (Davies & Prince, 2010) 
 
Swithcing costs are incorporated in this study as to identify whether these might or might not 
be affecting the SEA compensation model over time, context and varying degree of strategic 
significance of the advertising form. Switching costs are particularly interesting to be studied 
in the context of SEA since it can be assumed that SEA switching costs are fairly low 
compared to other advertising especially, if the advertising client has administrative access to 
their AdWords account (Google, n.d.c). In such a case a significant part of the value added by 
one agent may be transferable to be the starting point of another agent who may thus more 
quickly grap the objective of the advertising. Since swithcing costs build upon trust literature, 
it similarly challenges the assumption that the compensation model decision is consistently 
driven by pure economic utility considerations. Morover, similarly to prospect theory, the 
switching costs approach builds on agency theory and takes the changeing context into 
consideration arguing that parties will be more or less likely to behave opportunistically 
based on the subtle shifts of information and power between them over time. As such, 
swithcing costs introduces an additional cost for the principal to consider when evaluating the 
value of a given agency relationship.  
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2.5  Literature Summary & Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework presented in Figure 4 draws together the actors and variables 
considered by Agency theory. The objective of the theoretical framework is to provide a 
guide for testing the explanatory power of agenct theory in SEA contractual agreements over 
time. The framework builds heavily on the works of Bergen et al. (1992) and contributes to 
the authors’ work with additional theoretical lenses as well as respect for the temporal 
element of agency-client relationships. The two time periods are color coded to illustrate the 
temporal nature of the different challenges faced by the principal. T0, in blue, indicates the 
time before a contract is struck. T1, in red, denotes the more advanced stages of the 
relationship.  
 
 
Figure 4: Theoretical Framework: Agency Theory & Critical Extensions 
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At the initial T0 stage, the advertising client faces the adverse selection problem i.e. the risk 
that an agency might be misrepresenting its intention or ability to conduct the desired SEA 
service appropriately. To mitigate this problem, the principal with limited 
understanding gathers as much information about one or multiple possible agents as is 
economically viable. The principal is aware that there is considerable uncertainty in the 
environment and that this, together with the agent's actions, will define realised outcomes 
when a contract is struck. Once the principal has found a good agent, it proposes a contract to 
the agent. The principal takes its own goals, both parties risk preferences and multiple other 
contextual factors into consideration while designing the most appropriate contractual model 
along the behaviour versus outcome continuoum. The objective of the contract is to minimize 
relationship governance costs, maximise principal gains and minimise the agent's incentive to 
engage in moral hazard i.e. shirk on its agreed responsibilities. Agency theory assumes the 
parties are inherently motivated by self-interest and expects the agent to wish to exert 
minimum effort while receiving maximum compensation. The agent is also assumed to be 
inherently more risk averse and thus prefers a behaviour-based model with a guaranteed 
payoff, whereas the principal advertiser would prefer an outcome-based model to align goals 
by transferring business risks over to the agent. The agent takes its own goals, risk 
preferences and contextual factors into consideration when accepting or rejecting the offered 
contract. 
 
At the more advanced and ongoing T1 stage, the relationship length has increased and the 
principal has gathered experiential information on the nature of the agent either through 
measuring results, monitoring behaviour or both. Depending on the contract terms, the 
principal may choose to continue, modify, or end the contract with its current agent after a 
certain time period has lapsed. The principal takes its gained experiential information as well 
as possible changes in the contextual circumstances into consideration when making a second 
round decision. Notable contextual changes, highlighted in red text, are that switching costs 
may have been introduced, and there may or may not now be significant changes in the other 
moderating factors of ease of measuring effect on outcomes, degree of goal conflict, length of 
relationship, monitoring costs,  and trust. The agents functional activities can affect some of 
the moderating factors: Carrying out agreed responsibilities and delivering results may, for 
example, build up trust in the relationship. 
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Agency theory and its predictive capabilities in real organizational contexts have been 
criticized for its many simplistic and pessimistic assumptions as well as its inability to 
encompass the full nature of the relationship and emergent trust between the parties. Many 
authors still maintain that that agency theory holds and that it us fully compatible when 
combined with useful extension theories (e.g. see Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012; Beccera & 
Gupta, 1999).  Several other theories are therefore drawn upon to refine and elucidate the full 
nature of the principal-agency relationship and potentially challenge the discussed agency 
theory assumptions. The purpose of this study is thereofore to test this model and 
consequently the revelvance of the outlined theories in the context of SEA compensation 
agreements from the agent’s perspective.  
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3 METHODOLOGY 
This section of the thesis describes the research methods selected for this study. The methods 
sectionsfirst justifies the qualitative research as approach most suitable for the context. 
Secondly, the research design is explicated to elaborate on the data sources, data gathering 
process as well as the data analysis methods. The final methods section evaluates the validity 
and generalizability of the results. 
 
3.1 Research Method 
The empirical section of this thesis is a qualitative, interview-based multiple case study on 
eight agencies providing SEA services in the Finnish market. Given the nature of the research 
questions, this study combines explanatory and descriptive elements to describe phenomena 
governed by multiple variables as well as shed light on why this is happening in certain 
specified contexts (Saunders et al., 2003). This study therefore combines both the inductive 
and deductive research approaches. The study is primarily deductive as it uses available 
theories to make predictions and offer explanations (Chalmers, 1999). This is done by taking 
previous researchers’ agency theory hypotheses as the foundation of this study’s theoretical 
framework, thereby testing the propositions in the defined new context of SEA advertising. 
The study is also slightly inductive i.e. deriving theories from a set of data gained through 
solid empirical research (ibid),  as the study strives to go beyond mere deductive theory 
testing and inductively develops new insights and extends theory to fill current gaps. The use 
of both approaches is acclaimed by authors such as Saunders et al. (2003) who describe the 
frontier of these approaches to be blurry and that a combination of the two is thus beneficial.  
 
The case study approach was selected for this thesis because it is seen as particularly 
appropriate for answering how and why research questions for  complex phenomena in 
contemporary settings (Yin, 2009). Moreover, a descriptive approach is used as it is argued to 
provide important support for case study research by richly illustrating the studied 
phenomena on which data is gathered (Saunders et al., 2003).  Multiple cases were taken into 
consideration in the study in order to balance both gaining deep insight into the chosen 
context and cases as well as to make the findings of the study more generalizable. 
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The qualitative study design was preferred over quantitative research methods because it has 
been argued to better facilitate gaining a deeper insight into the behaviour and beliefs of firms 
(Yin, 2009), as it has the ability to more accurately capture human impressions and 
perceptions compared to quantitative research (Saunders et al., 2003.)  Moreover, previous 
empirical studies on agency compensation models have indeed been largely quantitative in 
nature and focused on theory testing through data gathered from client-side studies (see 
Spake et al. 1999; Davies & Prince 2010; Davies & Prince 2011). It has however been argued 
that  ‘quantitative research cannot deal with the social and cultural constructions of its own 
variables’ (Silverman 2001:29, cited in Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008:4). Qualitative research 
has therefore been argued to be particularly useful in providing improved understanding to 
the issues that remain elusive after quantitative studies (ibid) and many of these have been 
identified during the literature review and are reflected in the research questions. This notion 
also supports employing a qualitative research design that can help gain fresh understanding 
to the issues that remain inadequately explained by previous compensation model studies. 
The aim of this study is to describe and explain phenomena and search for explanations 
instead of frequency; numerical data would therefoe not have provided satisfactory answers. 
Moreover, the contract between a client and its agency is highly confidential information so 
gaining access to and statistically analysing the nature of multiple contracts, especially across 
agencies, has been already previously suggested to not be feasible (Lace, 2003). 
 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Sample Selection 
The empirical study was conducted as a multiple case study. The inclusion of multiple cases 
was deemed beneficial as it has been suggested to enable comparison across cases, therefore 
yielding more accurate and generalizable theory than single case studies (Eisenhardt 19991; 
Yin 1994).  The use of multiple cases also mitigates the risk of findings being only 
idiosyncratic to one case instead of showing consistency across several cases (Eisenhardt 
1991). This is suggested to enable the building of more robust theories (Eisenhardt 1989b).   
 
The data for this study was collected from the agency side for multiple reasons. Firstly, all 
existing empirical studies on agency compensation models from an agency theory perspective 
have thus far been deductive, quantitative studies with data gathered from the advertising 
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client side (see: Spake et al. 1999; Davies & Prince, 2010). Thus taking a different stance and 
qualitatively studying the agency side of the story was expected to provide new and 
interesting theoretical and empirical insights to the benefit of both advertising clients as well 
as agencies. Secondly, individual contracts between clients and their agencies are highly 
confidential information, so asking advertisers to discuss their contracts, especially in respect 
to which agency they are working with, has been argued to not be feasible (Lace, 2003). 
Strikingly, since the author of this study currently works at Google and has access to identify 
client and agency affiliations, this matching of agencies and clients may in fact have been 
possible without participants’ explicit consent, and publishable as long as data would be 
anonymized. This option was however eliminated as it was deemed ethically inappropriate. 
The decision to not interview clients was also related to ethical considerations and the 
author’s employment at Google. This study was motivated by the desire to develop new 
interesting insights for the benefit of both clients and agencies so the author did not wish to 
run the risk of accidentally introducing clients with a false sense that ‘something might be 
wrong’ with the agency or contract a particular studied client was currently using. Secondly, 
asking an agency directly about what compensation models they use and why was expected 
to provides an efficient means for aggregating an overview as to what models an entire 
agency systematically uses or does not use. Thirdly, agencies’ key informants with 
experience of multiple clients and client types can be deemed to have more and varied 
experience in the use and use rationales of various compensation models, compared to 
individual client firms whose managers may or may or may not have extensive experience in 
several compensation models and model negotiation processes. As such, the research 
questions were expected to be more efficiently answered through agency-side studies as 
opposed to client-side studies, considering the limited scope afforded by a Master’s thesis. 
Moreover, it should be emphasized that though the particular empirical lens assumed by this 
study is that of the agencies, the objective of this thesis is to primarily deductively test 
whether agency theory, i.e. the perspective of the (principal) client, holds, as expressed by 
agency key informants. The primary objective of the study is therefore to gain valuable 
theoretical insights for principal advertisers, yet the findings are also inarguably an 
interesting, insightful and rare benchmarking opportunity for agencies as well. 
 
The sampling strategy used for this study was theoretical sampling  i.e. adding multiple cases 
with the intention of selecting cases that will likely replicate or extend emergent theory by 
offering something new or eliminating alternative explanations (Eisenhardt 1989b). The 
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theoretical sampling criterion applied for this case study was designed to both provide 
healthy variation in results, yet contain enough commonalities across cases to facilitate 
reasonable pattern recognition. Eight cases were initially selected based on the suggestion 
that the inclusion of 4 to 10 cases usually works well, in order for case studies to be both 
theoretically robust yet manageable in data volume (Eisenhardt 1989b). Notably, theoretical 
saturation, whereby adding additional cases only provides minimal incremental value (ibid), 
was largely already reached after 7 cases. The final case was nevertheless included due to the 
interview already being scheduled and the results providing additional support and several 
well-articulated quotations. The eventual theoretical sampling criterion applied for this study 
is as follows:  
1. All agencies have clientele in the Finnish market and thus have a common operational 
context and competitive situation providing a defined research context and reasonable 
basis for cross-case comparisons (Eisenhardt 1989b).  
2. Case agencies were included from all agency types (SEM agencies, digital agencies, 
media agencies’ SEM departments) in order to provoke the possible emergence of 
patterns across multiple agency types.  
3. All agencies currently have one or more continuous contacts at Google’s large 
customer sales team (Google’s large customer sales department, at the time of the 
study, communicates regularly with a total of 10 agencies’ performance departments). 
This can be viewed as a proxy for the agency’s relative importance in the AdWords 
marketplace and the volume of their total client portfolio’s media budget running 
through AdWords.  
 
Notably, Case agency 1 is an emerging competitor in the Finnish market and is the only 
agency included in the study, which at the time of the interview, did not have a permanent 
office in the Finnish market. This agency was included in the study due to its theoretically 
interesting and exceptional operational model, which was also found to be affecting the 
agency’s compensation models. These are discussed in more detail in the findings section. 
 
3.2.2 Unit of Analysis 
It has been suggested to be important for a study to clearly state the difference between the 
used units of analysis as well as the empirical units of observation (Fletcher & Plakoyinnaki, 
2011). The unit of analysis, meaning the specific object examined by this study, is the 
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contract between the contracting advertising client (principal) and the service providing 
agency (agent). This study is therefore considered to be a holistic case study whereby there is 
only one main unit of analysis (ibid) though many other mediating variables that affect the 
unit of analysis are indeed identified and evaluated. The empirical units of observation refer 
to the sources of data used for the study and these are the key informants of the case agencies, 
as previously discussed. 
 
3.2.3 Data Collection 
This study uses primary data collected through interviews with key informants at the case 
agencies. Interviews were chosen as the appropriate means for data collection, because it has 
been argued to be a highly efficient means for gathering rich data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). Moreover, interviews allow for respondents to answer freely according to their own 
thinking (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005) and has been suggested to be particularly beneficial in 
research settings where it may be difficult for the researcher to forecast responses in advance 
(Daymon, 2002), as was expected when attempting to confront largely economics-based 
theory with empirical, behavioural reality. The nature of personal interviews also allowed for 
the interviewer to repeat or follow-up with clarifying questions in order to dig deeper and 
expose the most relevant information (Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2002).  
 
The interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews whereby a list of questions 
were developed on a fairly defined set of topics (Bryman & Bell, 2003) initially outlined in 
the litereature review. The interviewing method applied in this study is considered semi-
structured as opposed to structured as the interviews were conducted in a fairly 
conversational manner, questions did not necessarily follow in the exact preoutlined order, 
and the exact preoutlined wordings of the questions were not strictly followed (Bryman & 
Bell, 2003). Moreover, the interviewer retained the freedom to pick up with additional issues 
raised up by each interviewee (ibid). The rationale for selecting the semi-structured interview 
approach was that it affords some flexibility: The researcher wanted to strike an adequate 
balance between covering the areas suggested by theory whilst leaving room for the 
informants to potentially bring up new issues that they felt to be important. Moreover, the use 
of semi-structured interviews was deemed appropriate at it has been advocated to be 
frequently used in multiple case studies since it provides important and necessary grounds for 
cross-case comparability (ibid).  
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The interview guide was designed to address several important themes that emerged during 
the contextual and theoretical parts of the literature review. The interview guide was intended 
to first identify each compensation model used by the agency, and more importantly, the 
rationale for their selection. The second part of the conversation involved discussing model 
adaptation to individual clients as well as the model negotiation process in general. The 
fourth part addressed the overall client-agency operational context and was forecasted to 
explicate the agency theory constructs of information asymmetry, goal alignment issues and 
task programmability. The final part of the interview guide delved further into performance 
based compensation models to further identify tension points and barriers to adopting these 
models should they not be found to be in wide use - as turned out to be the case with most 
studied agencies. Because the semi-structured interview guide method  may not always result 
in all the exact same items being discussed by all respondents when new topics may emerge 
(Patton, 2002), follow-up emails were occasionally carried out to seek clarification for the 
most important emergent concepts. The semi-structured interview guide, as a whole, is 
available in Appendix 1. The questions asked in the interview were carefully phrased as to be 
truly open-ended as has been deemed vital (Patton, 2002). The interviews were concluded 
with the question, ‘What essential issues may I have missed or have not been covered in the 
discussion of this subject area?’ in order to leave ample room for completely new emergent 
perspectives. 
 
The data gathering period of the study took place between August and December 2014. All 
interviews apart from Case 1 were conducted in Finnish and either face-to-face or through 
video conference due to the author’s residence outside of Finland. Each interview was 
recorded on tape and partially transcribed as a stand-alone case. In order to mitigate the 
barrier for agencies to take part in this public study, all case agencies and their respective 
interviewees participated in the study anonymously. As a result, individual case company 
descriptions are kept at a minimum in order to not convey recognizable traits of the 
individual cases, especially considering the narrow agency landscape in Finland. Table 5 
below summarizes the role of each case respondent, the type of agency they represented and 
the length and mode of the interview conducted: 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 Case Agency & Interview Details Table 5
 Total: 8 Agency Type 
Turnover  
1000 EUR Personnel  Contact Interview Duration 
Interview 
Mode 
Case 1 SEM  4500 - 7500  25-30 C-level  1h 20min Face-to-face 
Case 2 SEM 2000 - 3500 25-30 C-level 60 minutes 
Video 
conference 
Case 3 Media 15000 - 25000 25-30 B-level 60 minutes Face-to-face 
Case 4 Digital 2000 - 3500 15-20 C-level 45 minutes 
Video 
conference 
Case 5 Media  15000 - 25000  25-30 C-level 45 minutes Face-to-face 
Case 6 Digital 2000 - 3500 15-20 CEO 45 minutes Face-to-face 
Case 7 Digital  4500 - 7500 15-20 CEO 40 minutes Face-to-face 
Case 8 Digital 4500 - 7500 25-30 CEO 40 minutes 
Video 
conference 
 
Each interviewee was selected from the case agencies based on identifying themselves as 
either being a strong influencer on the compensation models used at the agency (high 
influence B-level), a key model decision makers or influencer (C-level), or  the key model 
decision maker and at the same time the head of the agency as a whole (CEO). As such, it is 
assumed that the informants views are consistent with and representative of the views of the 
agency overall. The shortest length that any given interviewee had worked in the SEM 
industry was 4 years, indicating that all respondents had considerable experience in the 
industry.  
 
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
Each individual interview was first partially transcribed and then thematically coded into 
tables for the purpose of generating rich insights through conducting within-case analysis 
(Pettigrew 1988, referred to in Eisenhardt 1989b). Extensive within-case analysis was 
conducted in order to become ‘intimately familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity’ 
(Eisenhardt 1989:540). Extensive cross-case analysis was then carried out with the intention 
of using thematic content analysis to find similar themes and constructs across the individual 
cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Comparison across multiple cases while examining 
several themes simultaneously was further facilitated by the use of further matrices and tables 
(ibid) as well as basic spreadsheet filtering mechanisms. Key to this process was identifying 
emergent categorical themes and grouping the case data to identify within-group similarities 
and intergroup differences as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989b). This was completed with 
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further usage of matrices and tables that were constructed and reconstructed in an iterative 
manner. The process of cross-case analysis was not begun until the majority 7 out of 8 
interviews were conducted in order to be able to more systematically and credibly use the 
replication logic, whereby the same steps are executed for each individual case (Yin, 1994). 
This resulted in the development of an empirical compensation scheme determination model, 
which is the final product of the findings analysis. The pattern matching technique was then 
used in the discussion section to examine the empirical findings variables and redefined 
constructs against previous theories suggested by relevant literature (Yin, 2009; Saunders et 
al., 2003).  
 
3.3 Validity and Reliability of the Study 
According to Yin (2009), the rigor of a study is determined through its validity and reliability 
and can be tested along the specific dimensions of construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity and reliability. Other authors argue that in qualitative research, the issue of 
conformability is also important (Guba & Lincoln, 1994) and is agreed to be highly relevant 
due to the authors’ present role at being employed by Google. All suggested dimensions are 
addressed separately below though they are acknowleged to contain significant interlinkages 
(Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki, 2008). 
 
Internal validity, or credibility in qualitative research (Bryman & Bell, 2003), concerns the 
issue of whether the causal relationships between variables are valid (Gibbert, Ruigrok & 
Wicki, 2008). The causal relationships between variables and results in this study are deemed 
to be at a high level due to adhering to the suggestion of using a clear research framework 
(ibid) and the dedicated use of matrices, summarizing rationales and supporting quotations in 
explaining the relationships between each variable in the findings and discussion sections. 
Moreover the pattern matching technique used in the discussion section is suggested to 
improve internal validity as it requires findings to be analysed and tested in the fire of extant 
knowledge (ibid). 
 
Construct validity examines whether the relevant concepts of a study are accurately 
conceptualized. Construct validity is therefore concerned with whether a study accurately 
reflects reality and actually measures what it claims to measure (Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki, 
2008). A high level of construct validity for this study is achieved through the suggested 
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measure of providing a meticulous chain of evidence for the reader to trace the logic and 
draw the same conclusions as stated in the study (ibid). This is done through a high volume of 
case quotations in both the findings section as well as with additional supporting quotation 
tables in Appendecies 2 and 3. 
 
External validity that parallels the qualitative research term transferability, concerns whether 
the results of a study are generalizable to apply to other contexts (Bryman & Bell, 2003; 
Gibbert, Ruigrok & Wicki, 2008). The use of the pattern-matching logic and cross-case 
comparison, are applied in order to increase both internal and external validity (Yin, 2009) as 
multiple bases are used to gain more robustness. The generalizability of this study is based on 
analytical generalizability, relying on having employed a replicative logic with cross-case 
analysis, revealing the findings being largely consistent across multiple cases (Eisenhardt, 
1989b). Essentially the level of analytical generalizability sought by this study is limited to 
boundary conditions pertaining to the context of the study (Finnish market) as well as the 
nature of the work (search engine advertising or work of similar nature). The level of 
generalization sought by this study is essentially to reflect the compensation model 
availability and model determination process in the Finnish market. 
 
Reliability addresses the issue of whether the results of the study can be replicated such that 
the same conclusions will be logically reached (Yin, 2009). The reliability of this study is 
ensured by providing a clear description of the research process and aforementioned chain of 
evidence. Moreover, a recommended case study database with transcriptions, emails and 
audio recordings was maintained for the purpose of later verification (Gibbert, Ruigrok & 
Wicki, 2008). Moreover the study and final product have been reviewed by an appropriate, 
knowledgeable supervisor as recommended (Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
 
Confirmability, concerns whether the researcher is being objective to the study or whether 
the research is unreasonably influenced by its authors possible biases (Bryman & Bell, 2003). 
In terms of ethical considerations, it should be acknowledged that the researcher has been 
employed by Google at the time this study was conducted. The author has been an AdWords 
and YouTube account strategist for the Finnish market and has worked with both end-client 
advertisers and agencies since the summer of 2013. As such, the author has significant 
insights about the nature of AdWords advertising as well as the quality of the work conducted 
by each agency participating in the study. The author would however like to openly admit 
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that personal understanding of advertiser-agency contracts, specifically, has not been 
particularly in-depth. It should be noted that this thesis has not been explicitly commissioned 
by Google though widespread internal interest has emerged during the course of its 
completion. In order to mitigate any potential biases and ensure the replicability of the study, 
only data explicitly gathered during the interviews has been used for this study. This is also 
driven by the desire to keep a high level of ethical consideration whereby respondents need 
not fear that their daily correspondence, as opposed to volunteered interview responses, might 
be recorded in this public study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 56 
 
4 FINDINGS 
The findings section of this study first describes the observations made on the different 
compensation schemes used at the studied case agencies. This is followed by analytically 
examining the specific reasons behind model selection and results in the identification of 
various factors that affect compensation model determination. These factors that influence 
model selection and the agency-client relationship as a whole are described and categorized 
as being either desirable features, or moderating and boundary factors. The final section 
brings the findings together in a model that summarizes the entire model determination 
process.  
 
4.1 Observed Compensation Models & Their Use Rationales 
The multiple case studies revealed several compensation models being used. A full review of 
quotations on each identified compensation model is available in Appendix 3. A 
commonality across all discussed models was contract term flexibility to the client: 7 out of 8 
agencies reported that their contract terms were on a 1-3 month rolling basis or less, and only 
one agency reported that they used fixed term contracts. Overall, the results suggest that the 
fixed-fee model is by far the most dominant compensation model as it was reported to be the 
predominantly used model by 7 out of the 8 agencies studied.  A distinct feature of AdWords 
advertising at the studied agencies was that the advertising client typically, though not 
always, owns the Google AdWords account, which can be easily transferred to another 
agency or audited by another agency. In most cases, the client was suggested to pay for their 
own media budget directly to Google so that the agency did not have to bear credit risk for 
the media budget (Cases 1, 2, 4, 5, 7). Client churn was discussed to be relatively frequent 
overall. As quite a sore topic, this was not further examined. The following Table 6 
summarizes the previous use, current prevalence and offering of the various models at the 
studied agencies: 
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 Compensation Models Used for Search Engine Advertising Table 6
 
 
Contract 
term 
Traditional 
Commission 
Tiered 
Commission 
New 
Commission Fixed fees Time bank 
Performance 
bonus  
(+ Fixed fee / Time 
bank) CPA 
Case 1: SEM None 
  
Dominant  
(only offered) 
    
Case 2: SEM 1-3 months 
   
Dominant  
(only offered) 
   
Case 3: Media 1-3 months 
Some  
old clients Few 
 
Dominant 
 
Few 
 
Case 4: Digital 
Monthly 
rolling 
   
Dominant Few Few 
Few / none 
currently 
Case 5: Media 1-3 months 
Some  
old clients 
  
Dominant  
(in use) 
Dominant 
(offered) (No longer used) 
 
Case 6: Digital 
Fixed term 
6-12 
months 
Some  
old clients 
  
Dominant 
  
(No longer 
used) 
Case 7: Digital 1-3 months 
Some  
old clients 
  
Dominant  
(in use) 
Dominant 
(offered) Frequent 
 
Case 8: Digital 
Monthly 
rolling 
   
Dominant  
(only offered) 
 
(Previously but no 
longer used) 
(No longer 
used) 
 
4.1.1 Traditional Commission  
As defined in the literature review, the traditional commission-based compensation model 
involves the agency being compensated based on a defined percentage of the client’s media 
expenditure. This model was currently being used by 4 out of 7 agencies studied (Cases, 3, 5, 
6, and 7). All informants from agencies that used the model, however, suggested that this was 
an older historical model, which was currently being more or less actively phased out of use. 
The main rationale for the model’s previous use had been based on the fact that a higher 
media budget usually constituted a higher amount of work for the agency. Clients currently 
still on the model were suggested to be ones that were part of a global deal (Case 5) or ones 
that had been with their agencies at the time the model was still widely offered i.e. before the 
year 2008. The benefits of the model involved its simplicity, flexibility and scalability. 
Informants stated that while the model with generally high revenues, it was being scaled 
down. The downsides of the model involved its intrasparency due to undefined work tasks, 
and unfairness because it scaled too quickly up or down either making the agency 
remuneration too high or too low. Case agencies 5 and 6 elaborated: 
It punishes the client when the campaigns are successful because the commission goes up when the 
budget goes up even when there is not any more work needed (Case 6). 
 
It’s our aim to be transparent and fair so this is not in align with what we want so sometimes we have 
had to return money to the client to be fair because we have not been able to justify such a high fee. 
This model also does not encourage us to work as no activities or hourly work has been defined (Case 
5). 
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Lastly, the model itself did not signal the agency’s accountability or ability to deliver results.  
 
4.1.2 Tiered Commission Based on Varying Media Spend 
The tiered fee based on media spend was described to be a compensation model whereby the 
agency is paid a percentage fee which varies up or down based on the client’s media spend. 
The rationale behind this compensation mode, similarly to the traditional commission based 
model, was that a higher budget typically meant more work for the agency.  This model, only 
suggested to be used on a couple of long-term clients at Case 3, was described to be used 
with clients whose media budgets had high monthly variance. The tiered fee model was 
suggested to be an improvement to the commission based model’s potential adverse impacts 
on fairness towards the client and less positive or negative variance to agency profitability.  
This model had thus emerged to tackle the high monthly budget variance and fixed 
percentage commission issue present in the traditional commission model. 
  
4.1.3 Fixed-fees 
The monthly fixed-fee compensation model was suggested to be currently predominantly in 
use by 6 out of the 7 agencies studied. The fixed fee compensation model, involves the 
agency making an assessment of the hourly or daily workload it believes a client requires, 
and then translating that assessment into a monthly fixed fee.  As discussed in the literature 
review, the fixed fee model had emerged as an improvement to the commission model. As 
such the model had been widely used for the past 6 years and become somewhat of a norm 
and the model clients expected (Case 2). 
 
The simplistic characteristics of this model were agreeably beneficial to both parties:  It was 
easy for clients to understand and made calculations at both ends relatively easy. Also the 
model could be easily scaled across all of the agencies’ clients with little administrative 
burden.  
 
Other features were however more debated across the studied agencies. The model was 
considered only moderately flexible:  Though it adjusted easily to taking on new advertising 
forms and varying goals (performance & branding, other media like email) there also existed 
a clear concern that clients risked growing out of their models, especially if growth was quick 
and the agency’s initial forecasts are not accurate (Case 4, 5, 7). This was a particular 
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problem of the model because fee renegotiation was time consuming and as infrequent as 
annually or biannually (Case 5). One agency explained: 
The problem with the fixed fee is that if the scope of the project drastically changes, the fixed fee 
would need to be renegotiated, which requires a lot of time (Case 7). 
 
Moreover, the model’s perceived transparency varied with some agencies detailing exactly 
what was involved and how long it would take (Case 2, 3), while others left the contract 
description more open (Case 4, 7, 8). Also the fixed-fee model’s perceived fairness was 
debated: The model was described to occasionally have some level of up or down 
adaptability based on realized working hours (e.g. Case 2 & 3) or then a part of the fee could 
be allocated to another type of service (Case 2). In terms of risk, the fixed-fee model was 
described to be good for agencies as it introduced the idea of long-term cooperation.  A 
contrary complaint however was that profitability could become strained. One agency 
complained: 
We may have internally noticed the fixed fee is not profitable for us and then externally the client 
might feel we are not doing enough for the fee (Case 7). 
 
The model also allowed for the generally risk averse agencies to engage in testing out new 
products and features on a client’s account which can take a significant amount of time and 
involve taking some risks concerning results, thus allowing for flexibility of goals (Case 4).  
 
Similarly to the commission model, the fixed-fee model in itself does not particularly signal 
the agency’s accountability or ability to deliver results. 
 
4.1.4 Time Bank  
The time bank model was described to a compensation model whereby the agency calculates 
the monthly minimum and maximum expected workload of a client, from which the eventual 
agency fee is calculated based on actual working hours rendered. The two agencies that used 
the model both described that the model was a more recent trend. Though the majority of 
their client base was still using monthly fixed fees, the time bank model was now the model 
they predominantly offered to new clients.  
 
The use rationale for the model was that an agreed minimum number of working hours 
guarantees the agency a set return for its work, but also allows the agency to be compensated 
for workload fluctuations; thus mitigating the profitability risks of the agency which 
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calculates the required workload. The model was viewed as highly fair and transparent for the 
client as it ensures the client only compensates the agency for actualized work hours and 
motivates by withholding both parties’ up and downside potential: 
The time bank model has been offered for the past 2 years easy for us to maintain our own profitability; 
we predefine what work will be done and how many hours it requires. We will have set a specific 
frame of how many hour we can do min and how many hour we can do max due to human resource 
constraints. It’s very flexible for the activity and needs of large or growing clients were their needs can 
change a lot and making labour hour predictions 6 months ahead can be challenging (Case 5).   
  
Moreover, this model tackled some of the grievances of the fixed-fee model such as the fact 
that agencies experienced that clients would occasionally assume that their fixed-fee 
contracts included more work hours than was reasonable and avoids the agency from wasting 
time on contract renegotiation: 
Clients might have occasionally thought that the fixed fee encompassed everything and then they might 
have felt that we did not do enough work for that fixed fee (Case 7). 
  
The multiple case study nature of the thesis provided some healthy variance of opinion: Case 
agency 8, which only advocated the fixed fee model, specifically expressed discontent about 
the time bank model being a ‘swamp of internal complexity’ for the agency and noted that it 
preferred to have the client conversation revolve around payment for results as opposed to 
agency working hours: 
We believe clients rewards us for results, not the hours worked…Looking at hours does not necessarily 
bring you bliss. Most clients don’t even ask about the hours (Case 7). 
 
Compared to the fixed fee, the time bank model thus argued that the agency would have to 
risk signalling working hours as opposed to results. 
 
4.1.5 Performance Bonus  
The performance bonus was found to be a model that had a time bank or fixed fee model as 
the basis accompanied by a performance bonus. The bonus was usually based on over or 
under achieving a predefined CPA level  (Cases 4, 5, 6) though one agency described that it 
had frequently varied the metrics on which the bonus was based (Case 7).  Five out of the 
eight studied agencies reported to have used a performance bonus at some point in their 
agency’s history however are no longer offering it.  Only one agency was found to be 
particularly actively offering the model yet even they noted that only half of their current 
client base had such a model in use.   
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Agencies that used the performance bonus described their reasons for its implementation as 
wanting to signal their company ethos of driving for results, building and ensuring client 
commitment to KPIs (elaborated on later) as well as incentivizing the agency’s willingness to 
take a bit of extra risk and be fairly compensated for exerting extra effort: 
We are usually willing to drop our hourly fee and take more risk if we can reach a model that we both 
can accept. With the bonus model, we may not charge all hour but take a bit of risk so then it is for the 
benefit of the client when we put in an extra bit of effort instead of just saying that now our hours are 
up (Case 7). 
 
It was suggested that the disadvantages with performance bonus contracts was that they were 
not only risky for the agency, but also risk averse clients also preferred not to have sudden 
large bonus payouts. Moreover, performance models were described to be increasingly 
complex, and inflexible for varying client goals: 
Challenge with this model is that most client need to grow so it’s difficult to define what is most fair, is 
it to optimize for efficiency or increase volume. If we base the bonus model based on efficiency, it will 
eat out volume, if we base the bonus on volume, it can eat out efficiency. Client needs may change 
(Case 5). 
  
4.1.6 CPA Pricing Model 
 The CPA pricing model, whereby the agency receives a fee per conversion and covers all 
media expenditures was found to have been used by 4 out of the 8 agencies studied and only 
one was still actively offering it.  The model’s disadvantages were described to be many. The 
model was argued to be impossible to scale across an agency’s broad client base with varying 
goals.  From the client side, its infrequent appeal was described to stem from clients 
perceiving the model as too complex and expensive (Cases 2, 4, 8). Case 2 for example 
recalled a specific client case where it made complex calculations for estimating an accurate 
mutually beneficial CPA pricing model for varying sales levels, but the client ended up 
rejecting the idea and going for a competitor’s basic fixed fee package.  This is presumably 
because the CPA model had been perceived as too expensive and difficult for the client to 
comprehend. The accounting focused Case 8 further explained that there were clear issues 
with the risk-reward ratio that agencies could expect with performance-based models which 
was causing most agencies to refuse such models as being unfair: 
As a representative of an agency, I must say that if the agency takes more risk, there should be an 
appropriate reward to go with it as well...My opinion is that results-based models are bad models for 
agencies because the agency has to take a lot of the clients risks and the client is not willing to pay for 
the risk transfer (Case 8). 
 
From the agency’s perspective, Case agencies 2 and 3 were open to the idea of the CPA 
pricing model but called for further internal testing of the model at the agency side to 
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establish its potential. Case 2 also emphasized that clients were not asking for CPA or other 
results based models for that matter. Case 6, which had used the CPA only compensation 
model, described a mixed success experience with the CPA model. It had been using a model 
whereby the agency paid the media budget and the client only paid a fixed fee. The model 
had worked well for the first year until the client wanted a CPA level reduction, which the 
agency did not think was possible for the amount of time that it would take to reach the goal, 
thus making the model unfair.  
  
4.1.7 New Commission 
Case agency 1, which only focused on ecommerce clients, was the only agency found to be 
using a compensation model whereby a client pays the agency a percentage commission on 
‘profitably invested media spend’. This model is hereby named as the new commission due to 
its similar properties yet improvements to the traditional commission model. Essentially, the 
entire business model of Case agency 1 functions such that an ecommerce client provides the 
agency with the profitability figures of all its web shop's individual products. The agency 
then uses its internally developed automatic bidding software to optimize the client’s 
AdWords account to achieve or exceed a predefined profitability goal such as a ratio of 1:3 or 
a 1:4 return on ad spend. The agency would take a percentage commission of the clients 
AdWords media expenditure. The magnitude of the media expenditure was defined by 
maximizing the stated profitability goals considering the market demand for the client’s 
products. Automation was not only being used in bidding optimization, but also keywords 
and products were created through feeds to scalably ensure the widest possible selection of 
the client’s products being covered by AdWords advertising. Due to the compensation 
scheme where commission is based on a percentage of media spend, the client’s profitability 
and the agency’s revenue on the client were argued to be simultaneously maximized. 
  
The rationale for the agency using the selected compensation model was based on multiple 
factors. Firstly, due to scalable automation, the compensation model was not linked to time 
spent on client accounts since value was not necessarily linked to expenditure. A model based 
on time was thus deemed illogical for the agency’s scaled operational model. Secondly, the 
percentage of media expenditure was deemed easy for clients to understand as all calculations 
remained simple (e.g. X% * 1000€ = last month’s agency fee). Thirdly, the selected 
compensation scheme, allowed for the agency to freely carry out all activities that it believed 
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would contribute to its clients’ profitability. Thus it was more or less transparent. Fourthly, 
the model was easily scaled across all the agency’s clients that were selected based on having 
an ecommerce platform and conversions with a clearly defined monetary goal. As a business 
model, the agency and its compensation logic were geared towards signaling their drive for 
results. The model was very risky as the client could quit at any time, however a diversified 
portfolio and the scalable business model enabled the agency to drive for high revenues. 
Considering the defined segment of ecommerce, the agency compensation model was highly 
scalable though only for the particular client segment. In terms of flexibility, the model did 
not adjust well to workload, which was large in the beginning but less far into the relationship 
when high impact activities had already been completed. Moreover, the agency’s focus only 
on profit ruled it entirely out of flexing to client’s wanting variable ad media or branding as 
opposed to only performance goals. 
 
4.2 Desirable Features of Compensation Models 
The study revealed that there are a number of desirable features that agencies generally look 
for in compensation models. These desirable features were identified through content analysis 
and by placing all agency quotations on specific models into thematic matrices. The desirable 
features seemed to include both the agencies’ own preferences as well as a reflection on 
perceived client preferences. The following Table 7 provides an explanation of the 
constituents of each discovered desirable attribute as well as quotations to support their 
identification, definition and relative importance.  
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 Desirable Features of Compensation Models Table 7
Feature Rationale Supporting quotations 
Low risk  
1. Agency 
profit 
2. Client 
budgeting 
Reflection on how much risk was 
exerted on the agency’s profitability 
as well as how much risk did clients 
need to assume for budgeting 
purposes. Agencies were found to 
be generally highly risk averse. 
Clients, too, were generally inferred 
to be risk averse and to prefer 
budgeting for both agency fees and 
media expenditure to be predictable 
instead of fluctuating. 
LR1: ‘We need to make sure we get paid for the work done. Unfortunately it’s not 
free’ (Case 3). 
LR1:’It sets the scene for long-term cooperation that is stable” (Case 2). 
LR1: ‘Fees enable long-term development of a client account…not too much risks 
for the agency’ (Case 4). 
LR1: ‘Clients intend on growing so workload will hardly ever hold. Time bank 
makes it easy and reduces forecasting error’ (Case 5). 
LR2: ‘Slow moving, traditional client’s like to know their media budgets well in 
advance’ (Case 1). 
LR2: ‘Marketing managers don’t want large random performance bonuses to 
suddenly mess up their marketing budgets’ (Case 8) 
High Revenue Reflection on how much revenue 
potential the agency believes a 
model poses. This was only 
specifically emphasized by one 
agency (Case 1). 
‘Our agency focuses on high growth for ourselves and clients so we need a model 
that can support and incentivize that’ (Case 1). 
Fairness 
1. 
Reward/effort 
2. Reward/risk 
3. Ability to 
affect results 
A reflection of multiple elements 
that were perceived to contribute 
towards making a model fair for 
both the agency and the client. 
Fairness was broken down into 
three expectation elements:  
1) Sufficient pay for the effort and 
time exerted by the agency  
2) Compensation for the amount of 
risk the agency was expected to 
assume (reward/risk), 
3) The agency’s ability to affect the 
results on which it was expected to 
be evaluated. 
FA1:’We have calculated a fair price for the work and we have also had bad 
experiences where if we have calculated too few hours, we are unable to develop 
the account, which is not good for the client or us’ (Case 3). 
FA1: ‘The fairness approach is what we hope will eventually differentiate on us’ 
(Case 6). 
FA1, 2:’We created a [CPA] model we thought would be fair for both but the 
client rejected it because it was too expensive’ (Case 2). 
FA3: ‘Is it our fault, if results suddenly stop, if the client decided to cut on their 
TV expenditure’ (Case 5). 
FA3: ‘We want to be compensated for the results that come through our own 
work’ (Case 7). 
Results signal Reflection of how well a model, in 
itself, was perceived to signal a 
focus on accountability and ability 
of delivering results to the client. 
Note: It does not reflect the 
agency’s actual ability to deliver 
results as results can be delivered in 
any given model. 
‘As an ideology, or concept, everyone would like to only pay for results’ (Case 2). 
‘I suppose, if they [clients] could dictate the model, the CPA priced model is what 
they would want but we can’t really offer it to new clients’ (Case 4). 
‘We are an agency that focuses on results so we want it to be reflected in our 
compensation’ (Case 7). 
Flexibility 
1. Work 
content 
2. Workload 
3. Multiple 
client goals 
Reflection of how well the model 
can adjust to changes in work 
content (e.g. a client initially or 
later on also taking on display and 
email marketing), workload (e.g. an 
agency requiring to work more, if a 
client needed a large seasonal 
campaign or generally growing into 
a larger client), and the ability of a 
model to accommodate multiple 
client goals and attribution models 
for the same client (e.g. a client had 
both performance and branding 
goals). Contracts were generally 
suggested to be too rigid over time 
and risked becoming sub-optimal 
for both parties. 
F1: ‘In the larger client cases, SEM is part of a larger whole’ (Case 3). 
FL1, 2’AdWords is only a small part of what we do. The model needs to scale to 
help the client in other digital services’ (Case 7) 
F1, 2: ‘We can more easily offer an broader services to clients to take on e.g. 
analytics and email’ (Case 2). 
FL1, 2: ‘We use the same contract for all digital services. It keeps things simpler 
for the client…Contracts should live more according to the clients actual business 
needs when projects change and even the client may grow so much that pricing 
should change. This can be done but it has its own challenges’ (Case 4) 
FL1, 2,3:’Model needs to be easily scaled up or down so the client can easily buy 
an additional digital marketing service for a couple of months’ (Case 6). 
F2:’A common problem is to make the contract so tight that  it does not scale into 
either direction up or down and stops serving either party after a year or so. Then 
the client can’t get services from us and we can’t offer them what they need. This 
occasionally happens’ (Case 5). 
 
Simplicity 
1. Agency 
profit calc. 
2. Client 
budgeting 
3. Client 
understanding 
Reflection on how easy it was for 
the agency to calculate its own 
profitability (agency profit calc.), 
how easy it was for the client to 
calculate total advertising expenses 
(client budgeting), as well as how 
easy it was for the client to 
S1: ‘Hourly fees are a swamp of complexity for us internally so we avoid them’ 
(Case 8). 
S1& S3:’The compensation model would need to be sectioned up making it 
increasingly complex and challenging’ (Case 4). 
S3: ‘Clients can understand the model easily… This just makes the sales process a 
lot easier’ (Case 1) 
S1,2,3: ‘Easier for them when its fixed, easy to understand, easy to budget what 
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understand the model as the 
relationship progressed but 
particularly in the first sales 
negotiation situation (client 
understanding). 
the expenses will be, you don’t have to think so much at the client end’ (Case 2). 
S3:’’it’s easy to communicate that it will require X number of hours to do’ (Case 
7) 
S3: ‘The less there are numbers, the better. Clients are usually happier with 
shorter, simpler contracts, the better, safer and easier it usually seems to the 
client...more transparent’ (Case 5). 
S3:’If you think about marketing psychology, everything that you cannot 
understand is scary and then becomes an inhibitor for sales. Everything the client 
can understand, enables sales’ (Case 2). 
Transparency  A reflection on how easy it was for 
the client to keep track of what 
actions were being taken by the 
agency and how they create value. 
 
Highly important because perceived 
value was claimed to be the only 
real value. 
“We are moving towards complete transparency; We work for agreed hours and 
report on those hours”(Case 7) 
‘All models are fine as long as they are transparent for both parties’ (Case 5) 
‘For this price I get this kind of services aimed at producing this’ (Case 2) 
‘We use software so the client doesn’t necessarily feel that a lot is 
happening...’(Case 1) 
‘Even if we would produce really good results, but we would manage the client 
relationship poorly, the client might still change agency… You can’t just not 
communicate and send bills even if you know you are producing great results’ 
(Case 2). 
‘Remember, doing a good job is just them thinking you are doing a good job; 
perceived value is actual value’ (Case 1) 
Scalability 
 
Reflection on how easy it was for 
the agency to use the same model 
across multiple client types with 
varying business models and goals 
in order to minimize its own 
administrative burden. 
‘We use exactly the same model for all clients so ecommerce & what we call CPA 
clients’(Case 1) 
‘How do you create a model, which can be scaled across hundreds of clients, when 
all of them have different kinds of business models, different metrics and ways to 
place value of certain actions?’ (Case 2) 
‘We can easily apply the model [time bank] across various clients’ (Case 5) 
‘Must get something that is easy to work through every client’ (Case 6) 
‘Internal processes need to be simple and scalable from client to client so we don’t 
put time away from clients into admin’ (Case 8) 
 
After all quotations on specific compensation models were themed under what emerged as 
the various desirable features, each quotation was identified as either supporting or opposing 
the presence of a specific desirable feature in a given compensation model. This substantiated 
the respondents overall notion that no single compensation model was optimal as it revealed 
that the compensation models carried trade-offs between the desirable features. The below 
table summarizes the relative presence or absence of a desirable feature in a particular 
compensation model. The table has been compiled by first placing all agency quotations on 
specific models into thematic matrices and then creating an aggregate score of low, medium, 
or high based on whether the findings were overall consistently positive (high), negative 
(low) or occasionally conflicting (medium). The full set of respondent quotations as well as 
the rationale for each models’ derived aggregate scores for each attribute, are visible in 
Appendix 2.  
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 Compensation Model Desirable Feature Trade-offs Table 8
 
Traditional 
Commission 
Tiered 
Commission 
New 
Commission Fixed fees Time bank 
Performance 
bonus CPA  
Low risk Medium Medium Low Medium High Low Low 
Fairness  Low Medium Medium Medium High Medium Low 
Transparency Low Low Medium Medium High Medium Low 
Simplicity High Medium High High Medium Low Low 
Flexibility 
(within client) High High Low Medium High Low Low 
Scalability 
(across clients) High High Medium High High Low Low 
Results signal Low Low High Low Low High High 
High Revenue High Medium High Low Medium High High 
 
 
4.3 Moderating & Boundary Factors of Compensation Models 
This section provides a description of the boundary and moderating factors of compensation 
models. Moderating factors are defined as those that make a specific desirable feature more 
or less important. Boundary factors are defined as factors that make the importance of a 
feature cease completely. Each moderating and boundary factor and its effects on the relative 
importance of the desirable compensation model features are explained. The data has been 
largely organized into tables (Tables 9 though 19) for brevity.  
 
Model selection decisions encompassed both a reflection of agencies past experiences with 
clients as well as a desire to take new relationships to a particular level. Thus agencies were 
aware that certain moderating factors could reduce the potential negative effect of the 
absence or presence of a particular feature. The codes of T0 and T1 have been consistently 
used throughout the section to denote whether the variable would have an immediate or 
delayed impact on the compensation model decision and client relationship. The following 
table provides a summary of the features and their impact and these are further explicated in 
the subsections that follow. 
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 Moderating Factors Importance Impact on Desirable Attributes – Beginning Table 9
(T0) and During Relationship (T1) 
 
Low risk Fairness  Transparency Simplicity Flexibility  
Results 
signal Scalability  
High 
revenue 
Client 
knowledge & 
experience 
 
↑T0 ↓ T1 ↓ T0 ↑T0, ↑T1 
↓T0, (helps 
produce 
better actual 
results) 
  
Trust 
 
↑T0 ↑T0, ↓ T1 
 
↑T0, ↑T1 ↓T1 
  Historical 
trend 
  
↑T0 (Current) 
 
↑T0 
(Current) 
   Concern for 
agency 
reputation 
 
↑T0 
      Agency 
growth 
mandate ↓T0 
 
↓ T0 
  
↑T0 
 
↑T0 
Externalities ↑T0 ↑T0 
   
↓T0 
  Agency 
influence ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Client 
influence ↓T1 ? ? ? ? ? ↓T0, ↓T1  
 Agency 
experiential 
knowledge ↓T1 
       
Competitive 
environment 
↓T1, ↓T0 
(not 
currently) 
    
↓T0 
  Time 
constraints 
  
↑T0 ↑T0, ↑T1 ↑T0 ↓T0, ↓T1 ↑T0 
 
Goal type  
     
↑T0  
  Budget 
constraint ↑T0 ↑T0 
   
↓T0 
  *Impact of all variables denoted as a higher degree of the moderating factor leads to the denoted weighting.  
 
Contract Negotiation - Client Preferences, Negotiation Power, Experiential Data & 
Competitive Environment  
This section groups together a large number of moderating factors that were found to have 
similar effects. Table 10 summarizes the effect on specific feature evaluation in the beginning 
of the relationship (T0) as well as when the relationship progresses (T1). An upward or 
downward arrow denotes the increasing or decreasing importance of an attribute. Unaffected 
attributes are not included. The section below further explicates the feature evaluation and 
context. 
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 Agency vs. Client Negotiation Influence, Competitive Intensity & Agency Table 10
Experiential Knowledge Effect on Feature Valuation 
Attribute emphasis 
& effect 
Rationale Quotes 
↓↑Any agency 
specific feature 
preferences 
Agencies suggest their influence on 
model selection is generally higher 
than clients’ due to agency’s 
perceived role as model experts.  
 
 
---‘Clients usually provide very little thoughts or requests on what model 
should be used… Very little feedback on what model they have previously 
used or so forth. After a first meeting they may request an offer and we decide 
on a model. After we send it to the client they may come back to us to discuss 
the rates’ (Case 4). 
---‘Clients rely on our advice on model selection to understand what the 
models are’ (Case 6).   
---‘Only 1/20 clients ever instigate a compensation model negotiation’ (Case 
8). 
↓↑Any client specific 
feature preferences 
Agencies varyingly accommodate 
client preferences.  Specifc client 
preferences are suggested to be rare. 
---‘We don’t have to place models while being blind, we usually meet with the 
client a couple times and we try to map their needs and challenges and based 
on these assess what is the easiest model for them...Often we ask, which 
model would they prefer. The client will usually somewhat respond a couple 
that might be most preferable to them’ (Case 5). 
Scalability 
↓T0, ↓T1  
The total scope and volume of 
advertising reduces agency total risks 
and agencies that gain a larher scope 
may be willing to make more client 
specific adjustments either in the 
beginning or as the relationship 
progresses. 
---‘If the client has a really large scope of digital services (SEO, emails etc.) 
we might agree on a discount on their SEM services when the client as a 
whole becomes more profitable and less risky. We also get efficiencies when 
we not only analyze and monitor SEM performance but a larger scope of 
digital traffic’ (Case 4). 
---‘If there is only search, we need to calculate the profit very tightly just for 
that but if there is others then the profit is calculated more as a whole’ (Case 
3). 
Low Risk 
↓T0 (competition) 
↓T1 (client influence, 
experiential 
knowledge reduces 
uncertainty)  
 
Increased competition could make the 
agency need to compromise or at least 
reconsider its own risk bearing 
preferences in the beginning or as the 
relationship progresses.  
 
Agency experiential knowledge 
gathered over time with the specific 
client reduces uncertainty and the 
agency may be willing to bear more 
risks over time (T1)* Agencies 
seldom seek risk themselves so client 
influence is also usually involved 
before the agency assumes risk.  
---‘Another option is that we also look at the competitive situation and think 
about how our model plays with the competition’ (Case 5). 
---‘Finnish agencies have not been willing to take on models that assume that 
much risk and are so complex and difficult to setup’ (Case 7). 
---‘Clients hardly ever ask for them [performance-based models]’ (Case 2). 
---‘We are actually always ready to move towards a partially results based 
model but we need at least 3 months of our own data to establish the correct 
metrics levels….’ (Case 7).* 
---‘After a while, if we believe that the scope of the clients’ SEA should 
increase, we might suggest a higher monthly fee. Then a client may come 
back to us with a counter-offer saying that the increase of scope could be 
achieved through a performance bonus such that we will receive the bonus, if 
predefined goals are exceeded’ (Case 4).* 
 
The interview findings reveal that the SEA contract negotiation process usually involved the 
agency meeting with their prospective client once or twice to discuss the client’s needs. 
Larger client cases where the client held a bidding competition and submitted project 
specifications for what they wanted from the agency were suggested to be fairly rare (Cases 2 
& 5). Thus the majority of agency contract negotiation work involved the agency evaluating 
the client’s needs and submitting an offer to match the expected workload evaluated by the 
agency (Cases 2 to 8). The clients’ participation in negotiating the selected compensation 
model was agreed across cases to be small. Agencies usually only sought client’s input on the 
selected model to discover whether they had any particular preferences to accommodate. 
Model selection was thus usually based on expert recommendations made by the agency 
(Cases 3 to 7) or then entirely dictated by the agency’s only model used (Case 1, and mostly 
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also Cases 2 & 8 that usually only used the one fixed fee model). In the model selection 
process, agencies would discover whether they had any particular client preferences (bias 
towards a model or desirable feature) they needed to accommodate. Thus the focus of the 
initial contract negotiation process hardly ever focused on the contractual model itself but the 
rates and work scope within a model, which was usually recommended by the agency. All 
studied agencies reported that contract modifications within a specific compensation model 
(such as percentage commission, hourly fee) were frequent. 
 
In general, the scope of a client’s whole advertising was described to affect the contract such 
that if the client only wanted a narrow range of services, the agency would need to 
meticulously calculate that its profit was maintained at a certain level. If the client however 
also had other advertising such as display and social media, an individual contract could 
contain leeway to account for the client’s desired activities as a whole. 
 
Changes from one compensation model to another, over time, were found to be very 
infrequent and irregular apart from the general trend of gradually moving away from the 
traditional commission model. Also Case 7 had a common practice of frequently introducing 
the idea of performance bonuses in the beginning of the client relationship where it would 
take effect after 3 months into the relationship. Other agencies reported little to no changes or 
highlighted other changes in the account management work such as digging deeper into high 
potential accounts industries in order to justify a higher fixed fee (Case 2). Case 1 similarly 
reported that as the length of the customer relationship increased, it would increase its 
account management activities; the agency had even sent one of its client’s to an industry 
conference at the agency’s expense. The objective of increased account management 
activities was to retain the client and maintain their level of perceived value. Case 1 also 
reported that because most of its campaign building & set-up activities (value adding 
activities) were carried out during the first year of the client relationship, it would often 
decrease its percentage of media spend commission as its ability to add value to the client at 
the same rate reduced. 
 
The level of competitiveness in the market was found to have an effect on agencies valuation 
on their need to bear risks. Essentially the agencies reflected that should competition be 
fiercer, they might need to consider bearing more risk. Notably, this was not currently 
perceived to be the case. Moreover, agencies that accrued more experiential knowledge over 
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time through working with a client were willing to consider bearing more risks as the agency 
had a better idea of established performance levels so uncertainty was not as high as in the 
beginning of the relationship. Also, client negotiation power and tactics were found to, at 
least at one agency, have influenced the agency to bear more risks as Case 4 introduced a 
performance bonus instead of a higher fixed-fee as a means for expanding a client’s account 
later on in the client relationship. 
 
Historical Trend 
Compensation models in search engine advertising were found to have experienced trend 
changes over time such that some models were dominantly prevalent, being offered at certain 
times due to certain features becoming more or less important over the years. The general 
historical compensation trend echoed by several agencies (Cases 5, 7, 8) is summarized in the 
below Table 11.   
 
 Historical Pattern of Compensation Models in SEA & Effect on Feature Table 11
Valuation 
Time 
period 
Model Attribute 
emphasis & 
effect 
Rationale Reasons for deviation from norms 
- 2008 Traditional 
commission 
 
↑ Simplicity 
↓ Transparency 
• Traditional commissions had been the 
prevailing trend in advertising where 
simplicity was the norm. 
• Intransparent. Media budget 
inflexibility. 
2008- 
2012 
 
 
Fixed fees & 
performance 
(variations) 
 
↑ Results signal  
↓ Low risk 
 
• Traditional commissions began being 
replaced by fixed fees and performance 
model variations (CPA or model and CPA-
based performance bonus). 
• General distrust in SEA as a new industry – 
high performance expectations. Focus on 
signaling results. 
• Traditional commissions began 
being replaced by fixed fees and 
performance model variations 
(CPA or model and CPA-based 
performance bonus). 
• Agencies had bad experiences with 
performance-based models. Models 
require e.g. agency taking risk and 
compromising on flexibility. 
2012 - Fixed fees, 
time bank 
 
↑ Transparency 
↑ Flexibility 
• Fixed fees and time-bank as the new norms 
in a more mainstream industry. 
• Increasing movement towards 
transparency being more important 
for clients and flexibility when 
digital is growing quicker than 
traditional media. 
 
Client Knowledge & Experience 
Client knowledge & previous experience in digital marketing, SEA and working with 
agencies was also found to have varying effects on the client relationship and compensation. 
Table 12 summarizes the effect on feature evaluation in the beginning of the relationship (T0) 
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as well as when the relationship progresses (T1). This is followed by a further contextual 
description below. 
 
 Client Knowledge & Experience Effect on Feature Valuation & Relationship Table 12
Attribute 
emphasis & effect 
Rationale Supporting quotations 
↓Transparency 
(Less pressures), T1 
Knowledgeable clients can read 
results. 
---‘Working with people who know how to read results is easier. We just 
want to communicate how much revenue they got an at what cost, which is 
their profit’ (Case 1) 
↑Fairness 
(Agreement on 
importance), T0 
Knowledgeable clients are 
increasingly willing to pay a fair 
price. Higher knowledge levels 
typically correlated with larger 
clients. 
--- ‘Savvier clients understand that time equals money and if they want to get 
results, they will not come for free or in an hour or two per month’ (Case 3). 
---‘Smaller clients may sometimes think that a lower fee makes it cheaper not 
seeing that it will also limit the potential of the account… This is not a 
problem with the larger accounts probably because there are dedicated 
people responsible for search engine marketing and they see our side of the 
story as well...they have more experience on how it all work in general...’. 
(Case 4). 
---‘Large clients do not push down fees because they may often have 
personnel who have either worked with an agency for a long time or have 
actually in the past worked at an agency themselves. This is because they 
have seen both sides and understand how it works for both sides’ (Case 5) 
↓Simplicity 
(Less pressures), T0 
Knowledgeable clients are able to 
cope with more complexity.  
(See above)  
---‘The fact that the client was an intelligent buyer makes it obviously easier 
to talk to them and do sales with them...We tend to have a broader scope 
with them’ (Case 2).  
---‘If the client is not knowledgeable or responsive, it is difficult for the 
agency to push things and do as much as we can at our end, it just won’t 
work’ (Case 5). 
---‘Sometimes it can be frustrating if the client wants multiple things at the 
same time, like okay now there is just this specific small sum and the client 
wants to always be at the top slots of search, with a specific CPA…The 
variables fight against each other and cannot be optimized at the same time’ 
(Case 2). 
---‘The reason we want this model [performance bonus] is because it also 
makes the client commit to certain results. If we don’t nail down the metrics, 
the client may change their mind’ (Case 7). 
Flexibility 
(High knowledge), 
↑T0, ↑T1 
 
 
Flexibility (Low 
knowledge) 
↓T0, ↓T1 
 
Higher client knowledge correlates 
with increased scope & volume 
requiring more flexibility (work 
content, workload, goals). 
 
Flexibility in individual KPIs is a 
challenge for agencies. Inflexibility 
may even be preferable with clients 
with low knowledge because it 
requires the parties to set aside 
time to agree on the metrics. 
↓Results signal, T0  
(Less important, 
overall easier to 
produce actual 
results) 
Knowledgeable clients have the 
ability to demand more from their 
agencies (more pressures) but they 
were also described to understand 
the challenges with attribution and 
thus preferred non-performance 
models.  
 
A more knowledgeable client also 
helps their agency focus on the 
right things and eventually produce 
better results (regardless of the 
selected model). 
---‘If you know more about search, you can obviously assess the quality of 
the work better and demand more’ (Case 3). 
---‘A more knowledgeable client who is very informed is ready to go beyond 
a last click attribute on model to thinking about attribution within a wider 
context. With savvier clients when we move away from last click instant 
results to thinking more strategically about customer lifecycles, our 
compensation models actually move away from results. Then the KPIs must 
be different’ (Case 7). 
---‘Clients like the wrong numbers. A lot of work on having to educate 
customers on what is a conversion and other basic things’ (Case 6) 
---‘A knowledgeable client can focus on the right metrics for their firm’ 
(Case 2) 
---‘A client that is not quite up-to-date with this world will be difficult to get 
through that we would do the right things for them. Then we will be locked 
in doing what was best practice in 2008 and that is the challenge’ (Case 7). 
 
Client’s experience of working with agencies was frequently described to help the agency 
perform to a higher standard and enabled the agency to more easily reach a model that was 
mutually fair. This client knowledge could be gained either during the current relationship or 
the client’s previous agency relationships. Pressures for lowering fees were usually described 
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to only stem from small to medium sized clients as opposed to large clients. These smaller 
clients were suggested to not be able to understand the activities enabled by the appropriate 
fee unlike larger clients who often employed dedicated digital marketing experts. Client’s 
understanding and digital knowledge enabled them to both demand more from their agency, 
engage their agency better and as a byproduct motivate their agencies to better results. Most 
notably, higher knowledge levels correlated with larger clients who often used a broader 
scope of advertising thus passively emphasizing more flexibility. Client knowledge could 
already exist at the beginning of the relationship or developed over the course of the 
relationship. Client knowledge enabled a broader scope, which also required increased 
flexibility. Moreover, less pressure for taking on risker performance-based models came from 
more knowledgeable clients who were described to understand the complexity of attribution 
models.  
 
A recurring tension point in agency client relationships, which stemmed from inadequate 
knowledge, were issues with key performance indicators; more specifically what level they 
were at, how many could be achieved simultaneously and also whether clients could commit 
to keeping them fixed and remembering them. This was stated to be more frequent with 
clients that did not understand the necessity to select and maintain certain KPIs.  The overall 
consensus was that regardless of the model used, having clear, defined goals was an 
important part of the agency’s ability to deliver results since a “result” is whatever the parties 
have agreed is a result (Case 1, 3, 5, 7). Several agencies complained about clients often 
requesting for multiple conflicting goals to be achieved at the same time: 
It’s important to agree on a hierarchy of goals, if you want both cheap traffic and conversions with high 
value then that is just not going to work (Case 3). 
 
Moreover, it was suggested that the KPI disagreement problem existed across multiple 
stakeholders at the client. Case 1 elaborated on a large client case where ‘the CEO wants 
more profit, the guy below him wanted more revenue, and the person below him wanted 
more conversions’. A client’s failure to align its own stakeholders could even require the 
agency to sub optimize to keep its clients satisfied because ‘in the end, the customer is always 
right though as experts we have the responsibility to say that in the light of my experience 
and knowledge, this is not the best thing to do’ (Case 3). 
 
KPI alignment was generally suggested to be achieved through communicating with the 
client to agree on goals. This came at the expense of time investment from both parties. 
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Aligning goals could be achieved within the domain of any compensation model, however, it 
appeared that one agency used the performance bonus compensation model specifically for 
the reason that it created an easy gateway for getting both parties to the complete the time 
consuming process, which would then help the agency perform to expectations (Case 7). 
Overall, the findings suggested that the existence of disagreements on KPIs affected the 
compensation model attribute valuation such that a high degree of disagreement on KPIs 
made the agencies value inflexibility as opposed to flexibility. Thus it appeared that 
particularly, though not only, in the presence of clearly definable monetary goals (i.e. 
correlates with client goal type), agencies in fact value inflexibility in models because defined 
goals are easier to deliver on (e.g. Case 1 emphasizes ecommerce clients & Case 7 is a highly 
performance oriented digital agency).  
 
Trust 
Trust was found to play a crucially important role in agency relationships and compensation. 
Table 13 summarizes the feature evaluation effects of trust and this is followed by a 
contextual description below. 
 
 The Effect of Trust on Effect on Feature Valuation & Relationship Table 13
Attribute 
emphasis & 
effect 
Rationale Quotes 
Transparency 
↑T0 
 
Agency wants to signal its good quality by 
emphasizing transparency in the beginning. 
---‘We are moving toward complete transparency; We work for agreed hours 
and report on those hours’ (Case 7). 
Fairness 
↑T0,  
Clients are treated fairly in the hopes that 
they would become long-term business. 
 
‘It’s all about relationships and trust that helps us in retaining customers and 
growing them and ourselves in the long-term...The fairness approach is what 
we hope will eventually differentiate us. There are cowboys out there’ (Case 6) 
Flexibility 
↑T0, ↑T1 
 
Trust is an antecedent for clients increasing 
their advertising scope & volume and thus 
their business with the agency. Agency 
hopes and anticipates that trust will emerge 
requiring more flexibility (work content, 
workload, goals).  
---‘Our goal alignment usually best comes when we have proven to the client 
that we are worth their trust. The more we prove our value, the more the client 
will offer us challenge. … If the client does not trust us, they will not be able to 
accept what we are offering. If they have not worked with us, they will not 
accept those ideas… Being a trusted partner enables everything’ (Case 5). 
---‘Contracts should live more according to the clients actual business needs 
when projects change and even the client may grow so much that pricing 
should change’ (Case 4). 
Results 
signal, ↓T1 
(Less 
pressures) 
Trust (and experiential knowledge) removes 
pressures from the need to signal agency 
results producing capabilities through the 
model itself. The emergence of trust also 
reduces pressures off the need so deliver 
actual results when the client understands 
interdependencies between the client and the 
agency in producing results. 
Lack of trust means that a performance-
based compensation scheme cannot be 
verified (in the beginning of a relationship)*. 
---‘The relationship eases the tension off of the results. If we have a good spirit 
together, then results are something that are looked at together: Aha, so this 
time WE have not been able to achieve as much as we hoped. A good 
relationship means that problems are faced together, then it’s not anyone’s 
fault in particular, there is no blaming finger…’ (Case 8). 
---‘In my opinion the trust comes from people. Bad results aren’t a problem if 
things otherwise work well and good results are useless unless the client 
relationship is otherwise functional’ (Case 5). 
---‘A performance-based system requires trust but the agency is the one that sits 
on the analytics system. You almost need a third party to validate that there is 
no abuse’ (Case 8)*.  
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The studied agencies were entering into client relationships with the intension of creating 
long-term partnerships with their clients. The role of trust plays a pivotal role for the 
compensation model feature evaluation in both the initial and ongoing stages of the 
relationship: In the beginning when it is absent, but hoped and anticipated to emerge (T0), as 
well as when the relationship progresses and it became / did not become present (T1). 
Though the respondent’s definition of trust was not explicitly asked for, trust seemed to 
emerge between agency and client representatives, over time, through the quality and 
quantity of communication accompanied with results. Important means for building trust in a 
client relationship were suggested to be embedded in daily activities such as the agency’s 
quick response times, insightful suggestions as well showing interest in building the client’s 
account and demonstrating that the maximum value was being produced to the client at the 
current expense levels (e.g. Case 1, 3, 7). Most notably, trust was perceived as an antecedent 
of client growth as only a client that trusted the agency, over time, was going to take the 
agency’s (expansionary) advice. As trust built up, clients would (hopefully grow) and 
required more flexibility, which needed to be accounted for in the beginning of the 
relationship. Trust that emerged during the course of the relationship eased the tension off 
both the need to signal the agency’s ability to produce results through the contract type, as 
well as the actual need to deliver results when the client would become aware of the parties 
interdependencies in results production. Moreover, a lack of trust in the beginning of the 
relationship made using performance-based models difficult because their complexity almost 
required an intermediary to verify that there was no abuse.   
 
Time Constraints 
Time constraints were found to be an important moderating factor for client relationships. 
The effects of time constraints on desirable feature evaluation are summarized below in Table 
14.  
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 Time Constraints Effect on Feature Valuation Table 14
Attribute emphasis & 
effect 
Rationale Quotes 
Transparency 
↑T0, ↑T1 
Perceived value was claimed to be only 
value. Time constraints made agencies 
prefer models that would easily 
communicate to the client in simple terms 
what it is they were getting. 
 ---‘…it’s easy to communicate that it will require X number of 
hours to do” (Case 7). 
Simplicity 
↑T0, ↑T1 
Time constraints make agencies need to 
emphasize simplicity both in the beginning 
sales process as well as when the 
relationship progresses. 
 ---‘Developing the model can take up more time than actually 
producing the service and slows down the sales process (Case 8). 
---‘Compensation agreement negotiation takes up a lot of time 
that we don't want to waste too many times’ (Case 7). 
 ---‘Contract renegotiation can takes a lot of time’ (Case 1). 
---‘Model needs to be easily scaled up or down so the client can 
easily buy an additional digital marketing service for a couple of 
months’ (Case 6). 
 
Flexibility 
↑T0 
Renegotiating contracts is highly time 
consuming thus time constraints pressure 
preference for contracts that are more 
flexible from the start. 
Scalability 
↑T0 
Agencies want to limit their time on 
internal processes. 
---‘Internal processes need to be simple and scalable from client 
to client so we don’t put time away from clients into admin’ (Case 
8). 
Results signal 
↓T0, ↓T1 
Implementing complex results tracking 
systems takes up time that neither party 
has. Clients are unwilling to commit the 
time to set up performance-based models. 
 ---‘It [performance-based model] only requires more time and 
effort from the client side to decide to do it together but then it’s a 
different question whether they are ready to make that decision’ 
(Case 2) 
 
 
The role of communication time in trust building was viewed as extremely important for 
agency-client relationship success and longevity. The main constraint for transparency and 
results creation was found to be, in deed, the lack of time. Some agencies pinpointed the most 
important contributor to relationship success and longevity down to individual person-level 
chemistry and trust as this was the factor believed to make or break the client relationship 
(Cases 1, 3, 4, 8). Moreover, clients were suggested to take communication for granted and 
were hesitant to compensate their agencies for it because it did not directly contribute towards 
value creation. Furthermore, the paradox that emerged across all agencies was the fact that 
communication and the resultant client relationship quality superseded the importance for the 
agency to deliver actual results. Time constraints thus emphasized the need to make the 
model itself naturally transparent for the client. Clients were indeed argued to be irrational 
and Case 1 culminated their thoughts on client irrationality and the need for communicating 
value in this extreme thought-provoking example: 
Remember, doing a good job is just them thinking you are doing a good job; perceived value is actual 
value. ...What I am finding out now is that it may not be so important to make the client 20k more 
money, it is maybe more important to get them 10k more and then spend the extra time just letting 
them know how good you are, what you are going to do, just holding their hand through the whole 
process.... If we make then that 20k more, they should be very happy but the thing is they won’t 
understand that that 20k was only because you have the great software, you are focusing on profit, you 
have the AdWords account set up this great way. So what we should rather be doing is that focus less 
on doing really really well for the client and more on communicating what you are doing and why you 
are doing it, take them out for a dinner or whatever traditional way of doing it because the clients will 
not always make decisions based on rational results. 
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A related frequently suggested strain in the agency client relationship was that the person 
responsible for and specialized in account optimization was unlikely to be able to have the 
time to also manage the client relationship to a high level of standard, especially for a large 
sized account (Cases 3, 5, 7).  Case 5 explicated that the need for communicating the value 
created through SEM and other digital advertising had only recently grown to such a high 
magnitude as it correlated with the recent rapid growth of digital advertising budgets.  The 
study in fact revealed that several agencies (Cases 2 & 5) were in the early stages of 
conceptualizing some kind of a new digital account manager role to be a day-to-day 
middleman between clients and SEM consultants. Moreover, time constraints at both the 
agency and client ends made the agencies emphasize simple and flexible models that required 
minimal sales time and input from the client in both the beginning of the relationship and as it 
progressed. Time constraints also made the agencies focus on scalability to minimize internal 
admin time. 
   
Concern for Agency Reputation 
The findings indicated that the studied agencies had a strong concern for their reputation 
among clients and peers in the industry and that this made them emphasize attention to the 
element of fairness. The effects of reputational concerns are summarized in Table 15 below. 
 
 Concern for Agency Reputation Effect on Feature Valuation Table 15
Attribute 
emphasis & effect 
Rationale Quotes 
Fairness 
↑T0 
Agencies that highly 
care about their 
reputation 
emphasize fairness 
for their clients. 
---‘Clients rely on our advice on model selection and understand what the models are. The 
fairness approach is what we hope will eventually differentiate on us. There are cowboys out 
there’ (Case 6). 
---‘It’s a small market we care about our reputation and being fair with our clients in every 
respect’ (Case 3). 
 
Agency Growth Mandate 
The study found that agencies seemed to internally have a varying degree of growth desires. 
Notably, only one of the studied agencies was specifically found to be particularly aggressive 
about its growth desires (emphasizing the variable of “High revenue”) whereas other agencies 
growth desires were more subtly embedded in the element of fairness (reward/effort & 
reward/risk). Table 16 below summarizes how the degree to which the agency was seeking 
aggressive growth affected their attribute evaluation. 
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 Agency Growth Mandate Effect on Feature Valuation Table 16
Attribute 
emphasis, effect 
Rationale Quotes 
Transparency 
↓ T0 
 
The agency that sought high growth was willing 
to trade of transparency because the client was 
not expected to know the necessary things to 
achieve that quicker growth.  (Note: That the 
growth mandate reverses the effect of time 
constraint on making the model itself easily 
transparent for communicational purposes.) 
---‘It’s a good model [New Commission] because the truth is the client 
doesn’t even know what it is that we should be doing and we need to 
get there quickly’ (Case 1). 
Low Risk 
↓T0 
A high growth was expected to come with more 
risk taking.  
---‘We are able to bear a considerable amount of more risks than 
maybe other agencies because of the scalability element and market 
diversification’ (Case 1). 
 ---‘After a month the client will be like OK, you did not hit my 5:1 
return on investment you only did 4:1 why is that and then we’d get 
fired… The client can quit us any time, say, even one day in’ (Case 1). 
High revenue 
↑T0 
 
Agencies emphasis on a desire to gain high 
revenues and quick internal growth varied based 
on company preferences.  Others addressed this 
through profitability and fairness concerns. 
---‘We work a scalable business model and we are after significant 
growth for ourselves and our clients so we need to keep everyone’s up-
side potential open’ (Case 1). 
---‘Time bank has been offered for the past two years for us to 
maintain our own profitability…We can’t put up with unprofitability’ 
(Case 5). 
Results signal, 
↑T0 
(Less pressures) 
The agency emphasized its business model’s 
tendency to produce superior results and 
emphasized the client’s ability to leave the 
agency at any point in time, if results were not 
delivered. 
---‘We only focus on profit or revenue, nothing else…. It’s important to 
agree in a ratio of return…. We promise a certain return and work 
only towards that. I can freely focus on the products that have the 
highest profit impact as that will get us better results, more budget and 
more commission’ (Case 1). 
 
Externalities 
A number of externalities such as tracking system errors, seasonality and the use of multiple 
agencies were found to reduce the agency’s ability to affect the outcomes of their search 
engine advertising efforts. These were found to emphasize the sense of fairness, disincentive 
risk taking and thus reduce the importance to signal results through the model. Table 17 
below summarizes externalities effect on feature evaluation. 
 
 Externalities Effect on Feature Valuation Table 17
Attribute 
emphasis & 
effect 
Rationale Quotes 
Fairness 
↑T0 
Externalities (tracking system failure, 
heavy seasonality changes, use of 
multiple agencies) reduce the 
agency’s ability to affect outcomes 
(Fairness: 3. ability to effect results) 
making agencies emphasize fairness, 
unwillingness to take large risks and 
reduced the importance of signaling 
ability to produce results through the 
model itself. 
---‘The Finnish agency landscape is still very fragmented with clients having 
numerous agencies...there is at least three agencies sitting down in the same 
meetings.  When the landscape is fragmented, this means that everyone has had 
an effect on each other’s results and cannot be held accountable for the results. 
Using more performance-based models would require consolidation and we are 
far from it in this market’ (Case 5). 
---‘Client wants to set targets to be based on something that isn't actually under 
our control. …The performance of the web shop is based on a lot of other things 
like what they are doing offline like TV, Print and Radio, the campaigns of their 
competition etc. and that is not fair for us to’ (Case 7) 
---‘Seasonality & other media expenditures significantly affect how the client’s 
SEM does as a whole’ (Case 3) 
---‘Clients might delete tags off of their websites and then it’s difficult to verify 
results’ (Case 1).  
Low Risk 
↑T0 
Results signal, 
↓T0 
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Client Goal Type 
Whether or not the client had an easily quantifiable and meaningful goal was an essential part 
of whether it was important to consider signaling results and taking on performance-based 
models in general. Without a monetary value goal, these were deemed less relevant. Table 18 
below summarizes how client goal type affects attribute evaluation. 
 
 Client Goal Type effect on Feature Valuation Table 18
Attribute emphasis & 
effect 
Rationale Quotes 
Results signal 
↓ ↑ T0 
The lower the degree of 
measurability in terms of dollar 
value goals with a specific 
client, the less important results 
signal becomes for that 
individual client and vice versa.  
 ---‘They [CPA model] only work for a small segment of clients e.g. banks, 
travel packages or really simple online sales… there is a clear value at the 
end’ (Case 8). 
--- ‘It won’t work with clients that don’t have a clear dollar value related to 
a conversion’ (Case 6). 
--- ‘CPA based models are not applicable to all kinds of clients so such 
models are not easily scaled. Conversion volumes or values can be too low 
to base much on them’ (Case 4). 
 
 
Budget Constraints 
Budget constraints were found to be a significant factor in attribute evaluation and its effects 
are summarized in Table 19 below. 
 
 Budget Constraints’ Effect on Feature Valuation Table 19
Attribute 
emphasis & effect 
Rationale Quotes 
Fairness 
↑T0, ↑T1 
 
 
Agencies’ awareness & experience of 
client’s existing budget constraints mean 
that they fear that they might not be able to 
be compensated for the additional risk they 
assume. This makes them emphasize 
fairness more i.e. striking a good balance 
between reward/risk and emphasize fewer 
results signaling models. 
---’The truth is, we want clients that are looking for growth and if the 
client is truly looking for growth we pull the budget taps open for as 
long as it is profitable .As long as the client has inventory to sell, 
market demand should determine the budget spent...we just get it at 
the best possible rate of return on investment...This is usually, though 
not always the case’ (Case 2). 
---‘They [budgets] are meant to be uncapped but then they suddenly 
might not be. This limits the agency’s profit potential’ (Case 1). 
---‘Capped budgets stop the agency from taking more risk because 
their up-side potential can be limited’ (Case 6) 
 
 
Low Risk 
↑T0, ↑T1 
 
Results signal 
↓T0 
 
Budget constraints were described to be a frequent issue that made performance-based 
models less attractive, when the revenue potential of campaigns could be limited. Thus 
agencies believe no appropriate award might be available for taking on more risk. Budget 
constraints were suggested to stem from clients’ traditional way of doing things and this 
budget irrationality was lamented as it often stopped the agency from producing the results it 
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thought it could have been able to achieve. A capped budget affected agency motivation 
negatively as it reduced high profit potential as well as the opportunity of growing the agency 
remuneration under all compensation schemes when the scope of work remained limited. As 
such, budget constraints were also describe to affect overall agency motivation. 
 
4.4 Findings Summary: Agency Compensation Scheme Determination Model 
This section summarizes the agency compensation model determination process. No single 
model was considered optimal and comparing the models against each other involved 
evaluating the trade-offs to be made between the various desirable features. This evaluation 
was based on agencies own priorities as well as the presence or absence of moderating and 
boundary factors.  The moderating and boundary factors increased, decreased or eliminated 
the perceived importance or effect of each desirable feature either before the relationship had 
begun (T0) or during the course of the relationship (T1). The below Figure 5 illustrates in a 
model how the various factors affect how compensation models are determined 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model X 
  
Mod. 1:  
Client 
knowledg
e 
Mod.2: 
Compe
tition Etc. 
 
Model X 
Low risk Medium High Low  Low risk 
 
↓T0   Low 
Fairness  Medium High Medium 
 
Fairness  ↑T0 
 
  Medium 
Transparency Medium High Medium 
 
Transparency ↓ T1 
 
↑T0  Medium 
Simplicity High Medium Low 
 
Simplicity ↓ T0    Low 
Flexibility  Medium High Low 
 
Flexibility  ↑T0, ↑T1 
 
↑T0  Low 
Scalability  High High Low 
 
Scalability      Low 
Results signal Medium Low High 
 
Results signal ↓T0 
 
  High 
High Revenue Low Medium High 
 
High Revenue     High 
 
*Example: An agency ranks its preferences on the different features and e.g. considers Low Risk, Flexibility, Scalability and Simplicity 
particularly important leading it to prefer either Models 1 or 2.  Moreover, though Model 3 scores low on the desired attribute of Low Risk, 
the existence of particularly high Competition in the market means the normal preference for low risk might become less important and take 
precedence over other desirable features. 
Figure 5: Agency Compensation Scheme Determination Model 
Model Wants 
Agencies have 
preferences for 
compensation models 
features. 
Trade-offs 
All known available 
models carry trade-
offs between 
attributes.  
 
Moderating & 
Boundary Factors 
Increase /decrease  or 
eliminate the 
importance or effect of  
desirable features.  
 
Chosen Model 
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5 DISCUSSION  
The empirical contribution of this study is a process model for SEA contract selection that 
identifies the desirable and moderating features of compensation models and their boundary 
conditions. The study’s theoretical contribution lies in revealing when, where and how 
different theoretical lenses have explanatory power in the chosen context. The section begins 
with an initial discussion of the found compensation models. This is followed by an 
analytical dissection of the desirable and moderating features of compensation schemes. The 
final part ties the section together with tables and a discussion that synthesises the empirical 
context with the principals of agency theory, both in the initial and progressive stages of 
agency-client relationships.  
 
5.1 Compensation Model Analysis 
The study revealed a number of compensation models being used, mostly echoing that 
models used in traditional advertising were also applied to the SEA context. An important 
issue to revisit is the question of what actually constitutes behaviour versus an outcome-based 
compensation model, especially considering that this has already previously been found to be 
an issue of definition and debate (see Spake at al., 1999; Ellis & Johnson, 1993). Since nearly 
all of the studied agencies were found to be operating with contracts that could be easily 
dissolved within a short time, ranging from only days to a couple months, it could be argued 
that all of the contracts in SEA agency work are somewhat outcome-based: A client that is 
not satisfied with the results can dissolve the relationship fairly quickly since unbundling 
various online and offline advertising services between agencies was common. This seems 
especially true when the switching costs of a search engine advertising agency relationship 
seem considerably lower to that described by previous authors who studied creative agency 
work switching costs (Davies & Prince, 2010), where the client cannot similarly leave an 
agency with a built-up, fully functional AdWords account that may or even may not require 
continual management. 
 
The study revealed a completely new compensation scheme hereby named as the new 
commission scheme. Categorizing this scheme seems particularly difficult as the fee itself is 
based on media spend (behaviour-based), however no actions are detailed while the results 
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must be within a specified return or the agency can be dismissed at any point in time 
(outcome-based).  
 
The new commission scheme seems to be the first empirical account of a close variant of the 
theoretical ‘IRB’ compensation model conceptualized by Abou Nabout et al. (2012) briefly 
discussed in the literature review. Some clear differences do however exist. The new 
commission seems to, in fact, go beyond the conceptualized IRB model, as the use of 
automation solves the budget and bidding problem by removing human influence and letting 
the market and client profitability data direct optimal bidding and investment levels for 
ecommerce clients. Another key difference is also that the IRB bases the agency’s 
compensation on the profit of the client whereas the new commission bases the agency’s 
compensation on a percentage of the client’s media spend. As such, the theoretical scheme 
could be considered still slightly more performance-based than the discovered empirical 
scheme. A merge of the two schemes, with the commission of the new commission scheme 
being based on the profit as opposed to the media spend, could result in the ultimate 
performance-based model for performance driven ecommerce clients. Notably, this model 
was found to be highly inflexible and unable (a least without modifications and increased 
complexity) to accommodate for anything but performance SEA goals. This means that 
though it poses an interesting new opportunity for ecommerce advertisers, it is still not a 
complete ‘holy grail’ for advertisers seeking to expand into branding goals as well. This 
study serves to paint a more holistic picture of the multiple complex factors that alone and in 
conjunction affect the compensation model decision. As such, it reveals that it may be more 
practical for clients to focus on comparing the complete set of trade-offs between various 
models and assess what meets their firm’s specific requirements at a certain point in time 
instead of putting too much emphasis on wanting to compensate based on results or 
behaviours. 
 
Comparing the use of the various schemes across the types of agencies studied (see Table 6), 
the findings suggest that compensation scheme usage correlates with the history of the 
agency as well as the scope of its offerings (e.g. media agencies have a history of using 
commissions). This indicates that SEA cannot always be examined in isolation. Notably, the 
trend of which models being offered by each agency type seem to be diminishing as most 
agencies (Cases 2-8) conform either towards the fixed-fee or time-bank schemes. Literature 
suggested that advertising agencies typically shy away from fee-based models because of the 
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complex and synergistic nature of advertising that involves high degrees of creativity 
(Seggev, 1992: Zhao 2005; Lace, 200). This does not seem to be an issue of equal importance 
for search engine advertising as the nature of the work is significantly less complex and 
creative compared to creative agency work. As such, the fee is seems to be deemed 
appropriate. Previous studies also called for more in-depth studies on hybrid compensation 
models i.e. models that encompass both behaviour and outcome based elements (Spake et al. 
1999). This study reveals that their application in SEA services is currently at a very low 
level and seems to be driven by the importance  and emphasis on the desirable feature of 
simplicity.  
 
5.2 Discussion of Empirical Variables 
The following Table 20 summarizes the theories used to explain the desirable features and 
moderating factors of compensation models and these are analysed in more detail in the 
upcoming section.  
 
 Theoretical Groundings of Desirable Features and Moderating Factors Table 20
Desirable Features Moderating Factors Theoretical Explanations 
Low risk  
1. Agency profit 
2. Client budgeting 
3. High Revenue 
Agency growth mandate 
Budget constraint, 
Competitive environment 
Agency Theory, Prospect Theory,  
Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Fairness 
1. Reward/effort 
2. Reward/risk 
3. Ability to affect results 
Concern for agency reputation Agency Theory, Stakeholder Theory,  
Relationship Marketing, Trust  Literature 
Results signal  Agency Theory  
Flexibility 
1. Work content 
2. Workload 
3. Multiple client goals 
Simplicity 
1. Agency profit calc. 
2. Client budgeting 
3. Client understanding 
Transparency 
Time constraints Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Economics 
Scalability  Economies of Scale 
 Client knowledge & experience Agency theory (partially explained by task 
programmability) 
 Client negotiation influence 
Agency negotiation influence 
Historical trend & Experience 
Negotiation Theory,  
Trust literature,  
Institutional theory, Path dependency 
 Client goal type  
Externalities,  
Agency experiential knowledge 
Agency Theory 
 Trust Trust literature, Relationship marketing 
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Compensation Model Negotiation, Client Knowledge & Experience, Historical Trend & 
Agency Experiences 
Previous research had called for more investigations into the meaning of negotiation 
procedures in compensation model determination (Spake et al., 1999). Contrary to core 
agency theory literature, the findings of this study suggest that agencies have a considerably 
more active role in the compensation negotiation and model selection than merely accepting 
or rejecting an offer as had previously been assumed by multiple authors (Bergen et al., 
1992,: Spake et al, 1999; Zhao, 2004; Davies & Prince, 2010). This finding provides tentative 
support for the decade old claim by Zhao (2005) that the full spectrum of compensation 
models may (still) not be accurately understood by both parties.   
 
The phenomenon of agencies suggesting models could be explained by trust literature 
through the existence of general trust, meaning that there exists confidence in the agency 
through its reputation even before any actual interactions or performance takes place 
(Halinen, 1997). The phenomena could also be explained by negotiation theory whereby 
special knowledge and expertise can serve as the source of power (referred to as expert 
power) for one party to have its will be done over another’s in a negotiation situation (Kim, 
Pinkley & Fragale, 2005). Moreover, as agencies claim they have knowledge about the 
models and were found to usually make the first model suggestion, this could also to be 
triggering what negotiation theory refers to as the anchoring effect whereby the first offers act 
as anchors and have an 85% correlation with final outcomes (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). 
It should be noted that this negotiation flow does not necessarily mean that agencies have an 
upper hand in the overall negotiation proceedings since any given contract can still be highly 
efficient as clients were suggested to frequently discuss rates within a specific mode. A client 
could thus still be getting bargain rates within a proposed model such as a low fixed-fee. The 
implication of this finding is however that agencies’ own preferences, particularly for 
scalability across clients (discussed in more detail later), which primarily only benefits the 
agency, could be perhaps even subconsciously taking precedence over unique client needs i.e. 
flexibility within an individual client. The question that then follows is whether a client who 
is offered a fixed-fee might have considered themselves to be better served by a time-bank 
model, which some agencies might be less prone to suggest due to its administrative 
implications for the agency. The main trade-off between the fixed-fee and time-bank models 
is reduced simplicity to gain more flexibility (see Table 8). The time-bank model is less 
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simplistic for both parties yet the administrative burden falls harder on the agency side to 
keep keep track and communicate the activities and work completed.  
 
Moreover, the study revealed that agencies seem to have a tendency to fixate on only a small 
number of models and adhere to the models that clients expect. This phenomenon seems to 
not only be explained by scalability but also by the institutional theory perspective whereby 
agencies adhere to normalized industry practices (Eisenhardt, 1988) because these 
demonstrate its legitimacy (Zucker, 1987). 
 
Furthermore, in terms of compensation model determination, the competitive situation 
suggested that few agencies were pressured to offer performance based models. As such, a 
client’s ability to enforce a performance model request in the beginning of a relationship 
would be unlikely to succeed. However, as the relationship progressed, a reduction in 
uncertainty through agency experiential knowledge, made agencies willing to consider a 
performance-based model. For the majority of cases (all but Case 1 and Case 7) performance-
based models were not being actively offered by agencies, so a key determinant for these to 
be assumed is that the suggestion must come from the client. This seems to be in accordance 
with agency theory as agent’s are suggested to prefer behaviour-based models and thus 
unlikely to suggest otherwise. Moreover, though Ellis and Johnson (1993) speculated that 
contract tailoring and hybrid models could serve as a source of potential competitive edge for 
agencies, it seems that all apart from one agency (Case 7), do not view this potential as 
particularly lucrative. This seems to stem from all the trade-offs associated with the 
performance bonus model summarized in Table 8. 
 
The moderating factor of client knowledge seems to mostly relate to agency theory as 
existing somewhere between task programmability and information assymmetry yet it is not 
accurately captured by either. Task programmability focuses only on the nature of the task 
itself as being either dynamic or static thus affecting how difficult and costly it is to set up 
monitoring for the task (Eisenhardt, 1985). As such, it’s most stringent definition does not 
account for the participants’ understanding or experience of how programmable a task is. 
Moreover, the element of information assymmetry mainly examines the principal’s different 
levels of knowledge of the agent’s behaviours and the costs associated with getting this 
information (ibid). Thus it does not accurately capture the notion that over time, the principal 
may not only have a better understanding of the agency’s way of working but also a 
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developing understanding of the task itself. In summary, the elements of agency theory 
cannot accurately account for either participant’s initial or growing experiential knowledge of 
the nature of the task over time. The findings of this study indeed suggest that client 
knowledge of the task improves over the principals’ experience gained through both firsthand 
AdWords experience as well as experience gained through previous and current agencies. A 
significant factor also seems to be that both clients and agencies’ previous experiences can be 
either positive or negative and this experiential baggage may be carried over into future new 
agency-client relationships. This was suggested to be the case in regards to performance-
based models whereby both agencies and more experienced clients avoid performance-based 
models due to awareness of the issues associated with them. This phenomenon could be 
explained by path dependency whereby previous experiential history influences future 
decisions in complex environments, even when previous circumstances no longer prevail 
(Koch, Eisend & Petermann, 2009). Considering the high compensation model concentration 
on only certain models, this indicates that path dependency may be a significant decision 
making factor for both clients and agencies alike. Moreover, the study revealed that agencies 
had fewer problems with agreeing on and maintaining KPIs with clients that had a higher 
level of knowledge. This finding is in keeping with agency theory, which sugges that that 
goal conflict is indeed reduced by less information asymmetry between the parties (Spake et 
al, 1999) adding, however, that this can already pre-exist in the beginning of the relationship 
and not only as a particular relationship progresses. 
 
Interestingly, the element of client knowledge and experience seems to be following what the 
porposition of task programmability would predict (see Table 4). The findings suggest that 
clients with particularly low levels of knowledge and experience in SEA (typically small 
clients) were more likely to request outcome-based compensation models. The study also 
finds that the opposite is true: a higher degree of client knowledge results in the higher use of 
behaviour-based models as clients that were described to be highly familiar and experienced 
with SEA were argued to prefer behaviour-based models. As such, client knowledge levels 
seem to follow the same pattern as what the proposition of task programmability would 
predict though the above discussion emphasizes that the two cannot be taken as synonymous. 
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Simplicity, Flexibility, Transparency & Time Constraints 
The moderating factor of time constraint and related desirable features of simplicity, 
flexibility and transparency seem to be explained by agency theory and more specifically 
through its roots in transaction cost economics (Arrow, 1969; Williamson, 1985). In the 
beginning of the relationship, under circumstances of information asymmetry, agencies will 
prefer models that will minimize time expenditure costs that go into contract negotiation. A 
simple model is preferred because it is an easier and quicker sale that minimizes time costs 
for both to communicate and understand the contract scope. Some agencies were also taking 
negotiation time further into consideration longer down the line through the element of 
flexibility (e.g. through the time bank model), which then allowed them to minimize 
negotiation time expenditure also later in the relationship. Moreover, the preference for 
transparency in contracts is directly explained by agency theory whereby a model that allows 
for clearly communicating what actions are being taken is preferred as this will reduce 
monitoring costs for clients. 
 
The need for flexibility warrants further discussion as it is an important consideration for 
efficient contract determination for the SEA context. This is because flexibility involves 
examining the nature of the work and amount of effort required at various stages of the 
relationship. For the purpose of efficient contract determination, the study suggests that the 
nature of SEA is such that it may experience diminishing marginal returns, whereby an 
agency can add a considerable amount of value in the beginning but less as the account 
becomes more developed (Case 1). The implication is that the required workload reduces 
considerably over time unless there is something in the nature of the client’s business, which 
requires considerable changes, or then there emerges a large new feature up-date for 
AdWords, demanding more work. The study included a number of different agencies (SEM, 
Digital and Media) in order to provoke differences between their service offerings. Based on 
the study, it seems that agencies stabilize the issue of diminishing marginal returns by 
broadening the total scope of overall services offered to the client over time. This enables 
them to justify either growing the account and agency remuneration, or then maintain the fee 
at a stable level. Overall, the findings indicate that regardless of the model being used, clients 
should carefully consider what rate they are paying at each stage with varying levels of effort 
and added value. Key to this is maintaining contract negotiation terms such that this is 
possible or then selecting a model that allows for easy adjustments.  
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Low Risk, High Revenue, Competition, Agency Growth Mandate 
The findings related to agency and client risk preferences reveal both alignment and deviation 
from what agency theory would predict. On the agency side, the majority of agencies were 
indeed found to follow the classic model of what agency theory would predict. These 
agencies were risk averse and there was no indication that this risk aversion would not remain 
stable over time as has been suggested (Eisenhardt, 1989: Eisenhardt 1985). Consequently, it 
seems that very little portfolio risk diversification, beyond merely having a large client base, 
was taking place. This seems to be contrary to what previous scholars had assumed to be the 
case in advertising (see Davies & Prince, 2010). Moreover, these agencies would only accept 
risk should the competitive environment require them to do so (Ellis & Johnson, 1992). This 
was evident from the domineering preference for models that were deemed to be high in, the 
desirable feature, of low risk as well as the complaints that clients were unwilling to 
compensate the agencies for risk transfer should either party suggest a performance-based 
model. The findings however revealed that these same case agencies were not indicating a 
particular preference for high revenue (only fairness i.e. reward/risk or reward/effort) and 
high revenue was explicitly emphasized by only one agency, the new market entrant Case 1.  
This contrasting finding revealed that a more accurate explanation for the apparent 
phenomena could be provided by prospect theory whereby the majority of the studied 
agencies were in fact loss minimizers as opposed to profit maximizers as has been previously 
suggested could be the case in social settings (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 2012; Mukherji & 
Wright, 2002). Moreover, only Case 1 seemed to have what was labelled as a high growth 
mandate in the empirical model, which was leading it to be willing to take a higher amount of 
risk. Thus, the profile of this agency seemed to fit that of a prospecting strategy whereby the 
agency was seeking new markets and willing to assume more risk due to strategic reasons 
(Miles & Snow, 1978 referred to in Cuevas-Rodrigues et al. 2012). Overall, the findings 
suggest that for the specific context of SEA, it is sufficient to examine agency risk 
preferences on the agency level as opposed to take it to the individual agency employee level. 
However, considering the qualtiative nature of the study, it should be noted that the other 
agencies may also have implicitly considered high revenue to be an ouctome of the other 
models. 
 
Prospect theory also seemed to have further explanatory value in explaining client-side risk 
aversion. On the client-side, the study revealed that clients, too, were described to be highly 
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risk averse but that this had experienced changes over time: Clients were argued to be no 
longer as systematically concerned about the value of AdWords advertising, resulting in less 
performance-based compensation models being demanded of agencies in more recent times. 
This further supports the notion that risk preferences can vary over time based on contextual 
factors (Kahneman & Traversky, 1979). Furthermore, contrary to agency theory predictions, 
the case agencies’ descriptions of client risk aversion revealed that client’s risk utility curves 
seem to also have similar characteristics to that of agencies: Risk averse clients preferred 
behaviour-based models (fixed-fees and time-bank) because these mitigated the risk of 
sudden changes in the client’s marketing budget for both agency fees as well as media 
expenditure. This agency theory anomaly and resulting similarity in risk utility curves seems 
to be explained at least partially by the limiting contextual factor of budget constraints; 
clients in the real-world do not have a running budget tap even if advertising were successful. 
Too much unexpected success is thus even perceived as a problem and requires agency fees 
and media expenditures to be more or less accurately predictable.  
 
Client Goal Type, Agency Experiential Knowledge, Externalities 
The moderating factors of client goal type, agency experiential knowledge and externalities 
are clearly explained by and in line with agency theory: The more measurable the outcome 
and the higher the effect the agency believes it has over the outcomes, the more likely it is for 
outcome-based compensation models to be used (Eisenhardt, 1989; Spake et al. 1999: Ellis & 
Johnson, 1993). The empirical findings however suggest that the underlying drivers may not 
only be purely economical agency costs and risk calculations but an overall sense of fairness. 
This is perhaps more accurately explained by stakeholder theory (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 
2012). 
 
Scalability 
A compensation scheme’s desirable attribute not explained by agency theory is the agencies 
preference for models to be scalable across their client portfolios. Agencies’ drive for 
scalability across clients can be seen to be primarily motivated by the basic economic and 
accounting principle of economies of scale whereby it is desirable for a firm to limit variance 
in order to minimize its total average (service) production costs (Silberston, 1972). Scale and 
scope economies in keeping overall agency costs low have previously proven to exist within 
individual accounts as well as being found to be an important factor for agencies (Silk & 
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Berndt, 1993). In essence, the cost savings achieved through agencies’ scalable operational 
model could be enjoyed entirely by the agencies themselves in the form of higher profit 
margins.  It is, however, also possible that internal scalability also helps maintain low costs to 
an agency’s entire client base. Thereby clients could also experience scalability as an indirect 
benefit. Compensation model determination is a multivariate decision, so considering the 
dominant importance of low risk, it could be that the scalability preference is a convenient 
by-product, simultaneously fulfilled by the higher importance of other factors such as 
flexibility. 
 
Results Signal 
The desirable feature of results signalling seems to be explained by the hidden information 
model of agency theory (Bergen et al., 1992) whereby an agent engages in activities that 
reveal its nature and capabilities to the principal. Echoing the suggestions of Crain (2010) the 
study revealed that emphasizing the characteristics of a compensation scheme itself could be 
used in the sales negotiation process to reinforce an agency’s message of its ability to deliver 
results. Conversely, other models that did not signal accountability were suggested to even 
serve as a negative signal should the conversation move too far from results to discussing 
working hours.   
 
Perceived Fairness & Concern for Agency Reputation 
The desirable feature of fairness as well as the moderating factor of concern for agency 
reputation can be seen to have multiple theoretical explanations. When broken down into its 
constituents (reward/risk, ability to effect results, reward/effort), it is seemingly explained 
and in line with agency theory: The agent is only willing to take on client risks, if a premium 
is offered for the risk transfer, the agent must be able to have a clear affect on outcomes, and 
an efficient contract does not under or over compensate the agent (Ellis & Johnson, 1993). 
The last part however requires additional theoretical explanation because though the element 
of reward/effort meant that risk averse agents want to make sure that they are adequately 
compensated, the same agencies suggested that they would feel obliged to also return a part 
of the fee, if they perceived themselves to be largely overcompensated. Moreover, the 
importance of this desirable feature increases as the agency becomes more concerned for its 
reputation. These joint findings are indeed not explained by agency theory, which assumes 
that an agency is only motivated by self-interest and focused on maximizing its fees and 
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minimizing its efforts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Coughlan & Sen, 1989). This deviation could still 
be partly explained by agency theory itself when a short-term profitability time horizon is 
replaced by a long-term time horizon: Risk averse agents want long-term business, which is 
making them act in ways that will minimize their risk of losing the client. A further 
illustrative explanation could be offered by combining relationship marketing theory and 
stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory explains how agents as social beings generally value 
relationships, justice and fairness in their business dealings (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 2012) 
and relationship marketing clarifies how emphasizing the relationship is not necessarily mere 
altruism, but that being in a relational mode can be motivated by this being profitable for the 
firm (Grönroos, 1997). This seems plausible especially considering that it is generally more 
costly for a firm to acquire new clients than maintain existing ones (Grönroos, 1990). The 
findings of this study support the notionsince several agencies emphasized the existence of a 
high quality relationship and trust as being the key to the agency being assigned more work 
and challenge. This interpretation is further supported by previous empirical findings that a 
sense of justice affects advertising agency and client commitment to their relationships 
(Davies & Prince, 2010). 
 
Trust 
Trust was overall found to be an important moderating factor for advertising agency 
relationships and compensation models. In terms of classifying the agencies relationship 
marketing strategies, it seemed that all agencies were in a relational mode (Grönroos, 1997), 
whereby they believed that creating high quality long-term relationships was a profitable 
business. Even Case 1, which desired to operate a more scalable business was beginning to 
realize the importance of fostering the relationship to ensure its longevity. As such their 
behaviours were accordingly focused on creating perceived value as was suggested to be 
important (Grönroos, 1997). All the agencies stressed the importance of perceived value 
resulting from both the core value as well as the added value activities of customer service 
and communicating the value creation process itself.  
 
Trust played an important role in determining agency compensation models at each step of 
the relationship. The findings from Case 8 corroborate the claims of Spake et al. (1999) who 
maintain that the absence of trust is an impediment to the adoption of performance-based 
compensation in the beginning of a relationship: Tracking systems may be so complex that 
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they require a high degree of trust especially, if the tracking system is managed by the agency 
side. This phenomenon in not captured by agency theory, which assumes that a performance-
based compensation model is indeed preferable particularly in the absence of trust 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
As the agency-client relationship progressed, trust enabled growth, which made flexibility 
more important to accommodate growth. Adding in a multitude of additional media and 
various branding and performance goals thus also made outcomes less easy to ascertain. As 
such, the emergence of specific trust i.e. trust that emerged through interactions (Halinen, 
1997), over time, could indirectly lead to reduced outcome measurability. This type of 
causality is outside the predictive capabilities of agency theory. 
 
Interestingly, the findings of the study do not directly support the proposed link between 
agency theory and trust literature whereby trust reduces monitoring costs in principal-agent 
relationships (Beccera & Gupta, 1999).  This is deemed to be the case because regardless of 
what compensation model was being used or whether the relationship had high or low trust; 
agencies constantly faced the need to spend a large amount of their time reducing information 
asymmetry by communicating value to their clients. This involved communicating both what 
actions had been taken and what results had been achieved because clients want to hear about 
both agency efforts as well as results. As such, the finding indicates that if agencies are in a 
relational mode and seeking to build and maintain trust, both behaviour-based and outcome-
based contracts involve a high degree of monitoring costs to the client. This finding is 
contrary to agency theory, which assumes that monitoring costs and cost of measuring 
outcomes and risk transfer are on opposite sides with one that focuses only on verifying 
actions and another on verifying results (see Figure 1 by Eisenhardt 1985). As a theory based 
on economic and bounded rationality, agency theory does not accurately capture the 
important difference between perceived value and actual value as well as how it affects the 
relationship. Essentially, for a client to make an outcome-based compensation model truly 
efficient, it would need to signal to its agency its desire to have a purely transactional mode 
relationship and then expect nothing more than a numerical report. It seems that especially 
Case agency 1 would appreciate clients such as these as it operates a comparatively more 
transactional relationship than the other case agencies, however based on its practical 
experiences with clients from various international markets, such clients seem few. 
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Another highly important finding was that trust, characterized as a high quality interpersonal 
relationship between the parties, was not only found to reduce the agencies’ need to signal 
results but also to produce actual results. The reduced need to signal results in a relationship 
characterised by trust is most likely explained by reduced information asymmetry as the 
client gains positive experiential knowledge about the nature of the agent. Essentially the 
client’s fear of adverse selection diminishes when the agency has already proven its value. 
The reduced need to produce actual results was explained by the client understanding that 
there existed a clear reverse agency relationship whereby the agency is highly dependent on 
the client in order to produce results. It appears that the emergence of trust also mitigates the 
agent’s fears of moral hazard, when it believes and trusts that the partner is working to the 
best of its abilities under environmental uncertainty. The client’s willingness to overlook the 
agency’s shortcomings can be further explained by stakeholder theory whereby the agency’s 
previous trustworthy and dedicated behaviour has created social debt with which the client is 
willing to overlook the fact that it’s purely economic expectations may not always be met 
(Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 2012)   
 
In aggregate, as already predicted in the literature review, the key limitation of agency theory 
was found to be its inability to encompass the element of trust between the client and the 
agency as well as how trust evolves and affects the client relationship over time. 
 
5.3 Agency Theory Contextual Synthesis 
This section of the discussion synthesises the empirical context and empirical model findings 
with the principles of agency theory. In summary, the findings from the study suggest that 
when the empirical model variables are combined with the main constructs of agency theory, 
agency theory serves as a good predictor of compensation model decisions in the beginning 
of the agency-client relationship however that predictive accuracy diminishes as the 
relationship continues. For this reason, the empirical contexts of T0 (beginning of the 
relationship) and T1 (existing relationship) are examined separately. 
 
5.3.1 Predicting Initial Compensation Model Selection with Agency Theory 
Agency theory’s key limitation for describing initial compensation model determination is 
that it does not accurately capture the meaning of the negotiation process in compensation 
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model selection, nor does it explain the differences of importance between the different 
variables. The below Table 21 provides an overview of the combined theoretical and 
empirical model variables. The blue indicators delineate the situation(s) found in the 
empirical context before a contract is struck (T0). The relative concentration of the dots on 
the left side accurately indicate that a behaviour-based model is usually selected in the 
beginning of the relationship, unless the agency is less risk averse or the competitive 
environment exerts more pressures. Essentially, agency theory provides accurate initial 
compensation scheme predictions due to the very high importance of agency risk preferences 
and outcome measurability in determining initially selected schemes. 
 
 T0 – First Contract Determination Context Table 21
Behavior                                  Outcome Desirable 
Features 
Moderators Explanation 
Low Monitoring Costs
 
High Simplicity, 
Transparen
cy,  
 Monitoring costs are perceived to be generally high but these can be 
reduced by agencies’ frequent communication and choosing models 
that are easier for client to understand and track tasks. 
High
 
Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Low Low risk Externalities Agencies generally found to perceive the environmental uncertainty 
to be high e.g. client seasonality. (Case 1 tackles this issue by 
portfolio diversification as suggested by Davies & Prince, 2010)  
Low Outcome 
Measurability 
High Flexibility Client goal 
type, 
Time 
constraints, 
Trust (absent) 
Agencies perceive outcome measurability, per se, to be high due to 
level of tracking technologies but time constraints, externalities and 
the lack of trust make the ease of measuring outcomes generally low 
and more costly in terms of set-up and maintenance time. Also, 
clients have various performance and branding goals making it 
difficult to satisfy all of these. The absence of trust makes verifying 
outcome-based contracts costly in the beginning of a relationship. 
Low Effect on Outcomes High Fairness Externalities Perceived to be low due to seasonality, use of other media & multiple 
agencies. 
Low Goal conflict High  Client 
knowledge 
Goal conflict manifested mainly as conflict on KPIs (selection & 
maintaining over longer periods of time) and was higher with clients 
perceived to have less experience and knowledge of SEA. Case 7 
idiosyncratically suggests that an agency may suggest an outcome- 
based contract in order to align goals.  Agency theory predictions are 
thus fulfilled but not because the client wants to transfer risks but 
because the agency wants to make sure it can perform to 
expectations. Overall, there is no conclusive evidence that initial goal 
conflict results in higher use of performance-based models as was 
already found by Spake et al. (1999). 
High Agency 
Risk Aversion 
Low Low risk, 
High profit 
Fairness,  
High growth 
mandate, 
Competition 
Majority of agencies found to be highly risk averse and more 
specifically loss minimizing (prospect theory). One agency willing to 
assume risk due to apparent prospecting strategy. Generally the 
current level of competition requires competitive fees but does not 
require taking on risk. 
Low Client 
Risk Aversion 
 
High Low risk, 
Fairness 
Results 
signal, 
Competition 
Some (smaller) clients are suggested to be more risk averse and ask 
for outcome-based contracts to which agencies are not pressured to 
agree in the beginning of the relationship due to the competitive 
circumstances. 
 
Notably, clients risk aversion function seems to operate much like 
that of agencies’ such that they, too, prefer predictability and 
convenience in the fee. 
Long Relationship 
Length 
Short 
 
  NA [no support for Spake et al. (1999) notion that high initial goal 
conflict and high monitoring costs would lead to performance based-
models] 
Short
 
Long Low risk Externalities When the relationship is new, uncertainty is high and it is difficult to 
measure effect on outcomes (even Case 7 that has performance bonus 
will not have bonus take effect until later.) 
High Task 
Programmability 
Low Fairness Client 
knowledge 
The more the client knows in advance about SEA and digital, the 
more likely it is suggested to use behavior-based contracts (fees & 
time-bank) and pay what agencies consider a fair price. 
 
 94 
 
5.3.2 Predicting Changes to Compensation Model Selection with Agency Theory 
The main factors that change as the relationship progresses were found to be the client’s 
experience of perceived value as well as the emergence or absence of trust in the relationship.  
The findings of the study suggest that the compensation model predictive capabilities of 
agency theory reduce as the length of the agency-client relationship increases, as the relative 
importance of the various desirable features change. The following Table 22 with the red dots 
summarizes the found changes to the empirical context over time. The following section 
discusses these in more detail. 
 T1 – Consecutive Contract Determination Context Table 22
Changes 
over time 
Behavior                                  Outcome Desirable 
Features 
Moderators Explanation 
- Low Monitoring Costs High Simplicity, 
Transparen
cy,  
Trust Monitoring costs do not significantly reduce 
over time as agencies need to continually 
communicate value to clients in terms of both 
discussing results as well as how they were 
achieved. Trust also requires interaction. 
Change 
(less 
uncertainty) 
High Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Low Low risk Externalities, 
Agency 
experiential 
knowledge 
Perceived uncertainty due to the environment 
was found to somewhat reduce and make some 
agencies willing to consider the use of 
performance-based models (e.g. Case 5, 7). 
Potential 
changes (less 
easily 
measurable) 
Low Outcome 
Measurability 
High Flexibility Time 
constraints, 
Trust (absent 
or present) 
 
Client 
knowledge 
If trust has not emerged in the relationship, the 
client is unlikely to continue with the agency as 
switching costs are relatively low. If trust has 
emerged in the relationship, and the agency can 
grow the client (workload, various use of 
media, multiple goals), this places additional 
pressures on flexibility making outcomes 
potentially less measurable than before.  
Change 
(higher effect 
on outcomes) 
Low 
 
Effect on 
Outcomes** 
High Fairness Externalities Some agencies report improved clarity of effect 
on outcomes and become willing to take on 
more performance-based elements (Cases 4, 7) 
Change 
(More or less 
goal conflict) 
Low Goal conflict 
 
High  Trust If trust has emerged in the relationship, 
perceived goal conflict, if it existed, has 
reduced once there is a high quality 
interpersonal relationship. If trust has not 
emerged, clients may simply switch agency 
instead of model as model change does not 
tackle adverse selection problems. 
- High 
 
Agency 
Risk Aversion 
Low Low risk, 
High profit 
Fairness 
High growth 
mandate 
No indication of changes in agency risk 
aversion due to relationship length.  
- Low Client 
Risk Aversion 
 
High Low risk, 
Fairness 
Trust 
Results signal 
No indication of changes in client risk aversion 
due to relationship length however trust 
reduces the pressures to signal result producing 
capabilities and the need to deliver actual 
results. 
- 
Long  
Relationship 
Length 
Short 
 
 
 Trust Less goal conflict due to trust but monitoring 
costs remain approximately the same due to 
continual need to communicate value. If there 
is no trust and no perceived value, the client 
may terminate the contract due to low 
switching costs.  
Change (less 
uncertainty 
and easier to 
measure) 
Short Long
 
Low risk Externalities 
 
Less uncertainty and easier to measure effect 
on outcomes. 
Change 
(More or 
less) 
High Task 
Programmability* 
 
Low  Client 
knowledge 
If client knowledge and experience have 
increased during the relationship, the client 
may require more flexibility in task content 
(favors behavior), be able to cope with more 
complexity (favors outcome) or understand the 
challenges with attribution and the nature of 
agency work (favors behavior).  
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As the relationship progress, the client has several options to choose from depending on the 
circumstances: 1) Increase or decrease remuneration in the existing model, 2) Change model 
to other behaviour or other outcomes, or 3) Terminate the contract and relationship. Cross-
case analysis suggests that there are overall very little changes to compensation models 
within or between contracts but contract termination and clients moving between agencies is 
fairly frequent.  
 
Agency risk aversion (low risk and competition in the empirical model) seems to be the 
largest determining factor in compensation model selection. As agency risk aversion remains 
stable over time, this indicates that transferring risks over to the agency does not become 
significantly cheaper over time. As such, if a client has not had a positive experience with an 
agency (high trust and perceived value), it is more likely to either succeed in bargaining a 
lower fee or then terminate the relationship (assuming it fell victim to adverse selection), as 
opposed to agree to a relatively expensive performance model that also requires additional 
set-up time investment.  
 
The findings of the study indicate that the majority of agencies are loss minimizing and will 
thus suggest to begin a relationship with a largely behaviour-based model. This, together with 
the finding that the majority of compensation models remain behaviour-based even though 
there is a reduction in environmental uncertainty over time (that should predict an increase in 
behaviour-based models), suggests that the expalantory usefulnesss of the agency theory 
assumption of a linear risk-utility curve diminishes as the relationship progresses. A 
movement to outcome-based models seems only likely if the client specifically requests it 
indicating that they are willing to put in the extra time, which was found to not usually be the 
case. Willingness to invest extra time undoubtedly also requires that the client believes that 
the investment will be well worth it.  Indeed the reasons for the stagnancy between contract 
types seem to support the proposition made by Hendry (2002) who makes the explicit 
distinction between guidance costs and monitoring costs, suggesting that principals will 
prefer informal measures of communicating and guiding their agencies as long as the 
expected benefits of outcome-based contracts do not justify the costs of taking the time to 
specify results. As seems intuitively logical, compensation schemes do not seem to change 
unless there is a clear benefit to be gained, and it appears this is often not believed to be the 
case. This also supports the earlier suggestion by Spake et al. (1999) who argue that 
advertising must be an important part of the marketing mix to the client because measurement 
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is neither cheap nor trivial. The findings thus indicate that the introduction of the concept of 
switching costs to augment agency theory is indeed important as was suggested by Davies & 
Prince (2010). The findings in this particular empirical context, however, do not necessarily 
fully support the hypothesized model changes as presented in Figure 3 whereby model 
selection will follow an outcome-behaviour-outcome change pattern. The initial deviation 
from the hypothesis is explained by the dominant influence of agency risk aversion, usually 
ruling out performance-based models and causing a jump directly to the second stage. The 
findings generally seem to support the authors’ third notion that outcome-based contracts are 
associated with later stages of the relationship and with higher switching costs. As such, the 
reasons why most clients stagnate and usually do not seem to adopt performance-based 
models at later stages seems to be influenced by the fact that clients do not necessarily see 
their SEA service providing agencies as strategic partners.  
 
The findings have interesting implications on monitoring costs over time. Though 
information assymmetry reduces as the parties engage, monitoring costs still remain high due 
to the significance of perceived value. The explanatory capability of agency theory thus 
seems to reduce over time since the theory can only account for economic core value and not 
the principal’s perceived value, which is increasingly important for agencies to maintain 
long-term client relationships. As such, agencies may prefer models that allow for ample time 
to contribute towards managing the relationship, and an outcome-based contract is not 
necessarily going to provide monitoring cost efficiencies in terms of relationship 
management. The cliché of ‘results speak for themselves’ unfortunately does not seem to 
hold. 
 
Clients’ stagnation into using behaviour-based models could also be influenced by their 
relational intent. A client that is satisfied with its results, trusts its agency and expriences high 
perceived value is unlikely to want to compromise its results and good relationship. Thus it is 
unlikely to force a risk transfer change on its agency against its will. As such, the validity of 
the opportunistic behaviour and self-interest assumption of agency theory seems to diminish 
over time when the principal becomes increasingly aware of the importance of fairness. An 
act perceived to be done out of spite would most likely trigger the negative effects of 
reciprocity reducing agent motivation (Fehr & Falk, 2002) and potentially undermine the 
trust in the relationship (Cuevas-Rodrigues et al., 2012). This is especially likely if the 
agency’s negotiation response would be to counter offer a less risky but more flexible model 
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such as a time-bank model. In conclusion, a performance-based model will only be taken on 
further into the SEA advertising relationship if both parties view it as beneficial and fair.  
 
The findings indicate that though information assymmetry reduces as the parties engage, 
monitoring costs still remain high due to significance of perceived value. Moreover, though 
monitoring costs remain high, behaviour-based models persist. The explanatory capability of 
agency theory thus seems to reduce over time since the theory can only account for economic 
core value and not the principal’s perceived value, which is increasingly important in 
agencies maintaining long-term client relationships. This challenges the agency theory 
assumption of efficiency as the effectiveness criterion (Eisenhard, 1989a) when agencies that 
focus effort into non-core communicational activities to their client will be able to maintain 
clients for longer periods of time. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Summary of Main Findings 
This qualitative multiple case study based on interview data gathered from the agency side, 
investigated and described the various agency compensation models available for search 
engine advertising in the Finnish market. The objective of the study was to go beyond mere 
description and explain how and why compensation models are determined. The empirical 
findings revealed that compensation models used in search engine advertising are determined 
by agencies and clients prioritizing and balancing the trade-offs between what features are 
considered to be most important for a compensation model, since no single model was 
believed to encompass all desirable attributes (low risk, high revenue, fairness, transparency, 
simplicity, flexibility, scalability, and results signal). The importance of an individual feature 
is increased or decreased by a number or moderating and boundary factors that may already 
exist before the relationship is initiated, or emerge as the relationship progresses (historical 
trend, concern for agency reputation, agency growth mandate, externalities, client knowledge 
& experience, client preferences, client negotiating power, trust, agency experiential 
knowledge, competitive environment, time constraints, client goal type, budget constraints). 
Agency theory was generally found to offer satisfactory explanations for most of the 
discovered desirable and moderating factors of compensation schemes, though various 
additional complementing theories were necessary and valuable in explaining some 
completely deviating (e.g. scalability, historical trend) and generally aligning variables with 
considerably better accuracy. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that agency theory is a sound predictor of SEA 
compensation models in the beginning of the relationship mainly due to agency risk aversion 
appearing to be the most, and outcome measurability the second most, important factors 
affecting initial SEA advertising compensation scheme selection. This finding, together with 
the notion that clients are hesitant to compensate agencies for taking on their business risks, 
offers a brief explanation as to why performance-based compensation models still appear to 
be infrequently used, even though tracking technologies were acknowledged to have 
significantly improved. The predictive accuracy of agency theory was found to reduce as the 
relationship progressed since agency theory was not found to be able to accurately explain 
why certain moderating factors (e.g. trust, client knowledge and the need to signal and 
produce results) become more or less important as the relationship progresses. The agency 
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theory assumptions of risk neutrality and opportunistic behaviour thus diminish over the 
length of the relationship. In essence, agency theory could be used to argue that since the 
most important determining factor of compensation schemes is agent risk aversion, which 
does not change over time, agency theory provides a descent prediction that schemes will 
usually begin and remain as they are depending on whether the agent is generally risk averse 
or not. Though this explanation is largely valid, it would be considerably lacking in 
accurately depicting the whole complexity of the social context and the significant role of 
trust in the agency-client relationship. 
 
Explicit, non-theoretical, summary answers to the first two empirical research questions are 
provided in Appendix 4 for managerial readers wanting a brief, yet slightly more detailed 
overview.  
 
6.2 Theoretical Implications 
This study has several important contributions to examining agency compensation schemes 
from an agency theory perspective. Previous quantitative advertising compensation scheme 
studies from an agency theory lense have been silent on the relative importance of the agency 
theory taxonomy constructs initially developed by Eisenhardt (1989a). Moreover, as previous 
advertising agency specific studies have focused on client side data, these have not been able 
to assess agency side risk aversion. This study addresses these particular shortcomings and 
provides compeling evidence to suggest that the previously empirically forsaken contruct of 
agency risk aversion, interestingly, appears to be perhaps the most decisive theoretical 
proposition. This seems especially significant considering that there seemed to be largely two 
types of agencies (profit maximizing versus loss minimizing) and this had perhaps the most 
significant impact on the initially chosen compensation scheme, which then had the tendency 
to maintain throughout the relationship.  
 
In summary, whilst agency theory was found to be a sound predictor of some of the 
underlying features of initial SEA compensation schemes in the beginning of a client 
relationship, it was found to be unable to explain how certain features become more or less 
important as the relationship progresses and as trust builds up between parties over time. 
Overall, the empirical findings of this study suggest that agency theory is a good predictor of 
the final outcomes of compensation model negotiations for search engine advertising agency 
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relationships, yet the findings also provide empirical support for the notion that agency 
theory, alone, is not able to provide a full explanation for describing the nature of the full set 
of factors that drive the agency compensation model decision. Attempting to explain 
advertising agency compensation models decisions with agency theory alone might perhaps 
be likened to attempting to fit a square peg in a round hole: If you chisel the sharp edges off, 
the block will fit, yet half of the story will go missing. This study therefore echoes the 
previous conceptualizations of Hendry (2002) who suggests that when additional behavioural 
theory elements (namely trust and an assumption of agent honesty) are added to augment 
standard agency theory, these provide more accurate explanations of phenomena, yet these 
still yield similar results to what standard agency theory would predict. Moreover, this study 
suggests that much of the factors that affect compensation model decisions may also lie in the 
model negotiation process and the power and knowledge levels (awareness of available 
schemes and attribution models) of the participants. This further supports the notion that 
agency theory stands to benefit highly from the aid of other streams of literature. 
 
6.3 Managerial Implications 
6.3.1 Client-side Managerial Implications 
This study provides advertising clients a window for examining the types of compensation 
models currently used in SEA advertising in the Finnish market. Moreover, the model 
developed in this study provides a window for clients to see how agencies evaluate the 
important trade-offs to be made between the models as well as what implications these have. 
Heightened awareness of the nature of the models themselves as well as the tendency for 
agents to be the stronger influencer in model selection, can help clients decide for themselves 
whether it would be necessary for them to take a more active role in model negotiation. 
Appendix 5 provides a convenient one-page overview of the pros and cons of each 
compensation model from the perspective of both clients and agencies. 
 
Moreover, the study highlights some important aspects related to all compensation contracts 
that enable the client to maximize results, minimize risks and reduce the costs of monitoring 
the agency. These are for example the findings that a more knowledgeable and engaged client 
is typically believed to get more out of its agency regardless of what model is being used. 
Also, an important best-practice seemed to be that clients withhold ownership of their 
AdWords accounts. This reduces their exposure to adverse selection by keeping switching 
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costs low while maintaining access to the AdWords accounts makes it easier to check account 
activity levels to evaluate the occurrence of moral hazard.  
 
The findings suggest that SEA advertising contracts are fairly stagnant over time regardless 
of the selected model. Because adequate and perceptually fair compensation was found to 
have important motivational implications for agencies, clients seeking aggressive growth 
should consider either adopting models that easily accommodate for growth (time-bank 
model) or possibly consider renegotiating their contracts more frequently. In essence, though 
it is definitely not preferable to over compensate an agency, undercompensating an agency is 
likely to curb agency side growth efforts and should thus be avoided. 
 
The findings of the study and the accompanying model provide an explanation for why the 
majority of agencies are hesitant to accept performance-based compensation models. Client-
side managers can use the model to examine what the important trade-offs implications of 
wanting a performance-based model for their firm are, and help them evaluate whether such a 
model is desirable for their firm in the first-place. Managers wishing to pursue a 
performance-based compensation can use the model to assess whether they are willing to 
satisfy the additional requirements needed of moving towards these models (e.g. more time 
intensive, higher risk premium, and must minimize budget constraints). 
 
 
6.3.2 Agency-side Managerial Implications 
The model developed in the study provides an overview of the factors that the studied 
agencies need to examine while making compensation model decisions. As such, the model 
can be used by agencies to make more conscious and strategic compensation model decisions 
to account for the various different moderating factors that emerge, particularly during the 
course of the relationship (e.g. trust). This can be particularly useful for agencies where the 
people designing a client contract may not be the ones that manage the account itself as the 
model identifies how the importance of certain features may increase or decrease as the 
relationship continues. 
 
This study provides Finnish advertising agencies with an overview of the compensation 
models currently used in the Finnish market. The findings reveal that there is a general trend 
towards increased transparency and flexibility, favouring fixed fees and time-bank models for 
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agencies that are largely risk averse. Simultaneously, there is a new type of agency 
operational model based on automation entering the Finnish market. This operational model, 
focusing only on a narrow niche of ecommerce allows for a new type of compensation model, 
titled here as the new commission model to be used.  Finnish agencies are likely to be highly 
interested in this agency’s operational model and compensation scheme, as this outlier 
agency compromises on a number of the features that Finnish agencies conventionally value 
for the hopes of gaining higher revenues. This new emergent operational model and 
accompanying compensation model may pose future change pressures to the Finnish 
competitive landscape. 
 
6.4 Limitations of the Study 
The limitations of this study result from the way the study was designed. As noted before in 
the methodology section, the analytical generalizability of this study is contended to pertain 
to interorganizational contracts between two parties operating under a particular set of 
contextual attributes (i.e. Finnish market, search engine advertising, similar work content that 
is not highly creative). The study found that compensation model decisions are driven by a 
large number of interdependent variables. Considering this, the study cannot nor does it even 
attempt to claim that all possible determinant variables have been covered. Similarly, the 
study does not claim that all possible types of compensation schemes have been fully covered 
by the study and aknowledges that other models and variations may indeed exist and emerge 
as the industry develops. 
 
A significant boundary condition for the study also lies in its timing, sampling and data 
sources. The study was conducted as a cross-sectional study yet respondents were required to 
recall longer periods of time. Respondents described models and their usage to have evolved 
over the passed 6 years requiring them to think back significantly. Moreover, respondents 
were asked to not name any clients and speak on an aggregate, agency level only in order to 
ensure client confidentiality. As such, if the usage of a particular model was very infrequent 
at an agency, such as with most performance-based models, respondents’ discussion of the 
benefits and pitfalls of these models might have been based on only a relatively small number 
of client case experiences. In terms of sampling, though the agencies participating in this 
study were not meant to be any kind of representative sample, the agencies willing to 
participate in the study were coincidentally among the largest agencies in Finland. This 
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means that these agenices’ responses may have been, in principle, skewed towards 
challenging the agency theory assumptions of opportunistic behaviour and risk-utility curve 
linearity as these agencies’ strong reputations and client bases may make risk taking and 
opportunistic behaviour naturally less necessary for them compared to smaller challenger 
players in the market. Moreover, it can be assumed that only the agencies that perceive 
themselves to be generally honest and doing a ‘good and fair job’ for their clients would wish 
to discuss their client relationships and compensation models. This relative honesty as a 
starting point may potentially further skew the results away from agency theory opportunism. 
As such, the findings of this study may not accurately reflect the relative importance of the 
various decisionmaking variables for an agency that might aknowledge itself to be frequently 
and intentionally engaging in moral hazard. Consequently, a broader agency base may have 
yielded different results yet access to such for qualitative interviews was deemed 
unaatainable. The main theoretical finding that the explanatory power of agency theory 
diminishes over time is hinged on the contextual requirement that the moderating factor of 
trust is highly significant. As such, this finding may not hold its power in cases of client 
relationships that are more transactional in nature and the presence or expectation of trust 
does not mitigate opportunistic behaviour. 
 
The purpose of this study was to build and test a theoretical model for SEA compensation 
model determination. As such, the theories used to explain the findings were largely limited 
to the ones preidentified in the literature reviews. Consequently, it should be noted that 
alternative theoretical explanations beyond the ones identifies could provide further, even 
more accurate explanations of the phenomenon. Moreover, though the author has made 
significant efforts to mitigate personal bias due to a high degree of knowledge in SEA, some 
personal bias may still have subcosciously affected the analysis of the results.  
 
Finally, it is important to restate that this study does not, nor does it attempt to, answer the 
question of whether one compensation model is objectively better (more efficient, or 
produces better results) than another. The study has described the nature of the available 
compensation schemes and the emergent empirical compensation scheme determination 
model has explained the contextual factors that lead agencies to perceive one model to be 
more suitable than another. Thus the findings, in fact, support previously made claims that 
any compensation model can be equally viable as long as client’s and agency’s goals and 
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interests are aligned (ANA & AAAA, 2006), adding that these should reflect varying 
contextual circumstances.  
 
6.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
The study revealed that clients (principals) may have a less dominant role in the 
compensation model selection process than was previously believed. Thus future research 
should focus particularly on verifying and examining what could be the client side reasons for 
low participation in model selection. It is important to evaluate whether potential low 
participation might stem from clients making a conscious decision or due to being ill-
informed about the model options. The latter may have important implications for contract 
efficiency and appropriateness for meeting unique client needs as agencies could have a 
tendency to compromise individual client goals in favour of their own internal scalability and 
simplicity preferences. This would be particularly interesting to examine in the context of a 
client and an agency negotiating between two behavioural models (e.g. fixed-fee and a time-
bank) model where risk transfer is not an issue and agency opposition could merely be 
largely grounded in reduced scalability nd higher admin for the agency itself. Since time-
bank models are the growing trend, these cases could be increasingly frequent.  
 
This study examines compensation model determination from the perspective of agencies. 
Further studies on the topic of compensation models should consider repeating the study from 
the perspective of clients to seek further validation for the empirical model and following 
agency theory evaluation. Moreover, considering that a number of the studied agencies 
indicated a desire for growing their clients yet failed to do so (either due to compensation 
stagnancy or clients’ general lack of drive to reach a satisfactory outcome-based contract), 
further studies should focus back on client-side studies and investigate the roots of this 
stagnancy. This could help identify possible solutions for putting more Finnish advertisers 
back on a growth path. In light of the findings of this study, the author advocates that these 
studies either be conducted by an independent party, or then by a Google employee working 
in extremely close collaboration with the participating agencies as not undermine the trust in 
the agency-client relationship.  
 
The findings indicate that switching costs are an important consideration in agency client 
relationships even to the point where the longevity of the relationship is negatively related to 
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the need to produce and communicate outcomes to the client. As such, future studies could 
investigate the level of AdWords account ownership as well as account activity as predictors 
of client satisfaction in their agencies. Moreover, considering that the findings suggest that a 
higher level of knowledge enables a client to demand more, it could be interesting to 
investigate whether small advertising clients are even aware of the fact that they can indeed 
own their own AdWords accounts and easily monitor their agents’ actions through the change 
history function. This is an important consideration as heightened awareness of this 
opportunity could serve as a partial means for clients to help manage the moral hazard 
problem suggested by agency theory. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: Interview Guide 
 
1. Background information on the interviewee & agency 
 
2. Compensation models used 
2.1 What compensation models do you use and why? 
2.2 How can clients and agencies’ interests be aligned through contractual arrangements or 
other means? 
2.3 How often are contracts adapted to individual clients? 
2.4 How are contracts typically negotiated? 
2.5 How often are changes made to a contract over a client’s lifecyclee? Is/would this be 
necessary and why? 
2.6 How have compensation models changed over time? What kind of internal or external 
pressures might you have had? 
2.7 What are some of the most critical factors to a successful agency-client relationship and 
why? 
 
3. Performance-based compensation models (in more detail) 
3.1 Why do you (/do you not) use performance-based incentives with your clients?  
3.2 What are the challenges or barriers related to adopting such models? 
 
4. Themes overlooked  
4.1 What essential issues may I have missed or have not been covered in the discussion of 
this subject area? 
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Appendix 2: Model Desirable Feature Responses by Case Agency 
This summary table has been removed to preserve respondent anonymity. Readers may 
contact the author and requests to view this table will be handled on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Appendix 3: Summary of Model Specific Quotations  
Theese summary tables have been removed to preserve respondent anonymity. Readers may 
contact the author and requests to view the tables will be handled on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Appendix 4: Summary Answers to the Empirical Research Questions 
Q1: What compensation models are used for SEA services and why? Q2: How are models 
selected? 
 
Agency compensation models used in search engine advertising are determined by 
prioritizing and balancing the trade-offs between what features are considered to be most 
important for a compensation model, as no single model has been found to encompass all 
desirable attributes (low risk, high revenue, fairness, transparency, simplicity, flexibility, 
scalability and results signal). The importance of an individual feature is increased or 
decreased by a number or moderating and boundary factors that may be exist before the 
relationship is initiated or emerge as the relationship progresses (historical trend, concern for 
agency reputation, agency growth mandate, externalities, client knowledge & experience, 
client preferences, client negotiating power, trust, agency experiential knowledge, 
competitive environment, time constraints, client goal type, budget constraints). The study 
reveals that agencies have a key role in suggesting which compensation model is to be used 
in a particular client relationship. The found models and their implied prevalence are 
summarized in Table 6. 
 
The currently predominantly used compensation model in SEA services in the Finnish market 
is the fixed-fee model, which is based on specifically or broadly defined activities to be 
completed within a specified time. With the prevailing trend in compensation focusing on 
higher transparency there seems to be an increasing amount of time-bank compensation 
models being used for newly formed contracts. The popularity of these models seems to stem 
from the fact that in Table 8, these models score either a ‘high’ or a ‘medium’ in most 
features, with lows on the features that the majority of agencies value less (high revenue) or 
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which they know they can compensate for once the relationship progresses (trust and 
delivering results reduces the need to signal results through the compensation model itself).  
The following is a summary of the factors that have led to fixed fees being the dominant 
model and time-bank fees gaining more momentum as described through the variables 
discovered through the course of the study: 
1. Agencies are generally highly risk averse. As agencies have a significant role in 
model selection they will suggest models that they believe will reduce their own risks. 
The reduction of risk is allowed by prevalent market conditions where few 
competitors are suggested (or found during this study) to be willing to assume more 
risk and offer performance-based models. 
2. The time-based models of fixed-fees and time-bank are relatively simple, allowing for 
clients to easily understand the models and thus they pose minimum psychological 
barriers during the sales process.  
3. Most of the studied agencies are in a relational mode and their objective is to build 
long-term trusted partnerships with their clients. Trust is viewed as extremely 
important as it is regarded as an antecedent for growth as only a client that trusts its 
agency is willing to expand its advertising, and fee with the agency. Thus in their 
initial compensation model selection decision, agencies emphasise fairness in order to 
foster the emergence of a climate of trust and also flexibility so that they can easily 
capitalize on that emergent trust and accommodate for desired future growth. Both of 
these are sufficiently provided for by the fixed-fee and time-bank models.  
4. Agency’s value scalability across their portfolio of client and the fixed-fees & time 
bank fees are largely scalable across all kinds of clients with varying business goals 
and attribution models. 
 
Q3: Why (or why not) are performance-based compensation models used for SEA services?  
 
Results based models were found to be scarcely used for compensating Finnish SEA services. 
The reasons for performance-based models’ unpopularity among the majority of agencies is 
evident from Table 8, which summarizes how these models (performance bonus & CPA) 
compromise agencies desirable attributes scoring either a ‘low’ or a ‘medium’ on most 
desirable attributes. Thus these models are initially preferred by agencies only when they 
value high revenue and signal the ability to deliver results. Based on the study, this is not 
often the case and almost never occurs in the beginning of a relationship. The following 
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summarizes the reasons for the infrequent use of the results-based compensation model based 
on this study: 
 
1. The majority of agencies are risk averse and prefer to minimize losses as opposed to 
maximize gains. Only a few agencies were found willing to assume more and usually 
only as the relationship progressed when environmental uncertainty was perceived to 
have decreased. The competitive environment does indeed pressure agencies to 
provide competitive prices but not to take on client’s business risks through 
performance-based models. Thus the motivation for taking on a performance-based 
model has to be more or less agency driven – which is usually not the case. As 
agencies were found to largely dictate the compensation model selection decision, 
unless a client specifically asks for performance-based elements to be introduced at a 
later stage, this will rarely happen because it is preferable for an agency to attempt to 
negotiate a higher fee for the (existing) low risk compensation model. 
2. Clients are argued to be largely unwilling to provide agencies with a higher reward for 
taking on more risk thus making performance based models seemingly unfair and 
unacceptable to agencies. 
3. Time seems to be the most significant constraint for performance-based model use 
because these models require significant time input from both the client and agency to 
create a model, and select and agree upon KPIs. Agencies indicate that clients are 
unwilling to invest the required amount of time to create mutually beneficial 
performance-based compensation models. 
5. Measurability is the antecedent for performance-based compensation models where 
clients and agencies struggle to achieve measurability due to clients not having 
meaningful (monetary) goals. There is also a general difficulty of establishing and 
maintaining mutually agreed upon KPIs partly due to the above time constraint. 
Agencies’ effect on outcomes may also vary with the use of multiple agencies and 
sudden tracking system failures.  
6. Clients prefer simple and transparent contracts. Including performance-based 
elements is perceived to unnecessarily increase contract complexity, which is deemed 
to be a barrier to sales. Moreover, transparency is an issue particularly in the 
beginning of the relationship when there is little trust between the parties where the 
agency is usually the more knowledgeable party that creates the measurement system. 
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The absence of trust in the beginning of the relationship makes performance-based 
models seem unviable at the time. 
4. Performance-based models involve locking down KPIs for results measurement thus 
making the models inflexible or then time consuming to renegotiate: Set KPIs will 
require fixation on either optimizing for efficiency or volume and this focus may need 
to shift. Moreover, should trust emerge in the relationship to enable more growth, the 
agency is not able to quickly and easily adjust for new goals, various media and 
increased workload.  
5. Compensation models do not seem to be taking on more performance-based elements 
over time because the build-up of trust in the relationship leads to the need of more 
flexibility for the agency to grow the client (work content, workload, and multiple 
client goals). Simultaneously there is less need for the agency to signal its ability to 
deliver results when the client has experiential knowledge on the agency. If the client 
experiences high perceived value and trust, it will provide the agency with more 
work, which is more easily accommodated by other models. If the client believes it is 
getting generally good value, it will continue the relationship and contract but may not 
be willing to invest more time into the relationship. In this case, the contract is likely 
to stagnate in its current form.  If, however, the client’s expectations have not been 
met and there is no trust in the relationship, the client is unlikely to want to pay a 
higher premium for risk transfer and invest more time and resources into the agency, - 
requirements for moving towards a performance-based model. Contract termination is 
also an easy option when switching costs are low due to relatively short contract terms 
and the clients typically owning the AdWords account itself. 
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Appendix 5: Summary of Compensation Model Pros & Cons – Principal & Agent Perspectives 
SEA Compensation Model Principal / Advertising Client Agent / Agency 
 + - + - 
Traditional commission  
Agency compensated based on 
percentage of media 
expenditures. 
• Simple, & flexible. 
• Agency incentivized to grow 
account. 
 
• Fee to agency scales too quickly up or down 
with small budgets and thus does not necessarily 
reflect agency workload > Agency might 
become under or over compensated in relation 
to actual workload. 
• Agency incentivized to grow media expenditure 
but it does not (necessarily) bear any risks. 
• Agency not incentivized to give media neutral 
advice. 
• No immediate responsibility over results though 
relationship unlikely to continue if unprofitable. 
• Intransparent of what activities are included in 
the contract. 
• Low risk. 
• Easy to calculate. 
• Can be highly profitable for the 
agency, if budgets are high. 
• Agency has up-side potential. 
• Risky when fee to agency scales too 
quickly up or down with small budgets 
and does not necessarily reflect agency 
workload > Unfair if agency 
undercompensated in relation to actual 
workload. 
• Sometimes requires agency to return 
part of fee for the sake of fairness. 
 
Tiered Commission  
Same as Traditional 
Commission but the rate 
varies based on media spend. 
• Simple, & flexible (but 
slightly less than above) 
 
• Slightly more fair than above. • Slightly more complex to 
calculate but still relatively easy.  
• Slightly more fair than above. 
Fixed fees 
Fixed monthly fee with the 
scope and content of activities 
more or less defined. Agency 
will typically have an hourly 
time calculation that they may 
or may not discuss with the 
client. 
• Simple to understand. 
• Makes budgeting for agency 
remuneration easy. 
• More or less transparent of 
what is included in contract.  
• Incentivizes risk averse 
agency to test new features  
(/does not disincentivize this) 
• Agent can give media neutral 
advice.  
• If fixed fee is set too low, agency is not 
incentivized to work on account as much as it 
would need. (Accepting the lowest bid offer 
might not necessarily be a good idea especially 
if the agency is not highly reputable). 
• High risk of moral hazard i.e. agency does not 
put in stated effort since increased effort will 
not affect fee (risk may be exacerbated if client 
does not have access to AdWords account). 
• Risk that agency only wants to upsell to a higher 
fee without taking responsibility for results.  
• Risk of stagnancy: Agency does not bear any 
risk so they are not incentivized to challenge 
client in a rapidly changing digital environment. 
• Low risk. 
• Scales easily across all client 
types, sizes and business goals. 
• Simple to communicate to 
clients. 
• Easy for agency to predict 
internal profitability and bill in 
advance. 
• One contract can be used to cover 
all digital services. 
• Sets the scene for long-term 
account development. 
• Gives freedom to test new 
features without too much risk. 
• If fixed fee is evaluated too low, 
agency profitability is strained. 
• If scope of work changes too quickly 
between review periods, agency 
profitability is stained. 
• Clients may unrealistically assume 
their contracts are all-inclusive and 
demand more than the agency can 
reasonably offer. 
• Agency up-side potential is locked for 
longer periods of time. 
Time bank 
Agency specifies a minimum 
and maximum number of 
hours that they will or can 
work and the eventual total 
will be adjusted based on 
actualized hours. 
• Highly fair when adjusts to 
workload. 
• Very clear what is included in 
the contract. 
• Simple to understand. 
• Flexible to work content. 
• Dishonest agency can misreport its working 
hours. 
• Low risk. 
• Highly fair when adjusts to 
workload. 
• Relatively simple to understand. 
• Flexible to work content. 
• Agency can get too stuck in a working 
hour as opposed to a results 
conversation with the client.  
• Up-side revenue potential is descent, 
but agency will not get awarded for 
particularly high performance. 
• Time bank profitability calculations 
can increase internal complexity. 
Performance Bonus 
A portion of the fee received 
by the agency is made 
dependent on outcomes that 
are locked to selected KPIs. 
The basis of the remuneration 
is a Fixed-fee or Time-bank 
contract.) 
• Incentivize agency be a bit 
more accountable and focuses 
effort on producing results. 
• Risk transfer can be expensive. 
• Performance bonus levels are difficult to take 
into account in budgeting > sudden bonus 
payout risk.  
• Time consuming to negotiate. 
 
• Provides some incentive and 
shows agency commitment while 
overall risk levels remain 
moderate.  
 
• Risky. 
• Time consuming to ensure these 
models are fair for both parties. 
• May be introduced as an alternative to 
a higher fixed fee thus requiring agency 
to assume risk instead of get risk free 
higher fee. 
CPA 
Agency covers the media 
expenditures and is then 
compensated based on a fixed 
fee per conversion. 
• Risks transferred to agency.  
• Agency focused to produce 
results. 
• Agency that seeks higher own 
profits is incentivized to 
challenge client on existing 
practices. 
• Risk transfer can be expensive. 
• Client must maintain the ‘big picture’ of their 
business because agency effort is focused on 
KPI delivery. 
• Agency not incentivized to take any risk and 
test new features. 
• Inflexible: Client must choose result KPIs to 
focus on either efficiency or volume. Both 
cannot be optimized simultaneously. Time 
consuming to renegotiate, if focus shifts. 
• Demonstrates agency 
commitment to results. 
• Agency rewarded for good 
performance. 
• If client budget is uncapped, 
agency upside potential is high.  
• Very time consuming to set up these 
models to be fair for both parties. 
• Agency needs to bear a lot of client’s 
business risks. 
• Locks the agency in to deliver on 
certain KPIs and potentially ignore 
other important business aspects. 
• Inflexible: Risk of agency mindlessly 
delivering on either efficiency of 
volume goals, whichever the KPIs have 
been set on.  
• Client’s that have budget constrains 
might limit agency profit potential 
making risk bearing unfair. 
New Commission 
Percentage commission based 
on realized media 
expenditures. Return on 
investment must be 
continually maintained at a 
predefined level or agent can 
be dismissed at any time. 
• Agency incentivized to focus 
on delivering profitability 
goals. 
• Promise of higher results 
generally demonstrates agency 
commitment to results. 
• Results are predefined and it is 
relatively easy to evaluate 
whether goals have been met. 
• Relatively simple to calculate. 
 
• Risk transfer can be expensive. 
• Not suitable for non-monetary business goals, 
highly inflexible and ignores all branding goals. 
• Workload has not been defined: Risk that 
agency allocates its time and resources to those 
clients or tasks where it believes the largest 
revenue impact will be made (low growth 
potential client expected to receive less 
attention). 
• Efficient application requires having and 
providing profitability data. 
• Can become expensive, if agency produces 
above expected results (what a shame…) 
• Agency remuneration levels are difficult to take 
into account in budgeting. 
• Demonstrates agency 
commitment to results. 
• High revenue potential. 
• No predefined workload or tasks 
enables agency to freely focus 
effort on the aspects that will 
make the highest impact. 
• Agency needs to bear a lot of client’s 
business risks. 
• Client’s that have budget constrains 
might limit agency profit potential 
making risk bearing unfair. 
 
 
